arbitrator

In October 1995, Saint Clair Adams applied for a job at Circuit City Stores, Inc., a national retailer of consumer electronics. Adams signed an employment application that included a provision stating he would settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to his application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator, with examples including claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, the Americans with Disabilities Act, contract law, and tort law. Adams was hired as a sales counselor in Circuit City's store in Santa Rosa, California. Two years later Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court asserting claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act and other claims based on general tort theories under California law. Circuit City filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams's claims pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court entered an order concluding that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement to submit his claims to binding arbitration. Adams appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the appeal was pending the Ninth Circuit ruled in an unrelated case that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to contracts of employment. Following that ruling the Ninth Circuit held in Adams's case that the arbitration agreement was contained in a contract of employment and therefore was not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. Circuit City petitioned the Supreme Court for review noting that the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that all employment contracts are excluded from the Federal Arbitration Act conflicts with every other Court of Appeals to have addressed the question. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.

Following the 1978 amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Environmental Protection Agency gained authority to consider data submitted by one registrant to support the registration of pesticides by follow-on applicants, provided the applicant offers compensation to the original data submitter. If the parties fail to agree on the amount of compensation, either may initiate binding arbitration, and the arbitrator's findings are final except for review based on fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. Appellees are thirteen large firms that had submitted research data to the EPA for pesticide registrations. After the 1978 amendments took effect, the firms filed suit in the Southern District of New York challenging the data-consideration and compensation provisions on constitutional grounds, later amending the complaint to include an Article III claim regarding the arbitration mechanism. The district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on their Article III claims. The District Court, rather than striking down the statutory limitation on judicial review, enjoined the entire FIFRA data use and compensation scheme. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. On remand in this case, appellees amended their complaint to reflect that EPA had, in fact, considered their data in support of other registration applications. The amended complaint also alleged that data submitted by appellee Stauffer Chemical Company had been used in connection with registrations by PPG Industries, Inc., and Drexel Chemical Company. Stauffer had invoked the arbitration provisions of § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) against PPG, and appellees entered in evidence the award of the arbitration panel, handed down on June 28, 1983. The district court reinstated its prior judgment enjoining the operation of the data-consideration provisions as violative of Article III. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on EPA's direct appeal.

In 1953 the Textile Workers Union of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Lincoln Mills of Alabama. The agreement was to run for one year and from year to year thereafter unless terminated on specified notices. It contained a no-strike clause and established a multi-step grievance procedure whose final step, available to either party, was arbitration. Several grievances concerning work loads and work assignments arose under the agreement. The union processed the grievances through every step of the contractual procedure, after which the employer denied them. The union then requested arbitration, but the employer refused. The union filed suit in federal district court seeking an order compelling the employer to arbitrate the grievances. The district court held that it possessed jurisdiction and directed the employer to comply with the arbitration provisions of the agreement. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, concluding that the district court lacked authority under either federal or state law to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. After the Court of Appeals decision but before oral argument, Lincoln Mills terminated its operations, ceased all work at the mill in March 1957, and contracted to sell its mill properties. Some of the grievances sought back pay for increased workloads, and the collective bargaining agreement authorized the arbitration board to adjust compensation retroactively.