Concept
Analyzing a Fact Pattern
Negligent interference with contract or prospective relations
Analyzing a Fact Pattern
Negligent interference with contract is not ordinarily actionable.1 Section 766C writes that default into the Restatement: a person is not liable for pecuniary harm that does not derive from physical harm to the plaintiff when the harm results from the actor's negligently causing a third person not to perform a contract with the plaintiff, interfering with the plaintiff's own performance or making it more expensive or burdensome, or interfering with the plaintiff's acquiring a contractual relation with a third person.2 A fact pattern therefore poses one question: does the plaintiff have something the default assumes is missing? Three things qualify. The plaintiff may have suffered physical harm, may be able to prove intentional and improper interference, or may have been owed a duty of care directly. Four questions test for them, because the intentional route has two parts, intent and improper conduct.
Question one comes out no. The only physical damage fell on a line owned by a stranger to Tern, so Tern's lost sales are pecuniary harm that does not derive from physical harm to Tern.6
Question two comes out no as well. The operator never heard of Tern, never knew that a storefront depended on that line, and aimed at no one's contract. The facts show carelessness and nothing more, so the intentional route is closed and question three never arises, since it applies only to a defendant who intended the interference.
Question four turns on whether Delvecchio did anything for Tern. It did not. Tern did not hire Delvecchio or rely on it, and the source ties a negligence action for pure economic harm to an undertaking or special relationship with the plaintiff.7 Whatever duty Delvecchio owed about the line ran to the line's owner, so a breach of that duty gives Tern nothing. With four noes, the loss falls within the first clause of § 766C: the actor's negligently causing a third person, Northgate, not to perform its contract with the plaintiff.8 Tern's recourse, if any, is against Northgate under the hosting contract.
Tern's lost sales are about the same in the original scene and in both variations, so the size of the loss decides none of the three outcomes. In the first variation the answer to question one flips, which takes the case out of § 766C and returns it to ordinary negligence.9 In the second, the answers to questions two and three flip together. Even there, the last check is for a privilege: cutting a cable is not advice, so none applies, but a defendant who intended the interference can still escape liability if one does.10
A wrong edit leaves the answer where it was. An operator who knew that Tern's storefront depended on the line but severed it carelessly supplies knowledge without purpose, and a careless act is neither purposeful nor substantially certain to interfere, so Tern is still within § 766C. The fourth question flips only on a duty that runs to Tern itself. Had Tern hired Delvecchio to survey and mark the route of Tern's own connection, carelessness in that work would breach a duty owed to Tern through the undertaking, and Tern could recover its financial loss in negligence with no claim of interference at all.11 The error in the other direction is to assume that Delvecchio's duty to the line's owner carries over to Tern, which invents a duty the plaintiff does not hold.
Stems built to tempt a wrong answer usually stress how predictable the plaintiff's loss was, how large it was, or who could best insure against it. None of those facts answers any of the four questions. The insurance argument is contested even among judges: one majority asserted that victims are better able to obtain insurance, and the dissent answered that it is not certain victims are generally better insurers against widespread loss caused by tortious acts.12 A problem may also set the case in a jurisdiction, or under a statute, that departs from the majority rule. Unless the stem says so, apply the general analysis.