Also known as: civil protection order · protective order · civil protective order
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A judicial directive issued to shield an individual from domestic violence, harassment, or stalking by restricting the respondent's contact with or proximity to the protected party.
Charles Cunningham sought a civil protection order against his former partner after repeated threats. During discovery of electronic records supporting the petition, the respondent identified certain files as inaccessible due to cost. The court required the respondent to demonstrate undue burden before limiting production.
Cassandra Cooper obtained a civil protection order after an assault. The prosecutor learned of exculpatory messages that could affect the related criminal case. The prosecutor disclosed the messages to the defense while noting that a protective order could limit further dissemination.
Curtis Cannon petitioned for a civil protection order and faced discovery requests for personal financial records. He moved for limits on disclosure to avoid embarrassment. The court evaluated whether good cause existed to restrict access to the information.
Charlotte Chung held a civil protection order that included conditions for supervised contact with her child. When she refused to produce the child for a required visit, authorities sought enforcement. The court examined whether the order created a duty that overrode other privileges.
Maurice M. was hospitalized at three months old with a fractured left femur and other indications of severe physical abuse. Hospital personnel observed respondent Bouknight shaking Maurice and handling him improperly. This led them to notify the Baltimore City Department of Social Services of suspected child abuse. In February 1987, the Department secured a court order removing Maurice from Bouknight's control and placing him in shelter care. Several months later, the shelter care order was modified to return Maurice to Bouknight temporarily. Following a hearing, the juvenile court declared Maurice a child in need of assistance and placed him under the Department's continuing oversight pursuant to a protective supervision order. The order required Bouknight to cooperate with the Department, continue in therapy, participate in parental aid and training programs, and refrain from physically punishing Maurice. Eight months later, the Department returned to juvenile court fearing for Maurice's safety. BCDSS caseworkers related that Bouknight would not cooperate with them and had in nearly every respect violated the terms of the protective order. On April 20, 1988, the court granted BCDSS' petition to remove Maurice from Bouknight's control for placement in foster care. BCDSS officials also petitioned for judicial relief from Bouknight's failure to produce Maurice or reveal where he could be found. The court issued an order to show cause why Bouknight should not be held in civil contempt for failure to produce the child. Maurice was not produced at subsequent hearings. At a hearing one week later, Bouknight claimed that Maurice was with a relative in Dallas. Investigation revealed that the relative had not seen Maurice. The next day, following another hearing at which Bouknight again declined to produce Maurice, the juvenile court found Bouknight in contempt for failure to produce the child as ordered. The court directed that Bouknight be imprisoned until she purged herself of contempt by either producing Maurice before the court or revealing to the court his exact whereabouts. Bouknight's claim that the contempt order violated the Fifth Amendment was rejected by the juvenile court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated the judgment upholding the contempt order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseCade Carpenter and Camila Cervantes disputed control over frozen embryos after their relationship ended. A prior civil protection order between them raised questions about whether one party could unilaterally direct disposition. The court held that mutual agreement remained necessary despite the order's existence.
A.Z. and B.Z. married in 1977. For the first two years they resided in Virginia, where both served in the armed forces. They underwent fertility testing after difficulties conceiving. The wife suffered an ectopic pregnancy that resulted in miscarriage and removal of her left fallopian tube. In 1980 the couple moved to Maryland for a year of additional fertility treatment that produced no pregnancy. The wife transferred to Massachusetts in 1988 while the husband remained in Maryland for schooling. He joined her in Massachusetts in 1991. After arriving in Massachusetts the wife began IVF treatments at a clinic. The couple first attempted a GIFT procedure on November 6, 1988, which produced another ectopic pregnancy and removal of the wife's remaining fallopian tube. They then pursued IVF from 1988 through 1991. Each time before egg retrieval the couple signed a clinic consent form. They executed seven such forms in total, the last in August 1991. On every form the wife wrote that the preembryos should be returned to her for implantation should the couple separate. The husband usually signed the forms while blank and before the wife completed the disposition language. The 1991 treatment produced twin daughters born in 1992, and two vials of preembryos were frozen for possible later use. In spring 1995, before the couple separated, the wife thawed one vial and had a preembryo implanted without informing the husband. He learned of the procedure from an insurance notice. Relations deteriorated, the wife obtained a protective order against the husband, the couple separated, and the husband filed for divorce. At the time of divorce one vial containing four frozen preembryos remained in storage. The husband moved for a permanent injunction prohibiting the wife from using the preembryos. The Probate and Family Court bifurcated the preembryos issue from the divorce action and held a hearing at which both parties were represented by counsel. The probate judge found the consent form unenforceable because of changed circumstances since 1991 and balanced the parties' interests, granting the husband a permanent injunction. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion. On February 8, 2000, it issued an order affirming the Probate and Family Court judgment, with this opinion to follow.
View caseAfter obtaining a civil protection order, a victim reported repeated violations to police. Officers declined to arrest the respondent despite the order's terms. The court later considered whether the victim possessed an enforceable right to police action under the order.
Jessica Gonzales obtained a temporary restraining order against her estranged husband in May 1999 in connection with divorce proceedings in a Colorado state court. The order was served on the husband on June 4, 1999. The state trial court modified the terms of the restraining order on June 4, 1999, and made it permanent. The modified order granted the husband limited visitation rights with their three daughters on alternate weekends, for two weeks during the summer, and upon reasonable notice for a mid-week dinner visit. On the evening of June 22, 1999, the husband took the three daughters, ages 10, 9, and 7, from outside the family home without any advance arrangements for visitation that night. Gonzales contacted the Castle Rock Police Department around 7:30 p.m. She showed officers a copy of the restraining order and requested its enforcement and the immediate return of the children. The officers stated there was nothing they could do and advised her to call back if the children did not return by 10:00 p.m. Gonzales made additional calls to the police throughout the night. She called at 8:30 p.m. after speaking with her husband who was at an amusement park in Denver. She called at 10:10 p.m., at midnight, and at 12:10 a.m. when she went to his apartment. Each time she was told to wait or that no immediate action would be taken. When she filed an incident report at the police station around 12:50 a.m., the officer took the report but made no effort to locate the children before going to dinner. At approximately 3:20 a.m. on June 23, 1999, the husband arrived at the police station and opened fire with a semi-automatic handgun. Police shot back, killing him. Inside the cab of his pickup truck, they found the bodies of all three daughters, whom he had already murdered. Gonzales subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Castle Rock. She alleged that the police department's policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of restraining order violations deprived her of due process. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Tenth Circuit en banc reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseIt shields victims of domestic violence or stalking by limiting contact or proximity from the respondent.
Civil protection orders address personal safety in abuse cases while discovery protective orders manage burdens in litigation.
Enforcement depends on whether the order creates a mandatory duty for officers, an issue examined in cases involving due process claims.
…BCDSS caseworkers related that Bouknight would not cooperate with them and had in nearly every respect violated the terms of the protective order. BCDSS stated that Maurice’s father had recently died in a shooting incident and that Bouknight, in light of the results of a psychological examination and her history of drug use, could…