Concept
Origins and Core Rule
Intentional interference with an existing contract
Interference With Existing Contracts
Origins and Core Rule
Contract law binds only the parties to a contract, so a party injured by a breach has no contract claim against a stranger who caused it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 fills that gap with a tort: one who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person, by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform, is liable to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting from the third person’s failure to perform.1
The tort has been described as a restriction against double-dealing. It protects contracts for labor by keeping others from acquiring that labor for themselves once they know it has been committed to another.2 Knowledge is therefore a precondition: the plaintiff may maintain the action only against one who knows the contract exists.3
The tort began with a dispute over a performer’s services. Lumley had a binding contract under which Wagner, a professional performer, was to perform for him exclusively for a period of time.4 When Wagner tried to forsake Lumley for a competing impresario, Gye, Lumley could have sued her for breach. Instead he sued Gye, who was a stranger to the contract and not liable under contract law.5 That suit, Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853), established the modern tort of intentional interference with contract.6
A majority of the court allowed the claim by extending an older remedy, the action per quod servitium amisit, which compensated an employer for the loss of an ordinary servant’s services. The majority applied it to an independent professional “artiste,” and to a performer who had made a binding contract with the plaintiff but had not yet entered his service. The result was a remedy for persuading someone to break a commitment to provide personal services exclusively to the plaintiff for a period of time.7
The reasoning did not stay confined to performers. Its rationale was that knowingly violating a person’s legal rights is actionable unless justified, and that interfering with rights under a contract violates those rights.8 The action therefore reached beyond personal services contracts, and the plaintiff could obtain an injunction as well as damages. Knowingly procuring the breach was enough: the plaintiff did not have to show that the defendant acted maliciously or meant to cause the plaintiff loss.9
Modern courts ask more of the plaintiff than Lumley did. Under the older rule, the burden fell on the defendant to justify the interference. Most courts now require the plaintiff to show improper purpose or improper means in order to make a prima facie case.10 The usual statement of the claim likewise lists interference “with improper motive or by improper means” among the elements.11 A few courts, it appears, still require the defendant to prove justification, particularly when the claim concerns an actual existing contract and not merely economic relations.12 Section 766’s word “improperly” carries this requirement, and a later section develops it.
Beyond impropriety, courts say in essence that the plaintiff must prove an enforceable contract with another, the defendant’s knowledge of it, the defendant’s intentional interference with the contract of specific persons, breach caused by the interference, and resulting damage to the plaintiff.13 Section 766 measures recovery by pecuniary loss, though courts frame the last element more broadly, to include unjust enrichment of the defendant or the prospect of injury that warrants an injunction.14 The next section takes these elements one at a time. One of them, inducement, needs a closer look here because it marks the boundary of the tort.
Inducement takes several forms. A defendant may offer the contracting party benefits for not performing, such as employment, sales, investment, or better terms for a transaction. A defendant may threaten negative consequences if the party performs, such as the loss of a transaction or of business relations with the defendant. A defendant may also simply persuade the party that the contract should not be performed or continued.15 In every form, though, the tort requires active inducement or persuasion. A defendant who merely makes an agreement with a party, knowing that the party will break a contract with the plaintiff, is not liable.16
Courts restate the rule in their own words. In Winternitz v. Summit Hills Joint Venture, a Maryland court described the tort in language it had used before: “a third party who, without legal justification, intentionally interferes with the right of a party to a contract, or induces a breach thereof, is liable in tort to the injured contracting party.” The court said this description is not substantially different from Restatement (Second) §§ 766 and 767, and it singled out §§ 766A and 767 as particularly instructive.18 Other decisions, such as Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., apply the same tort in their own formulations.
Section 766A reaches a different kind of interference. One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract between another and a third person, by preventing the other from performing it or by making the other’s performance more expensive or burdensome, is liable for the resulting pecuniary loss.19 Section 766 targets a defendant who works on the third party; § 766A targets one who works on the plaintiff’s own performance. A later section takes up that variant.
Courts take similar approaches to interference with business relations, but liability there is more restricted, so those claims call for separate treatment.20