Final Judgment Appeal
Caitlin Crowley lost her contract claim after a full trial in district court. She filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment. The circuit court accepted the case and scheduled briefing on the district court's rulings.
Also known as: Circuit Court of Appeals · U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals · federal circuit courts · Courts of Appeals · Circuit Courts · USCA
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Intermediate federal appellate courts that possess jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district courts of the United States and certain territorial courts except where direct Supreme Court review is available.
Caitlin Crowley lost her contract claim after a full trial in district court. She filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment. The circuit court accepted the case and scheduled briefing on the district court's rulings.
Curtis Cannon objected to the admission of certain documents at trial. After judgment against him, he raised the evidentiary issue on appeal. The circuit court applied the Federal Rules of Evidence to review the district court's rulings.
Carlos Castillo sued in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The district court interpreted state tort law against him. On appeal the circuit court reviewed that interpretation without deference to the trial judge.
The petitioner, a resident of North Carolina, sued respondent, a South Carolina corporation, for damages for injuries allegedly caused by the respondent's negligence. He was employed as a lineman in the construction crew of a construction contractor. Respondent Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., a South Carolina corporation in the business of selling electric power, had contracted with R. H. Bouligny, Inc. for $334,300 to build approximately 24 miles of new power lines, reconvert about 88 miles of existing lines to higher capacities, and construct two new substations and a breaker station. The petitioner was injured while connecting power lines to one of the new substations. Byrd first recovered full benefits under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law from his direct employer Bouligny. He then filed a negligence action against Blue Ridge in the United States District Court for the Western District of South Carolina under diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. At trial Blue Ridge asserted an affirmative defense that Byrd qualified as its statutory employee because the contracted work was part of its trade, business, or occupation. Blue Ridge's manager testified on direct examination that three of its substations had been built by its own construction and maintenance crews. His answers on cross-examination created uncertainty that prompted the trial judge to note he appeared to have changed his testimony. Blue Ridge also introduced evidence that it financed the project with a federal loan, purchased the materials, and maintained an engineering service contract with an independent firm for design and supervision. Its charter under the South Carolina Rural Electric Cooperative Act authorized it to construct generating plants, buildings, and equipment necessary for its operations. After all evidence was presented the district judge struck the affirmative defense, ruling that Blue Ridge could not be a statutory employer because its crews performed work only for its own use rather than for others. The judge then denied Blue Ridge's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the negligence claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Byrd in the amount of $126,786.80. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, resolved uncertainties in the manager's testimony in Blue Ridge's favor, and directed entry of judgment for Blue Ridge without remanding for further proceedings. Byrd petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The case had previously been dismissed on the ground that Blue Ridge enjoyed tort immunity as a nonprofit corporation, but the Court of Appeals had reversed that dismissal and remanded for trial. On the present appeal the Court of Appeals did not reach other grounds raised by Blue Ridge because its resolution of the statutory employer issue disposed of the case.
View caseCharlotte Chung challenged a state statute in district court and lost. She appealed the constitutional ruling. The circuit court heard the case and applied the governing precedent to the statutory scheme.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseCameron Cruz's company received a subpoena for internal communications. The district court ordered production. The circuit court reviewed whether the attorney-client privilege protected the documents.
Upjohn Co. manufactures and sells pharmaceuticals in the United States and abroad. In January 1976, independent accountants conducting an audit of one of Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries discovered that the subsidiary had made payments to or for the benefit of foreign government officials in order to secure government business. The accountants informed Gerard Thomas, Upjohn's Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel. Thomas is a member of the Michigan and New York Bars and had served as General Counsel for twenty years. Thomas consulted with outside counsel and R. T. Parfet, Jr., Upjohn's Chairman of the Board. It was decided that the company would conduct an internal investigation of what were termed questionable payments. As part of this investigation, the attorneys prepared a letter containing a questionnaire that was sent to all foreign general and area managers over the Chairman's signature. The letter noted recent disclosures that several American companies had made possibly illegal payments to foreign government officials. It stated that Thomas had been asked to conduct an investigation to determine the nature and magnitude of any such payments. Managers were instructed to treat the investigation as highly confidential and to send responses directly to Thomas. Thomas and outside counsel also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire and thirty-three other Upjohn officers or employees. On March 26, 1976, Upjohn voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 8-K disclosing the questionable payments. A copy of the report was simultaneously submitted to the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS immediately began an investigation to determine the tax consequences of the payments. On November 23, 1976, the Service issued a summons pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602 demanding production of the records described in the summons. The records included written questionnaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign affiliates. They also included memorandums or notes of the interviews conducted in the United States and abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn Company and its subsidiaries. Upjohn declined to produce the documents specified in the summons on the grounds that they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and constituted attorneys' work product prepared in anticipation of litigation. On August 31, 1977, the United States filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan seeking enforcement of the summons under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a). The district court adopted a magistrate's recommendation that the summons should be enforced. Upjohn appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit rejected the magistrate's finding of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. However, it held that the privilege did not apply to the extent the communications were made by officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn's actions in response to legal advice. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of who was within the control group. In a footnote, the court stated that the work-product doctrine is not applicable to administrative summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. § 7602. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseCharles Cunningham obtained a default judgment in state court. The defendant removed the enforcement action to federal district court. The circuit court later addressed whether the district court had properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state party.
In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services. At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state. The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction. Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title. The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.
View caseThe circuit courts of appeals hear appeals from final decisions of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, except where direct Supreme Court review is available.
Yes. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to proceedings in the United States courts of appeals.
Circuit courts sit below the Supreme Court and above the district courts. Their decisions bind district courts within the same circuit but not courts in other circuits.
…and their community.” Id. , at (slip op., at 14). Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the United States Courts of Appeals in recent years. In accordance with the judicial duty to base their decisions on principled reasons and neutral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commentary, courts have written…