Also known as: civil Officer of the United States · civil officers · U.S. civil officers
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Officials appointed or employed by the federal government who exercise significant authority under the laws of the United States. Such officials are subject to removal from office upon impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
President Carter instructed his Secretary of Energy to award federal leases to a company in which Carter held a secret interest. Congress investigated the self-dealing and opened impeachment proceedings against Carter. The proceedings targeted Carter because he qualifies as a civil officer subject to removal under the constitutional standard.
President Wilson removed a first-class postmaster without Senate consent. The postmaster sued for salary. The dispute turned on whether the postmaster held a position that made him a civil officer removable only through the impeachment process or by other means.
Frank S. Myers was appointed postmaster at Portland, Oregon, of the first class on July 10, 1917, for a term of four years fixed by statute. On January 3, 1921, President Wilson directed his removal without the advice and consent of the Senate. Myers protested to the department that his removal was illegal and refused to surrender his office. He was, however, ousted and a successor appointed with the consent of the Senate. He brought suit in the Court of Claims for his salary from the date of his removal to the end of his term. The Court of Claims gave judgment against him. The case comes here on appeal. By act of Congress approved July 12, 1876, it was provided that postmasters of the first, second and third classes should be appointed and might be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The term of the office was fixed at four years.
View casePresident Roosevelt attempted to remove an FTC commissioner for policy disagreements. The commissioner challenged the removal. The case examined whether the commissioner was a civil officer whose removal was limited to impeachment or whether Congress could restrict at-will removal.
William E. Humphrey was nominated by President Hoover on December 10, 1931, to succeed himself as a member of the Federal Trade Commission and was confirmed by the United States Senate. He was duly commissioned for a term of seven years expiring September 25, 1938, and after taking the required oath of office entered upon his duties. On July 25, 1933, President Roosevelt addressed a letter to the commissioner asking for his resignation on the ground that the aims and purposes of the Administration with respect to the work of the Commission could be carried out most effectively with personnel of his own selection, but disclaiming any reflection upon the commissioner personally or upon his services. After some further correspondence upon the subject, the President on August 31, 1933, wrote the commissioner expressing the hope that the resignation would be forthcoming and stating that their minds did not go along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission. The commissioner declined to resign. On October 7, 1933, the President wrote him that effective as of that date he was removed from the office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. Humphrey never acquiesced in this action. He continued thereafter to insist that he was still a member of the commission entitled to perform its duties and receive the compensation provided by law at the rate of $10,000 per annum. Humphrey died on February 14, 1934. Plaintiff brought suit in the Court of Claims against the United States to recover a sum of money alleged to be due the deceased for salary as a Federal Trade Commissioner from October 8, 1933, when the President undertook to remove him from office, to the time of his death. Upon the facts set forth in the certificate the Court of Claims certified two questions to the Supreme Court in respect of the power of the President to make the removal.
View caseAn independent counsel investigated a high-ranking executive-branch lawyer. The lawyer moved to quash the investigation. The motion raised whether the lawyer was a civil officer whose conduct could trigger impeachment or whether the independent-counsel statute altered removal rules.
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View caseA civilian was tried by military commission during wartime. The civilian petitioned for habeas relief. The petition tested whether the civilian was a civil officer subject to ordinary impeachment procedures or whether military jurisdiction could bypass those protections.
In October 1864 Lambdin P. Milligan, a citizen of Indiana who had lived in the state for twenty years and had never been in the military or naval service of the United States, was arrested at his home by order of General Alvin P. Hovey, commanding the military district of Indiana. He was charged with conspiracy against the United States, affording aid and comfort to rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and violation of the laws of war. On October 21, 1864, Milligan was brought before a military commission convened at Indianapolis pursuant to orders from the President and the War Department; the commission found him guilty on all charges and sentenced him to death, a sentence approved by the President with execution first set for May 19, 1865, and later postponed. After the military proceedings ended, Milligan petitioned the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the military commission lacked jurisdiction because he was a civilian citizen of a loyal state where the civil courts remained open and functioning. The petition stated that a grand jury had convened in the Circuit Court in January 1865, had been charged to inquire into violations of United States law, and had adjourned without indicting or presenting him; no indictment or presentment was ever returned against him. The petition was presented in open court on May 10, 1865, and the United States attorney appeared and submitted the application by agreement. The Circuit Court judges divided on three questions and certified them to the Supreme Court: whether a writ of habeas corpus ought to issue on the facts stated in the petition and exhibits, whether Milligan ought to be discharged from custody, and whether the military commission had jurisdiction to try and sentence him. The record filed with the certificate included the order convening the commission, the charges and specifications, the commission's findings and sentence, and the War Department order reciting presidential approval and directing execution. The Supreme Court heard argument from counsel for Milligan and for the United States on the certified questions.
View caseA state indicted a federal revenue collector for conduct in office. The collector sought removal of the case to federal court. The removal turned on whether the collector was a civil officer of the United States entitled to federal-court protection from state proceedings.
Joseph Hurtado was charged by an information filed in the Superior Court of Sacramento County with the murder of Jose Antonio Estuardo. The information was in the usual form and charged the crime with technical precision and in due legal language. It was filed after the defendant had been examined and committed by a magistrate, as required by the statute. The Constitution of California, adopted in 1879, provides that offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment. The Penal Code of the State, adopted in 1872 and in force at the time, contained provisions authorizing every person to be proceeded against criminally by indictment or by information, and specifying that an information is an accusation in writing presented by the district attorney after preliminary examination or waiver. Hurtado moved to set aside the information on the ground that it was not found or presented by a grand jury. The motion was overruled. He was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was put upon his trial. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and judgment was pronounced sentencing him to be hanged. From this judgment Hurtado appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of California, which affirmed it. He then sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.
View caseThe Constitution identifies the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States as subject to removal by impeachment and conviction. Cabinet secretaries and other principal officers who exercise significant federal authority fall within this category.
No. The Constitution provides impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate as the exclusive mechanism for removing a sitting President for misconduct. Other procedures such as recall elections or joint resolutions have no constitutional basis.
The constitutional text addresses sitting officers. Whether former Presidents or other former civil officers remain subject to impeachment after leaving office is a question left unresolved by the text itself.
The standard reaches corrupt exchanges of official acts for private or political gain as well as serious abuses of power that betray public trust. Explicit quid pro quo offers of appointments or regulatory favors in return for campaign support or favorable coverage have been treated as fitting within this category.