Concept
Narrow Exceptions
Negligent interference with contract or prospective relations
Narrow Exceptions
Section 766C marks the edge of its own rule. It denies recovery for pecuniary harm “not deriving from physical harm to the other” when the actor's negligence causes that harm in one of the listed ways.1 The qualifier does real work, because the bar reaches only financial loss that stands alone. A plaintiff whose loss grows out of bodily injury or damage to its own property falls outside the sentence the section writes. That textual limit is the first of three routes around the bar, and this unit takes them in the order a fact pattern should be checked:
- Does the loss derive from physical harm to the plaintiff's person or property, or from the invasion of a property right?
- Does the defendant owe the plaintiff a duty of its own, through an undertaking or special relationship?
- Does the forum follow a minority rule, or does a statute create liability for the loss?
The bar rests on two connected ideas. Pure economic loss spreads through contracts with no natural limit, and negligence law imposes no general duty to protect a stranger from financial loss that the plaintiff could have allocated or insured through its own bargain. Each route supplies what that default assumes is missing. Physical harm or an invaded property right gives the plaintiffs an edge that the defendant can anticipate and a court can count, so the fear of boundless liability recedes. An independent duty supplies the source of obligation that a stranger lacks. The departures reject the default itself, whether through the rule of a few courts or through a statute.
Because the default is strong, a plaintiff must point to something specific that it assumes away. In a majority-rule jurisdiction, neither the foreseeability of the loss nor its size changes the result by itself.
Harm Deriving From Physical Harm
Section 766C reaches only pecuniary harm “not deriving from physical harm to the other,” so its opening words mark where the bar stops.2 The bar covers financial loss that stands alone, with no injury to the plaintiff's body and no damage to the plaintiff's property behind it. When the defendant's carelessness does injure the plaintiff or the plaintiff's property, the plaintiff sues in ordinary negligence, and the financial losses that follow, such as profits lost during repairs or wages lost during recovery, are recoverable along with the physical harm.3 These are sometimes called parasitic losses, because they ride along with the physical injury. The intentional torts sort the same way. A defendant who interferes with the plaintiff's contract by beating the plaintiff answers for the plaintiff's economic losses as consequential damages of the battery, and the pure economic tort of interference arises only when no physical tort is involved.4
Physical harm changes the answer because of what the bar was built to prevent. Economic loss travels along contracts with no natural edge, while a defendant's duty of care ordinarily runs to the people its carelessness physically endangers. A plaintiff whose own body or property was struck is one of those people, and the group of such plaintiffs can be counted by walking the site: injured people and damaged property are visible. With a duty owed and a countable class, ordinary negligence damages control, and the plaintiff recovers what the carelessness proximately caused, financial consequences included. The worry behind the bar, liability reaching strangers whose only link to the accident is a contract with someone who was hurt, has no work to do.
The words “to the other” fix whose injury counts. The physical harm must fall on the plaintiff's own person or property, so damage to someone else's body or property does not carry the plaintiff's loss along with it.5 In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, the defendant's negligence physically damaged a vessel, and the damage cost the charterer the use of its right to ship goods aboard. The charterer had no possessory or ownership interest in the ship, and the Court denied recovery of that loss.6 The injury to the vessel was real, but it was the owner's injury, and a duty owed to the owner does not by itself show a duty to protect the charterer's finances.7
A fact pattern that stresses how large or how foreseeable the couple's extra cost was has not supplied the missing fact, because the section asks whose body or property was harmed.
Physical damage to the plaintiff's own land or goods is one way out of the pure-economic category, and invasion of a property right is another. Denial of access to an owner's land invades such a right, so liability to an abutting owner is appropriate, as the Massachusetts court held in Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher.8 What the abutting owner holds is the right to reach the road that borders the land, and that right makes it a different plaintiff from the business that merely loses customers when the same road is closed. A business whose traffic drops because a negligently damaged bridge must close has lost something it never owned, since the bridge was not its property, and no claim lies against the careless defendant.9 The dividing question in a closure case, then, is whether the plaintiff's own land was cut off from the road or only made less convenient to reach.
Once the claim rests on a property right, the damages follow the property tort, and the economic-loss limit stops capping them. If a defendant physically blocks the use of the plaintiff's property and so delays completion of a contract, trespass or nuisance ordinarily lies, and recovery can include every proximate harm, among them the costs of the disrupted contract or opportunity.10 In Little v. Chesser, damages for interference with a road easement included what the plaintiff paid workers whose work was disrupted. In Berliner v. Clukay, a person entitled to use a public road recovered from a trespasser who damaged it, including the cost of repairing the road.11 The pecuniary consequences are recoverable in these cases for the same reason they are recoverable after a collision with the plaintiff's shop: the defendant invaded something the plaintiff owns, and the losses follow from that invasion.
