canon of construction

In 2006 Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. The statute requires sex offenders to register in the jurisdictions where they live, work, and attend school. It also directs the Attorney General to specify the applicability of its requirements to offenders convicted before the Act’s enactment and to prescribe rules for their registration. At the time of enactment the nation’s population of sex offenders exceeded 500,000, and Congress left the treatment of these pre-Act offenders to the Attorney General after concluding that immediate application would impose costly burdens on states and localities. The Attorney General first left pre-Act offenders unregulated for six months after enactment. An interim rule issued in 2007 then required all pre-Act offenders to follow the same registration rules as post-Act offenders. Subsequent Attorneys General issued varying guidelines, with one directing states to register only some pre-Act offenders, another requiring registration only for those convicted of a new felony after enactment, and still others differing on whether pre-Act offenders could receive credit for time already spent in the community. Herman Gundy pleaded guilty in 2005 to possessing child pornography. He was released from prison five years later. He was arrested in 2012 for failing to register as a sex offender under the rules then prescribed for pre-Act offenders and faced an additional ten-year prison term. Gundy was convicted in 2012. He argued in the district court that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it authorized the Attorney General to specify the applicability of SORNA’s requirements. The district court rejected the argument. The Second Circuit affirmed, relying on its precedent that SORNA does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In the late 1970s, ISO, an association of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers that serves as the almost exclusive source of support services for CGL insurance in the United States, began revising its 1973 standard CGL policy form. The 1973 form provided occurrence-based coverage for sudden and accidental pollution and did not cap defense costs. Primary insurers including Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, and CIGNA Corporation sought four changes: a shift to claims-made coverage with a retroactive date, elimination of pollution coverage, and a legal defense cost cap. After ISO proposed 1984 forms that omitted some of these changes, Hartford persuaded General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest American reinsurer, to procure the modifications or derail the program. The Reinsurance Association of America agreed to boycott the 1984 forms unless the changes were added, and domestic and London reinsurers informed ISO they would withhold reinsurance until the forms were altered. ISO then withdrew the 1984 forms and adopted 1986 forms containing a retroactive date and pollution exclusion; it later withdrew support services for the 1973 form. Separate agreements among London reinsurers required primary insurers to switch to claims-made policies and excluded pollution coverage from reinsurance contracts covering North American risks. Nineteen states and many private plaintiffs filed 36 complaints alleging that these actions violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The cases were consolidated in the Northern District of California. The District Court granted motions to dismiss in 1989, holding the conduct fell within McCarran-Ferguson immunity and applying international comity to the foreign defendants. The Ninth Circuit reversed in 1991. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1992.

In October 1995, Saint Clair Adams applied for a job at Circuit City Stores, Inc., a national retailer of consumer electronics. Adams signed an employment application that included a provision stating he would settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to his application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator, with examples including claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, the Americans with Disabilities Act, contract law, and tort law. Adams was hired as a sales counselor in Circuit City's store in Santa Rosa, California. Two years later Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court asserting claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act and other claims based on general tort theories under California law. Circuit City filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams's claims pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court entered an order concluding that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement to submit his claims to binding arbitration. Adams appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the appeal was pending the Ninth Circuit ruled in an unrelated case that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to contracts of employment. Following that ruling the Ninth Circuit held in Adams's case that the arbitration agreement was contained in a contract of employment and therefore was not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. Circuit City petitioned the Supreme Court for review noting that the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that all employment contracts are excluded from the Federal Arbitration Act conflicts with every other Court of Appeals to have addressed the question. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.

In 1953 the Textile Workers Union of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Lincoln Mills of Alabama. The agreement was to run for one year and from year to year thereafter unless terminated on specified notices. It contained a no-strike clause and established a multi-step grievance procedure whose final step, available to either party, was arbitration. Several grievances concerning work loads and work assignments arose under the agreement. The union processed the grievances through every step of the contractual procedure, after which the employer denied them. The union then requested arbitration, but the employer refused. The union filed suit in federal district court seeking an order compelling the employer to arbitrate the grievances. The district court held that it possessed jurisdiction and directed the employer to comply with the arbitration provisions of the agreement. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, concluding that the district court lacked authority under either federal or state law to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. After the Court of Appeals decision but before oral argument, Lincoln Mills terminated its operations, ceased all work at the mill in March 1957, and contracted to sell its mill properties. Some of the grievances sought back pay for increased workloads, and the collective bargaining agreement authorized the arbitration board to adjust compensation retroactively.