Concept
The Section 766C Rule
Negligent interference with contract or prospective relations
Negligent Interference With Contract
The Section 766C Rule
Section 766C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts says that carelessness alone does not make a defendant liable for financial loss caused by interference with someone else's contract. The section denies liability for pecuniary harm, meaning financial loss, “not deriving from physical harm to the other,” when that harm results from the actor's negligently doing any of three things:1
- causing a third person not to perform a contract with the plaintiff (clause (a));2
- interfering with the plaintiff's performance of its own contract, or making that performance more expensive or burdensome (clause (b)); or3
- interfering with the plaintiff's acquiring a contractual relation with a third person (clause (c)).4
All three clauses describe the same kind of injury: lost profits, lost deals, or higher costs that stand alone, with no bodily injury or damage to the plaintiff's property behind them. That is pure economic loss, and § 766C is a pure-economic-loss rule. The section's own wording marks its edge. A defendant who physically beats the plaintiff, for example, answers for the resulting economic losses as consequential damages of the battery, because that harm derives from physical harm to the plaintiff.5 Later sections of this chapter take up the other situations in which negligently caused economic loss can be recovered.
Section 766C is the negligence counterpart to two intentional torts. A defendant who intentionally interferes with the plaintiff's performance (§ 766A) or with the plaintiff's prospective contractual relations (§ 766B) may owe compensation, but a defendant whose carelessness caused the same pecuniary loss does not (§ 766C).6 The Restatement adopted this approach from the Supreme Court's decision in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, which the next subsection takes up.7 In general, negligent interference with contract is not actionable.8 Every problem under § 766C therefore begins with one question: did the defendant act intentionally, or only carelessly? Only the careless defendant belongs to this section.
Causing a Third Party Not to Perform
Clause (a) denies recovery when the defendant's negligence causes “a third person not to perform a contract with the other.”9 The clause involves three parties. The defendant carelessly harms a third person, the third person consequently cannot perform a contract it owes the plaintiff, and the plaintiff loses the benefit of that deal. Nothing physical has happened to the plaintiff or its property, so the whole injury is financial and reaches the plaintiff only through the third person's inability to perform. Under clause (a), the plaintiff has no tort claim against the careless defendant.
Robins supplies the pattern. A steamship charterer sought lost profits attributable to delay after the defendant negligently broke a vessel's propeller. The charterer had a contract with the ship's owners but no property interest in the ship itself. The Court denied recovery of the losses attributable to the delay, reasoning that “[t]he law does not spread its protection so far.”10
The charterer's status explains the result. A time charter is not a lease of the vessel: the owner provides the personnel who operate the boat, and the charterer merely establishes the ports of call. The charterer therefore cannot be treated as the owner of the vessel for the term. It holds a right to receive the owner's services, including use of the boat, and that right is a contract right, not a property right.11 The damaged propeller belonged to the owner, so the charterer's loss sat one step removed from the physical harm.
The rule takes this shape because the charterer's loss is derivative. The defendant's duty of care ran to the owner whose vessel it damaged, and the charterer's loss exists only because the charterer had contracted with that owner. A duty owed to a third person does not by itself establish a duty to protect the plaintiff against economic harm, so breach of the owner's duty gives the charterer nothing to stand on.12 The bar is also a bright line, which means that showing the delay was foreseeable does not reopen the claim. Its purpose is to prevent boundless liability. One careless act that disables a ship could disappoint every charterer and supplier tied to the ship by contract. If each could sue, the defendant's exposure would depend on how many contracts the owner had signed, a number the defendant cannot know and did nothing to create.13
The supplier version has the same structure. In Byrd v. English, the defendant negligently damaged a utility's electrical conduits, and the owner of a printing plant that depended on the power they carried could not recover its lost profits.14 The harm fell on the utility's property, the utility could no longer deliver power, and the plant's loss flowed through the utility's failure to perform, just as the charterer's loss flowed through the shipowner's. Section 766C states the same rule of nonrecovery for purely economic losses absent physical harm.15 Robins and Byrd thus show the two common forms of clause (a): the third person is a service provider whose vessel is disabled, or a supplier whose line is cut.
Section 766C closes the tort route and leaves contract rights alone. The charterer still holds its contract rights against its own promisor, the shipowner. And a plaintiff who is a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the defendant and the injured third person may be able to recover under that contract if the defendant's performance breached it, even though tort recovery is barred.16 The useful question is which path the facts open. A plaintiff with a contractual route to the defendant sues in contract, and a plaintiff whose only link to the defendant is the harmed third person has no claim for the careless act.
Intent changes the result. The Restatement allows compensation when a defendant intentionally interferes with the performance of a contract (§ 766A), and it denies compensation for the same loss when carelessness caused it.17 The hypothetical shows the contrast.
The loss is the same in both scenes, so the defendant's state of mind separates them. A later section of this chapter takes up what intent and impropriety require.
Burdening the Plaintiff's Performance
Clause (b) shifts from the third party to the plaintiff's own performance. It denies recovery for loss that results from the actor's negligently “interfering with the other's performance of his contract or making the performance more expensive or burdensome.”19 The plaintiff can still do the work, but the defendant's carelessness has delayed it, rerouted it, or made it cost more. Because the plaintiff's body and property are untouched, the injury consists only of added expense or lost time, and that pecuniary harm will not support a negligence claim.
