Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A form of judicial redress that grants positive benefits or compels specific action rather than merely denying an opponent's claim. It encompasses orders such as injunctions, specific performance, or monetary awards that affirmatively alter the parties' legal relations.
Nexus Data Centers LLC sued BrightLine Telecom Corp for unpaid fees. BrightLine moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After the court denied the motion and set a deadline to answer, BrightLine filed nothing further. Nexus submitted an affidavit showing the failure to respond. The clerk entered BrightLine's default because the company stood as the party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief was sought.
Employees challenged a consent decree that set membership goals and created a training fund to remedy past discrimination. The decree ordered the union to take steps that would benefit some nonvictims. The Court upheld the order, recognizing that Title VII permits courts to award affirmative relief even when it reaches beyond proven individual victims.
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law. After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department. The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981. Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983. A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.
View caseA franchise applicant relied on repeated assurances from Red Owl Stores and incurred substantial expenses preparing to open a store. When the deal collapsed, the applicant sued for damages based on promissory estoppel. The court allowed the claim, treating promissory estoppel as a basis for affirmative relief rather than a mere defensive shield.
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View caseA partnership candidate proved that gender stereotyping played a role in the denial of her promotion. Price Waterhouse argued that other legitimate factors would have produced the same decision. The Court held that once the plaintiff shows an impermissible motive, the employer must prove it would have made the same decision anyway to avoid liability for affirmative relief.
Ann Hopkins served as a senior manager in Price Waterhouse's Office of Government Services in Washington, D.C., for five years before the partners there proposed her for partnership in 1982. Of the firm's 662 partners, only seven were women, and Hopkins was the only woman among the 88 candidates proposed for partnership that year. Thirteen partners supported her bid, eight recommended denial, three suggested holding her candidacy, and eight had no informed opinion. She was neither offered nor denied admission to the partnership; instead, her candidacy was held for reconsideration the following year. Hopkins had played a key role in securing a $25 million contract with the Department of State, which her office described as an outstanding performance carried out virtually at the partner level. Partners praised her as an outstanding professional with strong character, independence, and integrity, and clients found her extremely competent, intelligent, and productive. Nevertheless, partners criticized her interpersonal skills, describing her as overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with, and impatient with staff. Some partners' comments reflected sex stereotyping, including calling her "macho," suggesting she "overcompensated for being a woman," advising her to take a course at charm school, and recommending that she walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist, testified that the subjective evaluations and Hopkins' status as the only woman candidate made it likely that critical remarks stemmed from sex stereotyping. The District Court found that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by giving effect to partners' sex-stereotyped comments. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of liability but required the employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision absent discrimination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper allocation of burdens in mixed-motives Title VII cases.
View caseThe NAACP sued Mount Laurel Township, alleging its zoning ordinance excluded low- and moderate-income families. The trial court found the ordinance invalid and ordered the township to study housing needs and present a plan of affirmative public action to meet those needs. The decree required the municipality to take concrete steps to enable construction of affordable housing.
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View caseShareholders challenged a state statute regulating railroad rates as unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the state attorney general from enforcing it. The attorney general argued the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment as one against the state itself. The Court held that the action sought only to restrain the officer from unconstitutional conduct and therefore did not request affirmative relief against the state.
The legislature of the State of Minnesota, in the year 1905, passed an act fixing the rates of passenger fares to be charged by railroads within the State, and also fixing the rates for the transportation of freight. The act was to take effect on the 1st day of July, 1905, and it provided for the appointment of a railroad commission, with power to fix rates, and also provided for the enforcement of the act by penalties and by mandamus. Before the act took effect, the railroad companies affected by it filed bills in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, alleging that the act was unconstitutional, in that it was confiscatory, and deprived the companies of their property without due process of law, and also that it was in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, and they asked for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the act. These suits were brought against the railroad commission and the Attorney General of the State. While those cases were pending on appeal, the legislature in 1907 amended the law to create a railroad and warehouse commission with authority to set rates and to impose a penalty of one thousand dollars for each violation of charging higher rates, with the Attorney General charged with enforcement. After the Supreme Court decided the Minnesota Rate Cases in 208 U.S. 1, stockholders Perkins and Shepard of the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed a new bill in the Circuit Court against the commission members, Attorney General Edward T. Young, and others, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the 1907 act on constitutional grounds. The Circuit Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining Young from instituting suits to enforce the penalties. Young appeared specially, moved to dismiss the bill as a suit against the State barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but the motion was overruled; he declined to plead further, resulting in a default decree granting the injunction. Subsequently, Young, as Attorney General, commenced a mandamus proceeding in Minnesota state court against the Northern Pacific Railway Company to compel compliance with the 1907 rates. Upon learning of the state court action, the Circuit Court issued a rule to show cause why Young should not be held in contempt; after hearing, it found him in contempt, fined him one hundred dollars, and ordered him to dismiss the mandamus suit or remain in custody. Young then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the federal court's orders exceeded its jurisdiction.
View caseEntry of default occurs when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise. The clerk must enter the default as a ministerial act once those conditions are met.
Supporting sources
Affirmative relief grants positive benefits or orders specific action, such as an injunction or damages award. A defensive response merely seeks to defeat the opponent's claim without requesting independent relief for the responding party.
No. Affirmative relief sought by a defendant requires raising a counterclaim or cross-claim that could have been maintained independently of the plaintiff's action.
Filing a pre-answer motion constitutes defending and blocks default only while the motion is pending. Once the court denies the motion and sets a new deadline to answer, failure to file a responsive pleading allows the clerk to enter default upon proper affidavit.
Supporting sources
…the State to pay the taxes, and was therefore a suit against the State. In the present case the bill does not ask for any affirmative relief against the State. It simply asks for an injunction to restrain the Attorney General from instituting suits in the state courts to enforce an unconstitutional statute. This is not a suit…