Also known as: collateral estoppel · collateral estoppels · issue preclusion · estoppel by judgment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine preventing relitigation of an issue of ultimate fact or law that was actually litigated and necessarily decided by a valid and final judgment in a prior proceeding. The doctrine applies when the same parties or their privies are involved and promotes finality while protecting against inconsistent outcomes. It operates both defensively to bar a plaintiff from relitigating and offensively when fairness permits a nonparty to bind a defendant to a prior adverse determination.
Connor Clark was tried for robbing one poker player and acquitted when the jury found the prosecution failed to prove his identity as the gunman. Prosecutors then charged him with robbing a second player from the same incident. The prior acquittal necessarily resolved the identity issue in Clark's favor, so the state cannot retry that factual determination in the second prosecution.
Christine Castro stood trial for theft after a store clerk identified her as the shoplifter. The jury acquitted her because it found the clerk's identification unreliable. When new surveillance footage surfaced, prosecutors sought to charge her with the same theft using the additional evidence. The prior acquittal on the ultimate issue of identity bars the second prosecution even though the state acted in good faith.
Cobalt Energy lost an SEC enforcement action after a full trial that found it violated securities laws by filing false reports. A private investor who was not a party to the SEC case then sued Cobalt Energy for damages arising from the same false reports and moved for summary judgment on the violation element. The court permitted the investor to use the prior finding offensively because Cobalt Energy had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and no procedural unfairness resulted.
Crown Pharmaceuticals financed and directed every strategic decision in a supplier's lawsuit against a state agency over the same drug-pricing formula Crown later challenged. After the supplier lost, Crown filed its own action asserting the identical pricing claim. Because Crown exercised practical control and held a direct financial interest in the earlier litigation, the prior judgment binds Crown on the pricing issue.
Charles Cunningham was charged with multiple counts arising from one fraudulent scheme. He successfully moved to sever the counts for separate trials. After acquittal on the first severed count, he argued the government could not proceed on the remaining counts. The court rejected the claim because Cunningham's own request for separate trials prevented the attachment of jeopardy that would support issue preclusion across the severed cases.
Crystal Dynamics obtained a final judgment dismissing a securities class action. Congress later enacted a statute that would have revived the dismissed claims. Crystal Dynamics moved to enforce the judgment. The court held that the final judgment remained conclusive and could not be reopened by subsequent legislation because collateral estoppel protects the conclusive effect of a court's determination once rendered.
In 1987 petitioners filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against respondents. The complaint alleged that respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of stock in 1983 and 1984 in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The District Court dismissed the action as time barred under the then-applicable Kentucky statute of limitations. While petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson on June 20, 1991. The next day the Court applied that decision to dismiss another pending appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded petitioners' case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Lampf. On August 13, 1991, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice under the Lampf statute of limitations. Petitioners filed no appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later on December 18, 1991. On December 19, 1991, the President signed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Section 476 of that Act added section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Subsection (b) provides that any private civil action under section 10(b) commenced on or before June 19, 1991, which was dismissed as time barred after that date and which would have been timely under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than sixty days after December 19, 1991. Petitioners promptly filed a motion under section 27A(b) to reinstate their action. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
A prior judgment may be used offensively by a nonparty only when the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, possessed sufficient incentive given the stakes, and would not suffer unfair surprise from the change in remedy or forum. Courts weigh whether the defendant could have anticipated private damages exposure and whether procedural differences such as the absence of a jury render preclusion inequitable.
…" [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law . . . [to] review on the merits, without regard to the defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel,' " a Sioux claim for just compensation from the United States—even though the Court of Claims had previously heard and rejected that very claim. We considered and rejected…
…was whether the petitioner was one of the robbers, and the first jury by its verdict found that he was not. The doctrine of collateral estoppel
…pursuit of stale claims, complex statute of limitations problems, or the wasteful splitting of actions, with resultant claim and issue preclusion complications. [10] The Court of Appeals also observed that allowing civil suits without prior convictions "would make a hash" of the statute's liberal-construction requirement. 741 F. 2d,…
…or more than one judge, on the merits; and quite apart from questions of included offenses, the government may be barred by collateral estoppel if a fact is found in favor of the defendant and is dispositive in later trials, see Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U. S. 436 (1970). Finally, the prosecutor will have to justify, at least to the…
An acquittal bars relitigation only when the prior judgment necessarily decided an ultimate fact that the prosecution must prove again in the second case. If identity or causation was the sole rational issue resolved in the defendant's favor, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the state from retrying that same factual determination even with newly discovered evidence.
A nonparty that assumes practical control and holds a direct financial interest in earlier litigation is bound by the resulting judgment on issues actually and necessarily decided. The doctrine treats such control as creating privity sufficient to prevent the controlling party from relitigating the same issue in a later suit.
A criminal acquittal does not bind a civil court because the acquittal shows only that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The civil proceeding may independently assess the same facts under the preponderance standard and reach a contrary result without violating collateral estoppel principles.
A defendant's successful motion to sever charges for separate trials prevents jeopardy from attaching in a manner that would bar subsequent trials on the remaining counts. The defendant's consent to separate proceedings removes the double-jeopardy foundation for precluding the later prosecutions.