The closed street is the usual illustration. A business that loses customers because a defendant's negligence closed the street in front of it has suffered exactly this kind of harm: its premises are intact, and the only change is that doing business there has become harder. In 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., building collapses in Manhattan closed the surrounding streets, and the businesses those streets served lost money without suffering any physical harm. The New York Court of Appeals rejected recovery. It acknowledged that a building owner owes duties to those with whom it has a special relationship, but it held that the vast number of claims an urban disaster could generate put stand-alone economic loss outside the scope of the owner's duty.20 The same reasoning reached a contractor in Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., whose work was delayed because of pollution; the court denied its purely economic loss.21
These results share a mechanism. A collapse physically harms the people and property within its reach, but its economic ripple spreads to every business, supplier, and commuter that used the street. If each could sue, the defendant's liability would depend on how many strangers happened to rely on that street, a number the defendant could neither know when it acted nor limit. The bar on stand-alone economic loss cuts off that exposure, as it does under clause (a). It is a bright-line limit on potentially boundless liability, and foreseeable harm to the plaintiff does not lift it.22
A plaintiff whose own land is cut off stands differently from one whose customers are merely diverted. Diverting traffic leaves a business's property rights intact. Denying an owner access to the owner's land invades a property right, and liability to an abutting owner is then appropriate, as a Massachusetts court held in Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher.23 Once the claim rests on a property right, the economic-loss limit no longer caps the damages. When a defendant physically blocks the plaintiff's use of property and delays completion of a contract, trespass or nuisance is ordinarily available, and the recoverable damages can include the costs of the disrupted contract.24 In Little v. Chesser, for example, damages for interference with a road easement included the plaintiff's cost of paying workers whose work was disrupted.25
Ortega and Pell may have lost identical sums. The difference lies in what the obstruction did to each plaintiff's land.
Intent changes the analysis here as well. A defendant may interfere with a plaintiff's contract by offering a better deal to the plaintiff's promisor or by using its economic power to make the plaintiff's deal costly, and where no physical tort is involved, that conduct falls under the pure economic tort of interference with contract.26 The Restatement allows compensation when the interference with performance is intentional.27 In Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer District, the defendant physically blocked the plaintiff's road and thereby interfered with the plaintiff's contracts or prospects. The court held the blockage actionable as vigilante activity, which is deliberate conduct rather than carelessness.28 Even intentional interference must still be improper, a requirement a later section takes up.29 Clause (b) removes only the negligent version.
Blocking New Contractual Relations
Clause (c) completes the list by denying recovery for loss that results from the actor's negligently interfering with the plaintiff's acquiring “a contractual relation with a third person.”31 The first two clauses concern contracts that already exist. Clause (c) looks forward to a contract the plaintiff was working toward and never made. The structure stays three-sided: the defendant acts carelessly, something goes wrong between the plaintiff and a third person, and the plaintiff loses a deal. The related intentional tort is called interference with economic opportunity.32 Because nothing physical has happened to the plaintiff, the loss is pure economic loss, and § 766C denies a negligence claim for it.33
Intentional interference with prospective relations is actionable, which tempts students to assume that careless interference must be actionable too. It is not. Negligent interference with contracts or prospects is usually not enough.34 A signed contract gives the plaintiff a promise that someone was bound to honor. A prospect gives only an expectation, a deal nobody was bound to make, so a claimed loss of it is harder to verify. That difficulty fits the concern, voiced by some courts, that the economic loss rule protects against fraudulent claims.35 Even a defendant who set out to harm the plaintiff's dealings is generally liable only if the means or motive were improper, so it would be anomalous to hold a merely careless defendant liable for the same fragile interest.36
The bar is categorical, so it does not loosen when the prospect looks solid. A plaintiff who can show that the third person was ready to sign still has no negligence claim. The limit turns on the defendant's state of mind and on the kind of loss, and the strength of the plaintiff's proof changes neither. The usual setting is the real estate broker.
The broker's carelessness falls inside clause (c) because negligence in failing to communicate an offer to the vendor is not enough for liability, just as negligent interference with contracts or prospects is usually not enough.37 The usual understanding of brokerage points the same way. A broker ordinarily represents only one party, typically the one who hired the broker, which here is Okafor and not Renner.38 Renner therefore has no fiduciary or other special relationship with the broker on which to build a duty of care.
The deliberate version appears in Harper v. Adametz. Adametz, a real estate agent who held the listing for an 80-acre farm, learned that the owner would sell the whole farm for $6,500. Harper offered $7,000 for the entire farm. Adametz pretended to pass the offer along but never did; instead he told Harper that the owner would sell only the house and 17 acres for $6,000. Harper accepted, and Adametz arranged for the rest of the land to go to his own son, who paid nothing for it. Adametz and his son were required to give up the land they had acquired.39 A fiduciary theory runs into the usual view that a broker represents only the party who hired the broker, here the seller. Professor Palmer therefore reads Harper as interference with contractual prospects: the court protected the expectancy Harper probably would have had if the dishonest broker had not interfered. The broker's representations were easily improper enough to support liability for interference with prospective advantage, and it did not matter that he owed Harper no fiduciary or other special relationship.40
The two buyers each lost a real chance at the land. The broker who loses a message stays inside clause (c). The broker who invents a counteroffer to divert the land acted on purpose, and the negligence limit no longer governs. The common mistake is to let the size or provability of the lost deal stand in for that question, when the section asks only whether the interference was careless or deliberate.
The same limit governs a related setting in which a defendant's communications to third persons cost the plaintiff business. If a defendant tells customers that the plaintiff's goods are defective and they stop buying, the plaintiff may have claims for intentional interference with business relations or for product disparagement, but negligence alone seldom suffices.41 In Western Mass. Blasting Corp. v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's negligent investigation of damage to its insured's property led the defendant to assert a claim for damages that, if paid, would harm the plaintiff's business reputation. The court held that negligence was an insufficient basis for liability.42 The insurer's carelessness reached the plaintiff only through a statement made to others, and no physical harm lay behind the loss, so the case fit the pure-economic-loss pattern that clause (c) removes from negligence law.