Also known as: adverse possessors
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An individual who occupies land belonging to another in a manner that is actual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous for the statutory period. The occupation occurs under a claim of right without permission from the record owner. Upon completion of the period, title vests in the occupant by operation of law.
Valerie recorded an agreement granting Federal Studio shared access to a loading dock on her rear lot. Donna later entered the lot without permission, fenced it, paid taxes, and obtained a judgment declaring her owner by adverse possession. Donna redeveloped the lot as a private garage and refused the studio access. The studio sued to enforce the recorded access right against Donna.
Teresa acquired a prescriptive easement over Rick's lane by twenty years of continuous tractor use. Five years later she permitted the Small Farmers Cooperative to use the same lane for identical equipment traffic. Rick sued to enjoin the cooperative members. The cooperative's use began only after the prescriptive period ended and occurred solely by Teresa's permission.
O'Keeffe discovered that paintings she owned had been displayed in a gallery for many years after a theft. She sued the current possessor to recover them. The possessor defended on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired. The court examined whether the possessor's open display of the paintings for the statutory period vested title in the possessor.
Georgia O'Keeffe, a renowned artist, had three paintings stolen from An American Place gallery in New York in March 1946. The gallery was operated by her husband Alfred Stieglitz. The paintings subject to this action are "Seaweed" and "Cliffs," with a third painting "Fragments" also missing. O'Keeffe did not report the theft to the police or advertise the loss, though she discussed it with associates. Stieglitz died in the summer of 1946. In 1947 O'Keeffe retained Doris Bry to help settle the estate. Bry urged reporting the loss, but O'Keeffe declined. In 1972, O'Keeffe authorized Bry to report the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc., which maintains a registry of stolen paintings. In September 1975, O'Keeffe learned that the paintings were in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York on consignment from Bernard Danenberg Galleries. On February 11, 1976, O'Keeffe discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had sold the paintings to Barry Snyder for $35,000. She demanded their return, but Snyder refused. O'Keeffe filed her complaint for replevin in March 1976 against Snyder, who impleaded Frank as a third-party defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment to Snyder on the ground that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed and entered judgment for O'Keeffe. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to consider the issues. Frank traces his possession of the paintings to his father, Dr. Frank, who died in 1968, claiming to have seen them in his father's apartment as early as 1941-1943. Snyder purchased the paintings from Frank in 1975. There are factual disputes regarding the circumstances of the paintings' disappearance and acquisition.
View caseYes. Under the Restatement rule an appurtenant burden runs to all subsequent possessors of the burdened property, including an adverse possessor who obtains title by judgment. The rule treats the adverse possessor the same as any other subsequent owner for purposes of enforcing recorded servitudes.
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Yes. When successive possessors are in privity, their periods combine to satisfy the statutory requirement. Each must occupy the same land in a qualifying manner, but the chain of possession need not be unbroken by a deed so long as privity exists between the occupants.
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No. Adverse possession runs only against the present possessory estate during the life tenant's lifetime. The limitations period for extinguishing the remainder interest does not begin until the life tenant dies and the remainder comes into possession.
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…between N.J.S.A. 2A:14-6 and N.J.S.A 2A:14-30 and 31, the former statute has always been construed as vesting title in the adverse possessor at the end of the statutory period. See, e.g., Braue v. Fleck , 23 N.J. 1, 16 (1956). To summarize, the operative fact that divests the original owner of title to either personal or…