Also known as: class action · class-action · class-actions · class action lawsuit · representative proceeding
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural device permitting one or more representatives to litigate claims or defenses on behalf of a larger group that shares common questions of law or fact. Certification requires satisfaction of the prerequisites in Rule 23(a) together with one of the categories listed in Rule 23(b). The resulting judgment binds absent class members provided due-process protections such as notice and opt-out rights are observed.
Charles Cunningham and 180 other homeowners sued Canyon Construction alleging defective foundation work on identical model homes. Separate suits risked conflicting rulings on whether the same construction specifications violated building codes. The court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because individual adjudications would impose incompatible standards of conduct on the builder.
Catherine Carter, a New York resident, filed a diversity class action in federal court seeking statutory interest on late credit-card payments. A New York statute barred class treatment of such claims. The court held that Rule 23 governed certification because the federal rule addressed procedure and did not enlarge substantive rights under the Rules Enabling Act.
Cynthia Cortez and neighboring landowners brought a class action against Citadel Security for noise and light pollution from a nearby facility. The complaint alleged a private nuisance affecting use and enjoyment of land. Cortez satisfied standing requirements to proceed as class representative under the Restatement provision allowing a class member to sue on behalf of the affected public.
Curtis Cannon and thousands of consumers sued Crown Pharmaceuticals alleging a uniform misrepresentation on drug labels caused economic loss. Common questions about the falsity of the label and the defendant's knowledge predominated over individual reliance issues. The court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) after finding that a single proceeding was superior to thousands of separate suits.
Cassandra Cooper purchased a cell-phone plan containing an arbitration clause that barred class proceedings. She later sought to pursue a class action alleging improper charges. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted a state unconscionability rule that would have invalidated the class-action waiver.
In February 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion entered into an agreement for the sale and servicing of cellular telephones with AT&T Mobility LLC. The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties but required that claims be brought in the parties' individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding. The agreement authorized AT&T to make unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitration provision on several occasions. The parties agree that the December 2006 revisions control. The revised agreement requires customers to complete a one-page Notice of Dispute form. It allows AT&T to offer settlement. It provides that AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims. Arbitration must take place in the county where the customer is billed. For claims of $10,000 or less, the customer may choose in-person, telephone, or submission-based proceedings. The agreement preserves the right to bring claims in small claims court. It requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery plus twice the claimant's attorney's fees if the arbitration award exceeds AT&T's last written settlement offer. The Concepcions purchased AT&T service advertised as including free phones but were charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the phones' retail value. In March 2006, the Concepcions filed a complaint against AT&T in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Their suit was consolidated with a putative class action alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free. In March 2008, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its contract with the Concepcions. The Concepcions opposed the motion on the ground that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under California law because it disallowed classwide procedures. The District Court denied AT&T's motion. It described the arbitration agreement favorably in several respects. Nevertheless, the court found the provision unconscionable under the California Supreme Court's Discover Bank decision because AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It also found the provision unconscionable under California law as announced in Discover Bank. The court held that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because the rule was simply a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseCaleb Chang filed a putative class action alleging that telecommunications carriers engaged in parallel pricing conduct. The complaint contained only allegations of parallel behavior without facts suggesting an agreement. The Supreme Court held that such allegations failed to state a plausible claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and dismissed the action.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseThe plaintiff must demonstrate that common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues and that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. The court considers the class members' interests in controlling separate actions, the extent of existing litigation, the desirability of concentrating claims in one forum, and manageability.
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Yes. When a federal rule addresses the procedure for class certification and does not abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights, it controls under the Rules Enabling Act even if a state statute would deny class treatment.
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A class member may sue as representative when the claim involves invasion of interests in the private use and enjoyment of land and the member meets the standing requirements set out in the Restatement.
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The claims of individual class members are aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 under the Class Action Fairness Act. Separate and distinct claims cannot be aggregated to meet the ordinary diversity threshold of $75,000.
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…were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having been decided by October 28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional…