Concept
The Improper Interference Requirement
Improper interference: § 767 factors and privileges
Improper Interference and Privileges
The Improper Interference Requirement
Interference with another’s contract becomes a tort only when it is both intentional and improper. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 makes one who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract between another and a third person, by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform, liable to the other for the resulting pecuniary loss.1 One court called the adverb “improperly” the keystone of that statement.2 Section 767 tells a court how to apply the keystone. When an actor intentionally interferes with a contract or a prospective contractual relation (a business relationship that has not yet become a contract), the court gives consideration to seven factors in deciding whether the interference is improper.3 The sections below take up those factors one at a time.
Intent is the easier of the two requirements to satisfy. An interference is intentional when the actor desires to bring it about or knows that it is substantially certain to result from the actor’s conduct.4 An actor who proceeds with that certainty has chosen the result as surely as one who aims at it. Direct admissions are rare, so the element, essentially a factual one, may be proved by circumstantial evidence.5 The actor must also know of the contract, or know facts that lead the actor to inquire whether one exists.6 Even then, notice of the relationship is necessary but may not be sufficient, because the interference must also be improper.7
Because knowledge suffices, intent screens out very little. Knowing interference with another’s prospects of income is extremely common in ordinary business, property, and employment transactions, and it creates no liability without impropriety in the defendant’s conduct.8 Impropriety therefore does the real screening. In Westfield Development Co. v. Rifle Investment Associates, the court noted that the district court had not weighed the § 767 factors and had made no finding that the interference by Westfield or the other petitioners was improper. Intent could not fill that gap, because even intentional interference creates no liability unless the court concludes that the actor’s conduct is also improper.9 Liability for inducement thus stands on a different footing from liability for ordinary physical damage to person and property.10 Courts limit tort recovery in contractual settings through other doctrines as well: under the economic loss rule, for example, the landowner in Corporex could not recover against a subcontractor for defective performance.11
In Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, the same analysis ended the other way. The court concluded that departing associates had improperly interfered with their former firm’s client contracts.12 It stressed that they had violated a provision of the state Code of Professional Responsibility barring self-recommendation, that they had taken advantage of confidential information and client trust acquired while working for the firm, and that they had “unduly suggested a course of action” to the clients, to the firm’s prejudice.13 Analyzing the facts under § 767, the court held that contacting clients whose cases the firm was actively handling unduly suggested a course of action to them and unfairly prejudiced the firm, so the contact was improper.14 Set beside the lawn-care bid, the case shows that the line falls at the conduct, not at the awareness of harm. The bidder offered an honest price. The associates, on the court’s account, broke a professional rule and used confidences and client trust.
The requirement has an old lineage and a changing doctrinal form. The tort’s foundation is the ancient action of a master for the loss of a servant’s services, the action per quod servitium amisit, a legal consequence of the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century. Surviving laborers could demand high wages, and they left their masters when better pay and conditions could be had elsewhere.15 The traditional formulation of the Lumley v. Gye tort asks whether the defendant intentionally induced or procured breach of a contract between the plaintiff and another person, causing the breach and pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, and it allows a defense of justification or privilege in some circumstances.16 The first Restatement carried a prima facie tort requirement, which treats conduct as tortious on its face unless it is justified. After criticism, the American Law Institute discarded that requirement. Its new provision, § 766B, required that the defendant’s conduct be “improper” and adopted a multifactor balancing approach, with seven factors for the trier of fact to weigh in determining liability.17
The drafters chose “improperly” over the phrase “without justification,” which appeared frequently in judicial decisions and gave rise to questions of burden of proof.18 The new word has no fixed definition: its meaning is inconstant and mutable, and it draws its substance from the circumstances of the situation at hand.19 Comment b to § 767 puts the question as whether, upon a consideration of the relative significance of the factors involved, the conduct should be permitted without liability despite its harm to another, and it adds that the decision “depends upon a judgment and choice of values in each situation.”20 The listed factors therefore work as considerations to be weighed, not as a checklist of elements.21 The fifth factor shows that the weighing protects interests on both sides, since it counts the social interests in protecting the actor’s freedom of action together with the contractual interests of the other.22 Conduct that is routine in one setting may be improper in another, as the contrast between the lawn-care bid and the associates’ solicitation shows, and a standard whose content comes from the circumstances is built to draw that line.