Concept
Burden of Proof
Improper interference: § 767 factors and privileges
Burden of Proof
Who must prove that an intentional interference was improper? The Second Restatement lists seven factors for answering that question, but its lead-in says only that “consideration is given” to them and does not assign the burden.1 The silence matters. Improperness, or equivalently the absence of justification, is the crucial element of most intentional interference claims, and the party who carries the burden on it bears the risk of an inconclusive record.2
The traditional tort put justification on the defendant’s side of the ledger. Under the Lumley v. Gye formulation, the plaintiff proved intentional inducement of a breach that caused pecuniary loss, and the defendant could then invoke justification or privilege in some circumstances.3 One line of authority turned that structure into a pleading rule. The plaintiff pleads and proves the defendant’s culpable intent, while justification is the defendant’s affirmative defense, and improper motive is a factor in that defense rather than an element of the plaintiff’s case.4
The Second Restatement reframed the inquiry. Acknowledging criticism, the American Law Institute discarded the first Restatement’s prima facie tort requirement; its new section 766B required that the defendant’s conduct be “improper” and directed the trier of fact to balance seven factors.5 The reframing did not settle who carries the burden. At least under the Second Restatement, interference with an existing contract and interference with a prospective contract differ on whether the plaintiff or the defendant must prove that the interference was improper, so the first step in any problem is to identify which tort the plaintiff has pleaded.6
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. shows the plaintiff-burden rule at work. Toyota inserted a “no export” clause into its dealership agreements, barring dealers from selling Lexus automobiles for resale or use outside the United States, and it compiled an “offender’s list” of suspected exporters, warning dealers that doing business with them would bring sanctions.7 The California Supreme Court approved requiring the plaintiff to show wrongfulness as part of its own case. It reasoned that the requirement redresses the balance between a remedy for predatory economic behavior and keeping legitimate business competition outside litigative bounds. It went no further. Whether the plaintiff must prove an independently tortious act, a species of anticompetitive behavior proscribed by positive law, or unalloyed malice, the court left for another day.8
Della Penna is not alone. Over the past decade or so, close to a majority of the high courts of American jurisdictions have approved a rule that requires the plaintiff in an economic relations suit to plead and prove that the interference was “wrongful,” “improper,” “illegal,” “independently tortious,” or some variant of those words.9 Those courts have imported variations on the Top Service line of reasoning, which carries a corollary for privilege: a privilege becomes an issue only if the acts charged would be tortious on the part of an unprivileged defendant.10 Privilege, in other words, no longer decides whether the interference was improper. It excuses interference already shown to be wrongful.11
Courts do not apply the plaintiff-burden rule uniformly. Some still hold that justification is an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion. The factors relevant to that defense include the nature of the defendant’s conduct, the interests it was advancing, its motives, the relationship between the defendant and the employee, and the balance between societal interests in the defendant’s freedom of action and the employee’s contractual interests.12 Because “improper” and “without justification” are two ways of stating one element, the label an opinion uses tells you less than the question of who must come forward with evidence of impropriety. In Hatten v. Union Oil Co. of California, Inc., Union offered evidence that it was concerned about Hatten’s safety record. Hatten answered with evidence that a Union superintendent held a personal grudge against him. That support for a finding of ill will was enough to create a jury question on Union’s justification defense.13