Also known as: arbitrary and capricious · arbitrary or capricious · abuse of discretion · arbitrary and capricious standard · abuse of discretion standard
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review under which a court will set aside an agency's or trial court's action only when the decision lacks a rational basis in the record or rests on clearly erroneous reasoning.
Aisha Ahmed sued a manufacturer after a workplace injury. Her expert linked the injury to a chemical exposure using only anecdotal reports and a large analytical leap. The district court excluded the testimony after finding insufficient data support. On appeal the circuit court affirmed because the exclusion fell within the trial judge's discretion to reject opinions untethered to reliable methodology.
Massachusetts challenged the EPA's refusal to regulate vehicle greenhouse gases. The agency had concluded it lacked statutory authority and that regulation would conflict with other priorities. The Supreme Court held the refusal arbitrary because the statute plainly authorized regulation and the agency had not offered a reasoned explanation for declining to act.
In October 1999, nineteen private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA requesting regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. The petition asserted that carbon dioxide and other gases were heat-trapping greenhouse gases that had accelerated climate change, with carbon dioxide as the most important contributor according to the IPCC's 1995 report. The EPA received more than fifty thousand comments after requesting public input in 2001. A National Research Council report from 2001, prepared at the White House's request, stated that greenhouse gases from human activities were causing surface air temperatures to rise. On September 8, 2003, the EPA denied the petition on two grounds: the Clean Air Act did not authorize regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, and even assuming authority, the agency would not regulate due to scientific uncertainty about causation and concerns that regulation would conflict with the President's comprehensive approach involving voluntary programs and international negotiations. The denial order referenced Congress's decision in 1990 not to enact binding emissions limitations and the political history of climate change issues. Petitioners including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other states and private organizations then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review in 2005. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006 to address the issues raised by the denial. Massachusetts submitted affidavits showing that global sea levels rose 10 to 20 centimeters over the 20th century, already causing loss of coastal land owned by the Commonwealth, with projections of further inundation by 2100. The United States transportation sector alone emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999, accounting for over 6 percent of worldwide emissions.
View casePlaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of an executive order restricting entry from several countries. The district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the injunction as an abuse of discretion because the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their constitutional claims under rational-basis review.
Shortly after taking office, President Trump signed Executive Order 13769 directing a review of information provided by foreign governments about their nationals seeking entry and temporarily restricting entry from seven countries previously identified as posing terrorism risks. After courts enjoined that order, the President revoked it and issued Executive Order 13780, which again directed a worldwide review and temporarily restricted entry from six of the countries. Following completion of the review, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645 on September 24, 2017, placing entry restrictions on nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—whose systems for managing and sharing information the President deemed inadequate. The Proclamation imposed varying restrictions by country, exempted lawful permanent residents and asylees, provided for case-by-case waivers, and directed ongoing 180-day reviews; restrictions on Chad were later lifted after it improved its practices. Plaintiffs including the State of Hawaii, three U.S. citizens with foreign-national relatives from Iran, Syria, and Yemen applying for visas, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii challenged the Proclamation in the District of Hawaii on statutory and Establishment Clause grounds. The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on statutory grounds. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseJoshua's mother sued county social services after the agency failed to remove the child from an abusive home. The complaint alleged the agency's inaction violated due process. The Supreme Court held that the agency's decision not to intervene was not subject to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard because no constitutional duty to protect existed.
Joshua DeShaney was born in 1975. In 1980, a Wyoming court granted his parents a divorce and awarded custody of Joshua to his father, Randy DeShaney, who then moved with the child to Winnebago County, Wisconsin. In January 1982, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services became aware that Joshua might be a victim of child abuse after he was admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions. The examining physician notified DSS. A caseworker interviewed Randy DeShaney and visited the home, observing suspicious injuries on Joshua's head, but concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse to retain him in court custody and returned him to his father while recommending counseling and preschool enrollment. Over the next two years, Joshua was repeatedly treated for suspicious injuries at local hospitals, with physicians notifying DSS on multiple occasions. Caseworkers conducted regular visits, noted additional injuries, received reports from emergency room personnel and neighbors, and at one point convened a Child Protection Team that decided against retaining custody, yet consistently returned Joshua to his father's care after determining insufficient evidence existed for court intervention. In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that the child fell into a coma and suffered permanent brain damage requiring lifelong institutionalization for profound mental retardation. Randy DeShaney was later tried and convicted of child abuse. Joshua and his mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Winnebago County, its Department of Social Services, and two social workers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, claiming a deprivation of liberty without due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the respondents. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe NLRB adopted a rule classifying certain buyers as supervisors after notice-and-comment proceedings. An employer challenged the rule as arbitrary. The Supreme Court upheld the rule because the agency had supplied a reasoned explanation based on the record and had not departed from prior policy without justification.
