Civil Restraining Order

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the laws of New York. Its first Alabama affiliates were chartered in 1918, and in 1951 the Association opened a regional office in Alabama employing two supervisory persons and one clerical worker. The Association has never complied with Alabama's foreign corporation qualification statute. In 1956 the Attorney General of Alabama brought an equity suit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to enjoin the Association from further activities within the state and to oust it from Alabama. The bill alleged that the Association had opened a regional office, organized affiliates, recruited members, solicited contributions, given financial support and legal assistance to Negro students seeking admission to the state university, and supported a Negro boycott of Montgomery bus lines. On the day the complaint was filed the Circuit Court issued an ex parte order restraining the Association pendente lite from engaging in further activities within the state and from taking steps to qualify to do business. The State moved for production of a large number of records including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama members and agents. Over the Association's objections the Circuit Court ordered production of a substantial part of the requested records including the membership lists and postponed the hearing on the restraining order. The Association answered the bill, admitted its Alabama activities substantially as alleged, and offered to qualify if the bar from qualification were lifted, but it did not produce the membership lists. For its failure to comply the Association was adjudged in civil contempt and fined $10,000, with the fine subject to increase to $100,000 if compliance was not forthcoming within five days. After the five-day period the Association produced substantially all requested data except the membership lists, and the Circuit Court increased the fine to $100,000. The Alabama Supreme Court twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review the final contempt judgment, the first time for insufficiency of the petition's allegations and the second time on procedural grounds. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the constitutional questions presented.

In 1975, the Connecticut Welfare Department regulation restricted Medicaid payments for first trimester abortions to those certified as medically necessary by the attending physician, a term that included psychiatric necessity, and required prior authorization from the Department of Social Services along with a written request from the patient or, for a minor, a parent or guardian. Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services of Connecticut, enforced the limitation through this system of certificates and approvals. Appellees Poe, a sixteen-year-old high school junior who had obtained an abortion for which the hospital later sought reimbursement of $244, and Roe, an unwed mother of three unable to obtain the required certificate, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf of themselves and a certified class of indigent women unable to secure Medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation. The complaint challenged the regulation as inconsistent with Title XIX of the Social Security Act and as violative of Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection guarantees. The district court initially held that Title XIX required state funding of nontherapeutic abortions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed that statutory ruling, holding that the Act permitted but did not require such funding, and remanded for consideration of the constitutional issues. On remand a three-judge district court was convened; it invalidated the regulation and enjoined enforcement of the medical necessity certificate requirement as well as the related prior written request and authorization procedures. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to review the constitutional validity of the Connecticut regulation.

On January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah. The torchbearers were to proceed along a street in front of Juneau-Douglas High School while school was in session. Petitioner Deborah Morse, the school principal, decided to permit staff and students to participate in the Torch Relay as an approved social event or class trip. Students were allowed to leave class to observe the relay from either side of the street. Teachers and administrative officials monitored the students’ actions. Respondent Joseph Frederick, a JDHS senior, was late to school that day. When he arrived, he joined his friends across the street from the school to watch the event. As the torchbearers and camera crews passed by, Frederick and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” The large banner was easily readable by the students on the other side of the street. Principal Morse immediately crossed the street and demanded that the banner be taken down. Everyone but Frederick complied. Morse confiscated the banner and told Frederick to report to her office, where she suspended him for 10 days. Morse later explained that she told Frederick to take the banner down because she thought it encouraged illegal drug use, in violation of established school policy. Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520 states that the Board specifically prohibits any assembly or public expression that advocates the use of substances that are illegal to minors. In addition, Juneau School Board Policy No. 5850 subjects pupils who participate in approved social events and class trips to the same student conduct rules that apply during the regular school program. Frederick administratively appealed his suspension, but the Juneau School District Superintendent upheld it, limiting it to time served. In a memorandum setting forth his reasons, the superintendent determined that Frederick had displayed his banner in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity. The superintendent further explained that Frederick was not disciplined because the principal disagreed with his message, but because his speech appeared to advocate the use of illegal drugs. Frederick then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the school board and Morse had violated his First Amendment rights. The District Court granted summary judgment for the school board and Morse. The Ninth Circuit reversed, deciding that Frederick acted during a school-authorized activity and that the banner expressed a positive sentiment about marijuana use, but finding a violation of Frederick’s First Amendment rights because the school punished Frederick without demonstrating that his speech gave rise to a risk of substantial disruption. The Ninth Circuit further concluded that Frederick’s right to display his banner was so clearly established that a reasonable principal in Morse’s position would have understood that her actions were unconstitutional, and that Morse was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions of whether Frederick had a First Amendment right to wield his banner and whether that right was so clearly established that the principal may be held liable for damages.