Also known as:claim-preclusion · res judicata (claim)
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine that bars a party from relitigating a claim already decided by a final judgment on the merits in a prior action between the same parties. The doctrine requires identity of parties, a final judgment, and the same claim under the transactional test used in most jurisdictions. It extinguishes the claim entirely whether the prior judgment favored the plaintiff through merger or the defendant through bar.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
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Statute Of Limitations Dismissal
Caleb Chang sued Cedar Creek Farms in State A court for breach of a supply contract. The court dismissed the action with prejudice because the four-year limitations period had run and State A law treats such dismissals as adjudications on the merits. Chang then filed the identical claim in federal court in State B, where the limitations period is longer. The federal court must apply State A preclusion law to determine whether the dismissal bars the new suit.
Changed Circumstances After Facial Challenge
Corinne Cho and other providers brought a facial challenge to a state admitting-privileges statute and lost. After the statute took effect and imposed concrete burdens on clinics, Cho filed a new action asserting an as-applied challenge based on post-enforcement evidence. The court permitted the second suit because the new facts created a distinct claim not barred by the earlier facial ruling.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt579 U.S. 582 (2016)
In July 2013 the Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 2.
The bill contained an admitting-privileges requirement for physicians performing abortions and a surgical-center requirement for abortion facilities.
Before the law took effect a group of Texas abortion providers filed the Abbott case seeking facial invalidation of the admitting-privileges provision. The district court initially enjoined the provision but the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction and later upheld the requirement on the basis of evidence presented before enforcement.
On April 6 2014 petitioners a group of abortion providers that included some Abbott plaintiffs filed this suit in federal district court. They sought as-applied relief against the admitting-privileges requirement for facilities in McAllen and El Paso and a statewide injunction against the surgical-center requirement claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court held a four-day bench trial and received stipulations expert depositions and testimony. It found that the number of facilities providing abortions dropped in half from about 40 to about 20 after the admitting-privileges requirement began to be enforced. It found that the number of women of reproductive age living more than 50 miles from a clinic doubled. The number living more than 100 miles away increased by 150 percent. The number living more than 150 miles away increased by more than 350 percent. The number living more than 200 miles away increased by about 2,800 percent.
It found that the number of facilities would drop to seven or eight if the surgical-center provision took effect. It found that before H. B. 2's passage abortion was an extremely safe procedure with very low rates of complications and virtually no deaths. It found that abortion was safer than many more common procedures not subject to the same level of regulation. It found that the cost of compliance with the surgical-center requirement would most likely exceed 1.5 million dollars to 3 million dollars per clinic.
On the basis of these findings the district court enjoined enforcement of both provisions. The Fifth Circuit reversed in significant part holding that res judicata barred the challenges and that both requirements were constitutional. The case reached the Supreme Court.
Virtual Representation Rejected
Christopher Collins filed a FOIA suit seeking FAA documents after his close friend Greg Herr had already lost an identical suit. The court refused to treat Collins as bound by Herr’s judgment because the two men were not in privity and Collins had not controlled or been represented in the earlier action.
Taylor v. Sturgell553 U.S. 880, 893-895 (2008)
Brent Taylor and Greg Herrick were friends who shared an interest in restoring antique aircraft, including the F-45 model manufactured in the 1930s. In 1997, Herrick submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the Federal Aviation Administration seeking technical documents from the F-45 certification process held in agency records. The FAA denied the request under the trade secrets exemption after consulting with Fairchild Corporation, the corporate successor to the original manufacturer, which objected to disclosure. Herrick then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.
The Wyoming District Court granted summary judgment to the FAA, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision on July 24, 2002, upholding the exemption despite a 1955 letter from the manufacturer authorizing public use of the documents. Less than a month later, on August 22, 2002, Taylor submitted an identical FOIA request to the FAA for the same F-45 documents. When the agency did not respond, Taylor filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the 1955 letter had removed trade secret protection and raising additional issues about whether protection could be restored or recaptured.
After Fairchild intervened as a defendant, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Taylor's suit, concluding that he was virtually represented in Herrick's prior action. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, applying its own five-factor test for virtual representation that included identity of interests, adequate representation, and a close relationship.
The record showed that Taylor served as president of the Antique Aircraft Association to which Herrick belonged, that Herrick had asked Taylor to assist with restoring his F-45 without a formal contract, that Taylor later retained the same attorney who represented Herrick, and that Herrick had provided Taylor with documents obtained during discovery in the Wyoming litigation. Taylor had not participated directly in Herrick's suit, received no notice of it, and exercised no control over its conduct. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the virtual representation doctrine applied by the lower courts.