In July 1970, Amalgamated Local No. 1286 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for a representation election to determine whether the union would be certified as the bargaining representative of the 25 buyers in the purchasing and procurement department at Bell Aerospace Company's plant in Wheatfield, New York. The company opposed the petition on the ground that the buyers were managerial employees and thus were not covered by the Act. The plant is engaged in research and development in the design and fabrication of aerospace products. The purchasing and procurement department receives requisition orders from other departments at the plant and is responsible for purchasing all of the company's needs from outside suppliers. Some items are standardized and may be purchased off the shelf from various distributors and suppliers. Other items must be made to the company's specifications, and the requisition orders may be accompanied by detailed blueprints and other technical plans. Absent specific instructions to the contrary, buyers have full discretion, without any dollar limit, to select prospective vendors, draft invitations to bid, evaluate submitted bids, negotiate price and terms, and prepare purchase orders. Buyers execute all purchase orders up to $50,000. They may place or cancel orders of less than $5,000 on their own signature. On commitments in excess of $5,000, buyers must obtain the approval of a superior, with higher levels of approval required as the purchase cost increases. For the Minute Man missile project, which represents 70% of the company's sales, purchase decisions are made by a team of personnel from the engineering, quality assurance, finance, and manufacturing departments, with the buyer serving as team chairman. After the representation hearing, the Regional Director transferred the case to the Board. On May 20, 1971, the Board issued its decision holding that the company's buyers constituted an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining and directing an election. Relying on its recent decision in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., the Board stated that even though the company's buyers might be managerial employees, they were nevertheless covered by the Act and entitled to its protections. The Board rejected the company's contention that representation should be denied because the buyers' authority to commit the company's credit, select vendors, and negotiate purchase prices would create a potential conflict of interest. On June 16, 1971, a representation election was conducted in which 15 of the buyers voted for the union and nine against. On August 12, the Board certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's buyers. The company stood by its contention that the buyers were not covered by the Act and refused to bargain with the union. An unfair labor practice complaint resulted in a Board finding that the company had violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and an order compelling the company to bargain with the union. The company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the order and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. The Court of Appeals denied enforcement and remanded the case to the Board for a rulemaking proceeding. The Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for certiorari.
View caseAn employer contested an NLRB order finding an unfair labor practice. The record contained conflicting testimony about the employee's conduct. The Supreme Court held that the board's finding must be set aside when substantial evidence on the whole record does not support it.
Universal Camera Corp. was the respondent in an unfair labor practice proceeding initiated before the National Labor Relations Board under the Wagner Act. After a hearing, the Board found that the company had discharged an employee in retaliation for testimony the employee had given at a Board hearing. The Board therefore issued an order that required the company to reinstate the employee with back pay and to cease and desist from any further discrimination against employees who file charges or give testimony under the Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, over a dissent by Judge Swan, granted full enforcement of the Board's order. Although the court reviewed the entire administrative record, it concluded that the findings proposed by the trial examiner, which the Board had rejected, could not be treated as an independent factor in the court's own review of the evidence. This approach conflicted with the view taken by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the companion case of Labor Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. The administrative record revealed inconsistent testimony from the company's witnesses together with affirmative evidence that the officer who ordered the discharge had once been influenced against the employee because of the employee's appearance at the Board hearing. The trial examiner's proposed report formed part of the materials that were before the Court of Appeals for review.
View caseThe agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. A court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency but will set aside action that lacks a rational basis.
Appellate courts review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion. The trial court acts as gatekeeper and may exclude testimony when there is too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered.
Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act directs courts to set aside agency action found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(f)(5), a court may set aside a master's ruling on a procedural matter only for an abuse of discretion unless the appointing order establishes a different standard.
…Clean Air Act expressly permits review of such an action. § 7607(b)(1). We therefore "may reverse any such action found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." § 7607(d)(9). VI On the merits, the first question is whether § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas…