Also known as: on all fours · on all fours with · on point
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A precedent or factual situation that matches the present case in every material respect. No legally significant distinction exists between the two.
Anita Ali sued a supplier in federal court under diversity jurisdiction after a contract dispute. The facts and procedural posture matched a prior Supreme Court decision exactly. Because the cases stood on all fours, the court applied the balance-of-interests test to decide whether state or federal practice governed the unresolved issue.
Alan Ackerman served a corporate defendant by certified mail under the Federal Rules. State law required service only through a statutory agent. The facts aligned on all fours with precedent holding that a valid Federal Rule governs in diversity cases, so the court denied the motion to dismiss.
Anthony Arnold challenged state legislative districts in federal court. The complaint and factual record were identical to an earlier suit dismissed for lack of justiciability. Because the cases stood on all fours, the court dismissed the new action on the same ground.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseAustin Abbott sued in state court despite a contractual forum-selection clause. The facts and contract language matched a Supreme Court decision exactly. Standing on all fours with that precedent, the federal court transferred the case under the clause.
Stewart Organization, Inc., an Alabama corporation, entered into a dealership agreement with Ricoh Corporation, a nationwide manufacturer whose principal place of business is in New Jersey, obligating Stewart to market Ricoh copier products. The agreement contained a forum-selection clause stating that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under or in connection with the agreement. Business relations between the parties soured, and in September 1984 Stewart filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleging breach of the dealership agreement together with claims for breach of warranty, fraud, and antitrust violations. Relying on the forum-selection clause, Ricoh moved the district court to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406; the district court denied the motion after concluding that Alabama law governed and disfavored enforcement of such clauses, then certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A divided Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, holding that federal law governs venue questions in diversity actions and that the clause is enforceable; after rehearing en banc the full court adopted the panel result and reasoning, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAndre Antoine sought a permit for a group home. The city's denial rested on the same ordinance and factual circumstances as a prior Supreme Court case. Because the situations stood on all fours, the court applied the same equal-protection analysis and invalidated the denial.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
View caseAtlas Ventures sued a foreign parent corporation in federal court. The contacts alleged were identical to those in a recent Supreme Court decision. Standing on all fours with that precedent, the court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
In 2004, twenty-two residents of Argentina filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft, a German public stock company headquartered in Stuttgart that manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany. The complaint alleged that Daimler's Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated with state security forces during Argentina's 1976–1983 Dirty War to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill MB Argentina workers, including plaintiffs or persons closely related to them. The complaint asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, and California and Argentina law. Jurisdiction over Daimler was predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, another Daimler subsidiary incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA serves as Daimler's exclusive importer and distributor in the United States, purchasing vehicles from Daimler in Germany and distributing them to independent dealerships throughout the nation, including California. MBUSA maintains a regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine. MBUSA's California sales accounted for 2.4 percent of Daimler's worldwide sales. A General Distributor Agreement between Daimler and MBUSA established MBUSA as an independent contractor that buys and sells vehicles for its own account and has no authority to make binding obligations for Daimler. Daimler moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. After allowing jurisdictional discovery on the agency allegations, the District Court granted the motion in November 2005 and reaffirmed the dismissal in February 2007, concluding that Daimler's own contacts with California were too sporadic and that MBUSA's contacts could not be attributed to Daimler. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed in 2011, holding that MBUSA was Daimler's agent for jurisdictional purposes and that its California contacts supported the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler. Daimler petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the Ninth Circuit denied over the dissent of eight judges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2013 to decide whether Daimler is amenable to suit in California for claims arising from events occurring entirely outside the United States and unrelated to any activity in California.
View caseIt means the facts, legal issues, and procedural posture are identical in every material respect. No meaningful distinction exists that would allow a court to reach a different result.
Supporting sources
When cases stand on all fours, the court follows the earlier decision without further analysis of distinguishing factors. This promotes consistency and predictability in the application of legal rules.
Supporting sources
Yes. Minor differences that do not affect the legal analysis may still allow the cases to stand on all fours. Any difference that could change the outcome prevents the cases from being on all fours.
…context of this entire line of cases. Suffice it that they do not serve to distinguish Colegrove v. Barrett, supra , which is on all fours with the present case, or to distinguish Kidd v. McCanless , 352 U. S. 920, in which the full Court without dissent, only five years ago, dismissed on authority of Colegrove v. Green and…