Also known as: Article IV § 2 · Art. IV § 2 · Article IV, Section 2 · U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 · Privileges and Immunities Clause · Extradition Clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A constitutional command requiring each state to extend to citizens of other states the same privileges and immunities it affords its own citizens. The clause protects fundamental rights including the pursuit of a common calling or livelihood on substantially equal terms. Discrimination against nonresidents is invalid absent a substantial justification closely related to the distinction.
A constitutional command requiring a state to deliver up to another state a person charged with treason, felony, or other crime who has fled from justice upon proper demand by the executive authority of the charging state. The provision creates a mandatory interstate obligation to return fugitives and limits the asylum state's discretion to refuse compliance.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
A constitutional command requiring each state to extend to citizens of other states the same privileges and immunities it affords its own citizens. The clause protects fundamental rights including the pursuit of a common calling or livelihood on substantially equal terms. Discrimination against nonresidents is invalid absent a substantial justification closely related to the distinction.
Alexandra Armstrong, a citizen of State A licensed to practice law there, applied for admission to the State B bar without taking the exam under a reciprocity rule limited to State B residents. State B rejected the application solely because Armstrong maintained her primary residence in State A. The denial blocked her from representing clients in State B courts on equal terms with resident attorneys.
Albert Allen, a citizen of State C and member of its bar, sought reciprocal admission in State D under a rule requiring applicants to have resided in State D for at least one year. State D denied the application because Allen lived and practiced primarily in State C. The residency rule prevented Allen from handling matters in State D courts without additional examination or delay.
Adam Anderson moved from State G to State H and applied for state welfare benefits immediately upon arrival. State H denied benefits because Anderson had not resided in State H for one year. The denial prevented Anderson from receiving the same public assistance available to longer-term State H residents.
3 common questions
The clause protects citizens of one state from discriminatory treatment by another state with respect to fundamental rights, including the ability to pursue a livelihood on equal terms. It bars states from reserving economic benefits or professional opportunities solely for their own residents without substantial justification closely related to the distinction.
Supporting sources
A constitutional command requiring a state to deliver up to another state a person charged with treason, felony, or other crime who has fled from justice upon proper demand by the executive authority of the charging state. The provision creates a mandatory interstate obligation to return fugitives and limits the asylum state's discretion to refuse compliance.
Alice Atkins was indicted in State E for felony theft and fled to State F. State E's governor issued a formal extradition demand supported by the indictment and supporting papers. State F's governor refused to deliver Atkins, asserting an independent review of the evidence was required before surrender.
In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational. Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law. Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks. In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1 common questions
The clause creates a mandatory duty to deliver up a fugitive charged with a serious crime upon proper demand by the executive authority of the charging state. An asylum state governor may conduct only limited verification and may not refuse compliance or impose additional discretionary hurdles.
Supporting sources
…Amendment, as a whole , makes the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. This would certainly include the language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as well as the Due Process Clause. : For a more thorough exposition of my views against this approach to the Due Process Clause, see my concurring opinion in Rochin v.…
…See Spies v. Illinois , 123 U. S. 131. Decisions that particular guarantees were not safeguarded against state action by the Privileges and Immunities Clause or other provision of the Fourteenth Amendment are: United States v. Cruikshank , 92 U. S. 542, 551; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek , 259 U. S. 530, 543 (First Amendment); Presser v.…
…to travel from one state to another has long been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom. This right is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2
…any involuntary reduction or combination of a State's territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art.
…in Paul v. Virginia , 8 Wall. 168 (1869), had held commercial corporations not to be "citizens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
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View caseAnika Anand, a citizen of State I, sought employment benefits under a State J municipal program available only to individuals who had resided in State J for five years. State J denied the benefits because Anand had recently relocated from State I. The residency rule excluded Anand from economic support tied to her new employment in State J.
In July 1971 petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because the city and the Board had changed their maternity-leave policies after the complaint was filed. The court found that the acts complained of were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. It denied backpay on the ground that any damages would come ultimately from the city of New York and that holding otherwise would circumvent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape. On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the Board of Education was not a municipality within the meaning of Monroe v. Pape and that the District Court had erred in barring a damages award against the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 because it performed a vital governmental function and had no final say over its appropriations. It also held that a damages action against officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed because any award would have to be paid by a city held not amenable to suit in Monroe v. Pape. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument, the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
View caseNo. A corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the clause, so states retain broad power to regulate or exclude foreign corporations from intrastate business except as limited by other provisions such as the Commerce Clause.
Supporting sources
No when the program affects the ability to pursue a livelihood on equal terms. Residency requirements that condition employment-related grants or subsidies solely on prior state residence discriminate against citizens of other states and violate the clause unless the state shows a substantial justification closely related to the distinction.
Supporting sources
Alexis Archer was charged with a serious crime in State K and fled to State L. State K's governor made a proper extradition demand. State L initially questioned the supporting papers but ultimately delivered Archer to State K authorities after confirming the demand met constitutional requirements.
Frank Palko was indicted in Fairfield County, Connecticut, for the crime of murder in the first degree. A jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree, and he was sentenced to confinement in the state prison for life. Thereafter the State of Connecticut, with the permission of the judge presiding at the trial, gave notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors pursuant to an act adopted in 1886, now section 6494 of the General Statutes. Upon such appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. It found that there had been error of law to the prejudice of the state in excluding testimony as to a confession by defendant, in excluding testimony upon cross-examination of defendant to impeach his credibility, and in the instructions to the jury as to the difference between first and second degree murder. Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Errors, Palko was brought to trial again. Before a jury was impaneled and also at later stages of the case he made the objection that the effect of the new trial was to place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and in so doing to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Upon the overruling of the objection the trial proceeded. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree, and the court sentenced the defendant to the punishment of death. The Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the judgment of conviction, adhering to a decision announced in 1894, State v. Lee, which upheld the challenged statute. Palko sought review in the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 344.
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