Independent Duties and Torts
Section 766C bars pecuniary harm that does not derive from physical harm to the plaintiff, and the reasons for the bar assume that the plaintiff's only link to the defendant is a contract with someone else.13 That assumption can fail. The duty question arises in a variety of contexts and turns on a variety of factors,14 but the plaintiff must establish a duty running to itself. Where the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty because of its own undertaking or special relationship with the plaintiff, a negligence action is permitted even for pure economic harm, and legal malpractice is the standard example.15 Such a claim stands on a duty that the three clauses of § 766C do not describe, so the section's bar does not reach it.
The duty must be the defendant's own duty to this plaintiff. Robins Dry Dock shows why: the defendant owed care to the shipowner whose vessel it was handling, the charterer's loss followed from a breach of that duty, and the Court still denied recovery.16 A duty owed to a third person does not, by itself, show a duty to protect the plaintiff against economic harm.17 The plaintiff needs a second, independent duty running to its own economic interests. That duty may arise from a special relationship with the plaintiff, and a statute can create one as well: wrongful death statutes, for example, allow certain family members to recover economic losses that arise from negligent physical harm to others.18
An undertaking or special relationship changes the result for a reason parallel to physical harm, because it gives the class of plaintiffs an edge. A lawyer, auditor, or architect knows whose finances depend on its work, so it can price the job, insure the risk, or decline it. The plaintiff, for its part, has placed its financial interests in the professional's hands. The indeterminacy that justifies the general bar is absent, and because the duty is the defendant's own, the claim does not depend on the plaintiff's contract with anyone else.
The recognized examples cluster where others foreseeably rely on a professional's work. Lawyers, auditors, and architects whose fault causes no physical harm but does cause economic loss to those who rely on them are the usual illustrations.19 An auditor's breach of the duty to use care in auditing a business may sometimes also breach a duty to lenders who rely on the audit, provided the auditor has certain relationships with those lenders.20 The proviso carries weight, because the duty follows the relationship and not every creditor who happens to read an audit. Between a direct contract and total strangeness lies a continuum of relationships, and some points on it carry tort duties that a pure stranger would not owe.
Compare a lender who relied on an audit with the customer of a disabled supplier.
Both plaintiffs lost money through someone else's failure, and both losses were foreseeable. What separates them is the defendant's relationship to each. Fenwick & Cole knew who would rely on its report, while Quill's crew had no connection to Dorsey at all. A fact pattern that stresses how large or how predictable the loss was has not yet supplied that relationship.
Negligent misrepresentation is another tort that permits recovery of pure economic loss, and it carries duty limits of its own. A court listing exceptions to the economic loss rule counted negligent misrepresentation by a defendant in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions.21 Jurisdictions disagree about who owes that duty. Some limit it to those in the business of supplying information, while Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) requires only that the defendant have a pecuniary interest in the transaction.22 Others require a fiduciary or special relationship. A Delaware court on that view found none between the buyer of a painting and the auction house in Krahmer v. Christie's Inc., and a New Hampshire court found neither a special relationship nor an undertaking in Stillwater Condominium Ass'n v. Town of Salem.23 An Oregon court in Loosli v. City of Salem found no duty to a citizen who lost money when the city negligently approved a business location, because the statute ran to the public and not to that citizen's guidance.24 The tort has its own elements, and this chapter does not develop them. It matters here because it confirms the point: outside the minority and statutory departures below, recovery for negligently caused pure economic loss rests on a duty running to the plaintiff.
These claims are not negligent interference with contract under another name. A client whose deal collapses because the lawyer carelessly mishandled the closing sues for malpractice, and the lawyer's undertaking to the client supplies the duty. The same loss pleaded as negligent interference fails, because negligent interference with contract rights ordinarily is not actionable.25 Students err in two directions on this point. Some see a lost contract and an economic loss, apply § 766C, and stop without asking whether the defendant undertook anything for the plaintiff. Others assume that a duty owed to the injured third person, such as the shipowner, the utility, or the defendant's other client, carries over to the plaintiff. The first mistake overlooks the plaintiff's own claim, and the second invents a duty the plaintiff does not hold.
