Also known as:anti-commandeering rule · anticommandeering doctrine · anti-commandeering · commandeering prohibition
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A constitutional principle that bars the federal government from issuing directives requiring the States to address particular problems or commanding the States' officers or legislatures to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. The rule protects state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment by preventing Congress from conscripting state officials or dictating state legislative action.
Sources & Authorities
How it applies
Common Examples
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State Officers Ordered to Perform Checks
The federal government directs the State A Department of Public Safety to have its officers conduct background checks on all prospective handgun buyers and upload results to a federal database. Officer Anika Anand refuses to perform the checks. The state sues to enjoin the directive. The court holds the order unconstitutional because it compels state officers to administer a federal program.
State Legislature Barred from Authorizing Betting
Congress enacts a statute that prohibits any state from authorizing or licensing sports gambling schemes at entertainment venues. State B's gaming commission approves a license for Alliance Holdings to operate a betting platform. Federal officials threaten penalties against state officials. The court enjoins enforcement because the statute directly dictates what the state legislature may not do rather than regulating private conduct.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Cases
Casebooks
Common questions
Frequently Asked
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Does the anticommandeering rule prevent Congress from regulating private conduct that incidentally affects states?+
No. The rule forbids only direct commands to state legislatures or officers. Congress may regulate private actors directly and may preempt conflicting state laws when it does so under an enumerated power.
Supporting sources
Can Congress avoid the rule by conditioning federal funds on state compliance with a federal program?+
Sometimes. Conditional spending is permissible if the conditions are unambiguous, related to the federal purpose, and not so coercive that they leave states with no real choice. Direct commands without a genuine opt-out violate the rule regardless of funding ties.
Supporting sources
Does the rule apply equally to commands aimed at state executive officers and state legislatures?+
Yes. The doctrine prohibits federal directives that require state executive officials to administer federal programs and also bars statutes that dictate what state legislatures may or may not enact.
Supporting sources
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018)Constitutional Law
…v. United States , 505 U. S. 144 (1992), the Federal Government may not “commandeer” state legislative or executive power. The anticommandeering doctrine is rooted in the Constitution’s structure and in the text of the Tenth Amendment. In New York , we held that Congress could not command a State to enact legislation. In Printz v. United…
Constitutional LawThe relation of nation and states in a federal system · Intergovernmental immunitiesNEXTGENFoundational