Also known as:claims of privilege · claiming privilege · privilege claim · asserting privilege
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An assertion by a party or witness that certain information, communications, or testimony is protected from compelled disclosure by a recognized legal privilege such as attorney-client or self-incrimination.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Inadvertent Production Notification
Continental Bank produced a batch of emails during discovery in a contract dispute with Compass Logistics. After review, Continental Bank notified Compass Logistics that several emails contained attorney-client communications and asserted a claim of privilege over them. Compass Logistics promptly returned the specified emails and refrained from using them while the court resolved the claim.
State Law Privilege in Civil Action
In a federal diversity suit governed by state contract law, Chloe Chen sought to introduce a confidential marital communication. The court applied state privilege rules to determine whether Craig Caldwell could successfully assert a claim of privilege to block the evidence.
After receiving use and derivative-use immunity, a witness who had previously asserted a claim of privilege against self-incrimination answered questions before the grand jury. The grant of immunity removed the basis for the privilege claim and compelled the testimony.
Kastigar v. United States406 U.S. 441 (1972)
In February 1971 petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in the Central District of California investigating violations of federal gambling and related laws. The government believed that petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Prior to the scheduled appearances, the government applied to the District Court for an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003. Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, contending that the scope of the immunity provided by the statute was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and therefore was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel their testimony. The District Court rejected this contention and ordered petitioners to appear before the grand jury and answer its questions under the grant of immunity.
Petitioners appeared but refused to answer questions, asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. They were brought before the District Court, and each persisted in his refusal to answer the grand jury's questions notwithstanding the grant of immunity. The court found both in contempt and committed them to the custody of the Attorney General until either they answered the grand jury's questions or the term of the grand jury expired.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the contempt findings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether testimony may be compelled by granting immunity from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom or whether transactional immunity is necessary.
A state prisoner refused to answer questions at a legislative hearing, asserting a claim of privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court applied the federal standard to evaluate whether the state proceeding properly honored the claim.
Malloy v. Hogan378 U.S. 1 (1964)
In November 1959, Harold Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in Hartford, Connecticut, on charges related to pool selling. He pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor, receiving a sentence of one year in jail and a five-hundred-dollar fine, with the jail term suspended after ninety days followed by two years of probation.
Approximately sixteen months later, Malloy was subpoenaed to appear before a referee appointed by the Superior Court of Hartford County to investigate alleged gambling and other criminal activities in the county. During the inquiry, he was questioned about the circumstances of his 1959 arrest and conviction, including the identity of his employer, who paid his fine and bondsman, the tenant of the apartment where he was arrested, and whether he knew a man named John Bergoti. Malloy refused to answer any of these questions, asserting that his responses might tend to incriminate him.
The Superior Court adjudged Malloy in contempt and ordered him committed to prison until he answered the questions. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the contempt adjudication, holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege was unavailable in state proceedings and that Malloy had not properly invoked the state constitutional privilege. Malloy then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which was denied, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions presented.
The President filed a formal claim of privilege over subpoenaed Oval Office tapes sought by the special prosecutor. The district court reviewed the claim in camera to determine whether the privilege yielded to the demonstrated need for the evidence in a criminal proceeding.
United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury returned an indictment charging seven named individuals with offenses including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although not designated in the indictment, the grand jury named President Richard M. Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President requiring production of tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to precisely identified meetings between the President and others.
The President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations on April 30, 1974, including 20 subject to the subpoena. On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c) along with a claim of privilege. At a subsequent hearing, further motions to expunge the grand jury's action naming the President as an unindicted co-conspirator and for protective orders were filed by counsel for the President.
On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and ordered production of the materials by May 31, 1974. The court rejected claims that the dispute was a nonjusticiable intra-executive conflict and that the Judiciary lacked authority to review executive privilege. On May 24, 1974, the President appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Special Prosecutor petitioned for certiorari before judgment, which was granted.
The case was set for argument on July 8, 1974. The proceeding is a pending federal criminal prosecution in United States v. Mitchell et al. set for trial on September 9, 1974.
The government called a defendant's spouse to testify about joint criminal activity. The spouse declined to assert a claim of privilege and chose to testify after receiving immunity, allowing the testimony to proceed over the defendant's objection.
Trammel v. United States445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980)
On March 10, 1976, Otis Trammel was indicted with Edwin Lee Roberts and Joseph Freeman for importing heroin into the United States from Thailand and the Philippine Islands and for conspiracy to import heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 962(a), and 963. The indictment also named six unindicted co-conspirators, including petitioner’s wife Elizabeth Ann Trammel. According to the indictment, petitioner and his wife flew from the Philippines to California in August 1975, carrying with them a quantity of heroin, and Freeman and Roberts assisted them in its distribution.
Elizabeth Trammel then traveled to Thailand where she purchased another supply of the drug. On November 3, 1975, with four ounces of heroin on her person, she boarded a plane for the United States. During a routine customs search in Hawaii, she was searched, the heroin was discovered, and she was arrested. After discussions with Drug Enforcement Administration agents, she agreed to cooperate with the Government.
Prior to trial on this indictment, petitioner moved to sever his case from that of Roberts and Freeman. He advised the court that the Government intended to call his wife as an adverse witness and asserted his claim to a privilege to prevent her from testifying against him. At a hearing on the motion, Mrs. Trammel was called as a Government witness under a grant of use immunity. She testified that she and petitioner were married in May 1975 and that they remained married. She explained that her cooperation with the Government was based on assurances that she would be given lenient treatment. She then described, in considerable detail, her role and that of her husband in the heroin distribution conspiracy.
The District Court ruled that Mrs. Trammel could testify in support of the Government’s case to any act she observed during the marriage and to any communication made in the presence of a third person. However, confidential communications between petitioner and his wife were held to be privileged and inadmissible. The motion to sever was denied. At trial, Elizabeth Trammel testified within the limits of the court’s pretrial ruling; her testimony, as the Government concedes, constituted virtually its entire case against petitioner. He was found guilty on both the substantive and conspiracy charges and sentenced to an indeterminate term of years pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b).
In the Court of Appeals petitioner’s only claim of error was that the admission of the adverse testimony of his wife, over his objection, contravened this Court’s teaching in Hawkins v. United States and therefore constituted reversible error. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. It concluded that Hawkins did not prohibit the voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity from the Government in return for her testimony.
How must a party assert a claim of privilege over inadvertently produced discovery material?
The producing party notifies the receiving party of the claim and its basis. The recipient must then promptly return, sequester, or destroy the material and may not use it until the claim is resolved.
Which law governs a claim of privilege in a federal civil case controlled by state substantive law?
State law governs the privilege claim when state law supplies the rule of decision for the underlying claim or defense.
Does a witness's decision to testify on one topic waive the privilege against self-incrimination on unrelated character-for-truthfulness questions?
No. Testimony on one matter does not waive the privilege regarding questions that relate only to the witness's character for truthfulness.
Who bears the burden of proving that a spousal communication was not confidential?
The party opposing the privilege claim must rebut the presumption that spousal communications are confidential.
…the President as a coconspirator. Since we find resolution of this issue unnecessary to resolution of the question whether the
claim of privilege
is to prevail, the cross-petition for certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted and the remainder of this opinion is concerned with the issues raised in No. 73-1766. On June 19,…