collateral matter

The State of New York charged petitioner Harris in a two-count indictment with twice selling heroin to an undercover police officer on January 4 and January 6, 1966. At the jury trial, the undercover officer testified as to the details of the two sales, a second officer verified collateral details, and a third offered testimony about the chemical analysis of the heroin. Petitioner Harris took the stand in his own defense. He admitted knowing the undercover police officer but denied a sale on January 4. He admitted making a sale of the contents of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but claimed it was baking powder and part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser. On cross-examination, petitioner was asked whether he had made specified statements to the police immediately following his arrest on January 7 that partially contradicted his direct testimony. In response, petitioner testified that he could not remember virtually any of the questions or answers recited by the prosecutor. At the request of petitioner’s counsel, the written statement was placed in the record for possible use on appeal but was not shown to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to petitioner could be considered only in passing on his credibility and not as evidence of guilt. The jury found petitioner guilty on the second count of the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a per curiam opinion. The prosecution made no effort in its case in chief to use the statements. The prosecution conceded they were inadmissible under Miranda because no warning of a right to appointed counsel was given before questions were put to petitioner when taken into custody. Petitioner made no claim that the statements were coerced or involuntary. The Supreme Court granted the writ to consider whether such a statement may be used to impeach the petitioner’s credibility.

In December 1911 a federal indictment containing nine counts was returned against the defendant in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. The seventh count charged use of the mails to transport lottery coupons or tickets in violation of section 213 of the Criminal Code. The defendant was arrested without a warrant by a police officer at the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri, where he was employed by an express company. On the same day other police officers went to the defendant's home at 1834 Penn Street, obtained the key from a neighbor, entered the house, searched the defendant's room, and seized papers and articles that were later turned over to the United States Marshal. Later the same day the Marshal, accompanied by police officers, returned to the house, was admitted by a boarder, searched the defendant's room, and removed letters and envelopes from a chiffonier drawer. Neither the police officers nor the Marshal possessed a search warrant. Before trial the defendant filed a verified petition seeking return of the seized property, asserting that the seizure violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The district court ordered return of property it deemed not pertinent to the charge but retained the remainder, which the government stated would be used in evidence. After the jury was sworn the defendant renewed the petition, which the court again denied. At trial the defendant objected to introduction of the retained papers on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, the objection was overruled, and the papers—including lottery tickets seized by the police and letters seized by the Marshal—were admitted into evidence. The defendant was convicted on the seventh count and sentenced to fine and imprisonment. He then prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, assigning as error the refusal to return the property and the admission of the seized papers at trial.