Judgment Does Not Bind Nonparties
Camila Cervantes obtained a state-court injunction against General Motors that restricted certain testimony in product-liability cases. When a different plaintiff later sued General Motors in federal court, the court held that the prior injunction could not bind the new plaintiff because claim preclusion operates only between parties to the first action or their privies.
Baker v. General Motors Corp.522 U.S. 222, 246 (1998)
Ronald Elwell worked as an engineering analyst for General Motors Corporation from 1959 until 1989. For fifteen years he was assigned to the Engineering Analysis Group studying the performance of GM vehicles in product liability litigation, particularly those involving fires. He assisted GM lawyers in defending such suits.
Beginning in 1987 the Elwell-GM employment relationship soured. GM and Elwell first negotiated an agreement under which Elwell would retire after serving as a GM consultant for two years. When the time came for Elwell to retire, however, disagreement again surfaced and continued into 1991. A month later Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County Court alleging wrongful discharge and related tort and contract claims. GM counterclaimed that Elwell had breached fiduciary duties by disclosing privileged and confidential information and misappropriating documents.
Following a hearing, the Michigan trial court on November 22, 1991, enjoined Elwell from consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of General Motors Corporation's trade secrets, confidential information or matters of attorney-client work product relating in any manner to the subject matter of any products liability litigation whether already filed or to be filed in the future which Ronald Elwell received, had knowledge of, or was entrusted with during his employments with General Motors Corporation. In August 1992 the parties settled for an undisclosed sum. They jointly submitted a stipulated permanent injunction that the Michigan court entered without further hearing. The injunction comprehensively enjoined Elwell from testifying, without the prior written consent of General Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial, as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer of the product(s) in issue. The separate settlement agreement stated that court-ordered testimony would in no way form a basis for an action in violation of the Permanent Injunction or this Agreement.
In February 1990 Beverly Garner died when the engine of her 1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer caught fire after a Missouri highway collision. Her sons Kenneth and Steven Baker filed a wrongful-death product liability suit against GM in Missouri state court in September 1991. They alleged a defective fuel pump caused the post-collision fire. GM removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds. GM defended on the merits that the fuel pump was not faulty and that impact injuries alone caused the death. The Bakers sought to depose Elwell and call him at trial. GM objected on the basis of the Michigan injunction. After in camera review of the injunction and settlement agreement the Missouri federal district court permitted Elwell's deposition and trial testimony. The court relied on alternative grounds that Missouri public policy favored disclosure of relevant nonprivileged information and that the injunction was modifiable.
At trial Elwell testified in support of the Bakers' fuel-pump defect claim. He identified a 1973 internal GM memorandum concerning fuel-fed engine fire risks. The jury returned an $11.3 million verdict for the Bakers. The district court entered judgment on the verdict. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that Elwell's testimony should not have been admitted because the Michigan injunction controlled. Missouri's public policy favoring full faith and credit outweighed any disclosure policy. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the full faith and credit requirement stops the Bakers from obtaining Elwell's testimony in their Missouri action.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What are the four traditional elements of claim preclusion?
Claim preclusion requires a final judgment on the merits, identity of parties or their privies, identity of the claim under the transactional test, and a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first action.
Does a statute-of-limitations dismissal always trigger claim preclusion in a later suit?
No. Under Semtek, Rule 41(b) does not itself decide whether a limitations dismissal counts as on the merits for preclusion purposes. The rendering jurisdiction’s own law controls that characterization.
How does claim preclusion differ from issue preclusion?
Claim preclusion bars an entire claim that could have been raised in the first suit. Issue preclusion prevents relitigation only of issues actually litigated and necessarily decided, even if the second suit involves a different claim.
Can a judgment against one joint tortfeasor preclude a later suit against another for the same harm?
It can, if the jurisdiction treats all theories of recovery for a single accident as one claim and the plaintiff already obtained a final judgment on that claim against the first defendant.
Supporting sources
Does claim preclusion apply when the second suit adds new defendants not parties to the first action?
Yes, provided the claim is the same and the plaintiff had a full opportunity to join those defendants in the original suit. The doctrine focuses on the plaintiff’s claim rather than the identity of every possible defendant.
Supporting sources
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Claim preclusion
prohibits “successive litigation of the very same
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,” New Hampshire v. Maine , 532 U. S. 742, 748, but petitioners’…
. Any contention that NYCLA §24 conflicts with §1983 therefore would be misplaced. The Court nevertheless has relied on an…
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and collateral estoppel. However, Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional limitations would be neither necessary nor…
Civil ProcedureVerdicts and judgments · Effect; claim and issue preclusionUBEFoundational