Concept
Competition as Justification
Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
Competition as Justification
Competition is where the improper-interference requirement does its hardest work. Section 766B imposes liability only for interference that is both intentional and improper, and a rival who wins a customer usually satisfies everything else: it knew of the plaintiff's prospect, wanted the business, and took it.1 The plaintiff may have lost real money, so the claim turns on a single question: was the way the rival won improper?
The first Restatement answered that question too loosely. Section 766 required neither improper motive nor improper means; once the plaintiff proved intentional interference, it had made a prima facie case.2 That burden amounted to no more than the defendant's conscious act and the plaintiff's economic injury, so critics warned that ordinary business rivalry could draw expensive lawsuits over conduct the commercial world regarded as commonplace and appropriate. Read literally, the black-letter rules might even suggest to foreign lawyers that the whole competitive order of American industry is prima facie illegal.3
Courts repaired the problem by demanding wrongfulness beyond the interference itself. In Top Service, the court held that a claim of interference with economic relations is made out only when the interference is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference. Liability may arise from improper motives or improper means, which may be wrongful by reason of a statute or other regulation, a recognized rule of common law, or an established standard of a trade or profession.4 Privilege then becomes a secondary question, because none arises unless the interference would be wrongful but for the privilege.5 Competition supplies the clearest example of conduct that intentionally diverts a prospect and is still not wrongful.
The Second Restatement recasts the same idea as a competition privilege, a justification that excuses interference that would otherwise be improper. Under § 768(1), competition is not an improper basis for interfering with a prospective relation when three conditions hold. The relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the other. The actor uses no wrongful means and creates no unlawful restraint of trade. And the actor's purpose is at least in part to advance its own interest in competing with the other.6 Wrongful means signifies conduct that is unlawful, threats of unlawful conduct, and unlawful restraint of trade.7 Each condition asks whether the defendant is doing what competition is meant to reward: offering the customer a bargain the customer can judge.
A knowing falsehood costs the rival that protection. A defendant who knows that what it says is false is liable whether or not it has an ill motive and whether or not it intends to affect the plaintiff at all.8 Suppose the rival printer tells the firm that an independent laboratory found the plaintiff's work defective, and no laboratory ever tested it. A discount lets the customer judge the bargain, so the customer's choice still reflects the merits of the offer. A fabricated finding takes the merits out of the choice, and the diversion no longer deserves the protection that competition earns.
Purpose is the second place competition can lose its protection, though the test forgives more. Liability follows when the defendant acts out of spite and a desire to do harm for its own sake.9 Where the defendant's conduct is directed at least in part to advancing its competitive position, however, hatred or a wish for revenge does not alone make the interference improper; only conduct directed solely to the satisfaction of spite, and not at all to competitive advantage, is improper.10 That is why the rival owner's dislike of the plaintiff changes nothing in the printer hypothetical. Some jurisdictions have gone further and dropped purpose as a basis for liability. In Eldridge v. Johndrow, Utah overruled Leigh Furniture to the extent it allowed liability to rest on improper purpose, and plaintiffs there must prove improper means.11
The privilege stops at the edge of an existing contract, because the law protects existing contracts more than prospects. Greater protection goes to an interest in an existing contract, where respect for contract rights outweighs the public benefit of unfettered competition, than to a prospective relationship, where liability attaches only on proof of more culpable conduct by the interferer.12 Intentionally inducing or causing the breach of an existing contract is, in the California Supreme Court's words, a wrong in and of itself.13 Section 768(2) accordingly withholds the privilege from inducing the breach of an existing contract that is not terminable at will, because such a contract involves established interests that competition alone cannot justify disturbing.14
A contract terminable at will sits between the two poles. Its holder has an interest in future relations but no legal assurance of them, so interference with it resembles interference with a prospect, and a competitor's interference may be not improper.15
Some authority tightens the rule further when the defendant is a competitor. Proof of legally wrongful means may be required in an action against a competitor of the plaintiff, while the 'improper means' standard continues to govern actions against non-competitors.16
A truthful offer of better terms shows where the limit falls. Section 772(a) of the Second Restatement and § 20(a) of the Third protect truthful information, yet the Second Restatement suggests that an offer of better terms, even if truthful, is impermissible when the target is an existing contract. Applied to Lumley v. Gye, that suggests Gye's statement to Wagner, 'I will pay you twice what Lumley is paying you,' is not rescued by being true, although the commentary itself calls the point puzzling.17