Minority and Statutory Departures
The exceptions so far work inside the majority framework, because each supplies something § 766C assumes is missing: a physical injury to the plaintiff, an invaded property right, or a duty the defendant owes the plaintiff independently. The section itself still states the default, which is that one is not liable for pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm to the plaintiff when negligent interference causes it.27 The departures taught here are a different kind. They reject the default for plaintiffs who have neither a physical injury nor an independent duty, and they come from a very small number of courts and from legislatures. Negligent interference with an actual contract or with an economic opportunity remains non-actionable in nearly every jurisdiction, and fewer than a handful of courts hold otherwise.28 The judicial departures come first, followed by the statutes.
The best-known judicial departure is People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., a New Jersey decision from 1985.29 The defendant there allegedly handled dangerous chemicals negligently, and the airline's office had to be evacuated. No physical harm was done, but operations shut down and the airline lost profits.30 The court concluded that the general rule against liability was wrong. It held that a defendant owes a duty of reasonable care to protect against economic harm when “particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an identifiable class” suffer stand-alone economic harm, provided the defendant knew or had reason to know that such harm was likely.31
The court's reasoning attacked the majority bar at its premises. It observed that the one characteristic separating plaintiffs whose economic-loss claims courts have regularly denied from those who recovered is the fortuitous occurrence of physical harm or property damage, however slight, and a defendant who negligently injures a plaintiff or the plaintiff's property already answers for all proximately caused harm, economic losses included.32 That observation gives critics of the bar their best argument, since a line that depends on how slight a physical injury happened to occur says little about how careless the defendant was. The court also met the fear of infinite liability directly. It noted that the same objection had been raised and rejected when courts allowed recovery for other negligent torts and created strict liability for defective products and ultrahazardous activities, and it concluded that the answer lies in a more careful application of traditional duty and proximate-cause concepts to the facts of each case, not in obstructing a fairly grounded claim.33
The identifiable-class test is the court's answer to the boundless-liability worry developed earlier in this chapter. A defendant who knows or has reason to know that a particular plaintiff, or a defined group, will bear the loss faces a group with an edge, much as the physical victims of an accident form a group anyone can count. That knowledge lets the defendant take care or price the risk beforehand. On this logic the airline can sue, while the open-ended crowd of businesses affected when a street is closed presents the unbounded class the test was built to exclude. The court rejected the general rule itself and did not rest on an exception.34
An exam stem that describes a negligent release, an evacuation, and a week of lost profits, with no damage to the plaintiff's property, may leave open the question that decides the case, which is whose rule governs.
The two clinics lost identical sums, and the forum's rule on duty separates them. A stem that names no jurisdiction calls for the majority rule, and the minority approach enters the analysis only when the problem places the case in a state that has adopted it.
Other decisions that tend to support broad recovery for negligent interference with economic interests are Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College in Alaska and J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory in California.35 These decisions are decades old, and they have garnered almost no lasting support outside their home states.36 A few courts have replaced the absolute bar with a foreseeability approach, but the weight of authority has not followed them.37 Courts elsewhere resist for the reason the boundless-liability discussion identified: deciding which plaintiffs are close enough is a matter of degree, and a rule that makes that judgment claim by claim gives defendants and their insurers no way to price their exposure when they act. Critics of the bar make the argument People Express made, and it remains a minority view.
The departures have also produced anomalies. In California, J'Aire may have produced a rule that permits negligence-based recovery for interference with noncontractual economic prospects while demanding intent before liability attaches for interference with an actual contract, as the court of appeal applied it in Davis v. Nadrich.38 That arrangement inverts the settled principle that contracts receive greater protection, not lesser, than uncontracted-for opportunities.39 A plaintiff who holds a signed contract ends up worse off than one who holds only a hope, because the first must prove intent and the second need only prove carelessness.
Legislatures can draw the lines that make courts cautious, because a statute can name the protected plaintiffs, define the recoverable losses, and set limits on liability before any accident occurs. If courts do not create common-law liability for negligently caused economic harm, legislatures are free to create statutory causes of action, and state consumer fraud acts often permit such recoveries.40 A federal statute imposes liability for economic harm from oil spills in navigable waters, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E), and it carries liability limitations of its own.41 The Medical Care Recovery Act similarly allows the federal government to recover its economic costs of treating a member of the armed forces injured by a tortfeasor.42 In South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. Partnership, the First Circuit approved a marina's recovery of lost future profits after a gasoline spill that damaged the marina's property and also forced it to redirect capital and staff, which delayed a planned expansion.43 Such statutes leave the common-law rule where it is and add to it, because legislatures can supplement and define recoveries for negligently caused economic loss.44 A stem that names an oil spill or a consumer protection act therefore points to the statute's own elements and limits.