Also known as:colour of right · colors of right · colours of right · claim of right
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
A good-faith belief or assertion of ownership or legal entitlement to property. The belief supports the hostility element of adverse possession even when based on a mistaken boundary.
2
An honest claim of entitlement that supplies a defense to theft or embezzlement charges when the actor converts property under that belief.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Sense 1
1
Sense 1
A good-faith belief or assertion of ownership or legal entitlement to property. The belief supports the hostility element of adverse possession even when based on a mistaken boundary.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Cases
Examples
Sense 2
2
Sense 2
An honest claim of entitlement that supplies a defense to theft or embezzlement charges when the actor converts property under that belief.
Caitlin Crowley and her predecessors farmed a narrow strip they believed belonged to their parcel because an old survey stake sat several feet inside the true line. They planted crops and maintained a shed on the strip for more than ten years. The color of right arising from the good-faith mistake allows their successive periods to tack and satisfies the hostility requirement for adverse possession.
Seasonal Occupancy Plus Tacking
Cassandra Cooper received record title to lot A but occupied contiguous lot B under the mistaken belief that lot B was hers. Her immediate predecessors had done the same for summer seasons over many years. The color of right supplied by the shared mistake permitted tacking of the periods and satisfied the statutory requirement for adverse possession of lot B.
Howard v. Kunto2 Wash. App. 348, 469 P.2d 990
Land surveying errors led to a mismatch between deed descriptions and actual occupations on the shore of Hood Canal in Mason County. As long ago as 1932, McCall resided in the house now occupied by the Kuntos under a deed describing a 50-foot-wide parcel that was adjacent to the lot where the house stood. Several property owners to the west of defendants were similarly situated.
Since 1946, several conveyances occurred using the same legal description accompanied by transfer of possession to succeeding occupants. The Kuntos' immediate predecessors, the Millers, had a survey performed to build a dock which indicated conformity between deed and occupation, leading to placement of boundary stakes and construction of improvements.
The Kuntos took possession of the disputed property under a deed from the Millers in 1959. In 1960, the Howards, who held land east of the Kuntos, undertook a survey to convey an undivided one-half interest to the Yearlys. The survey revealed that the Howards were record owners of land occupied by the Moyers and the Moyers held record title to land occupied by the Kuntos.
In April 1960, Howard obtained a conveyance from Moyer of the land upon which the Kunto house stood in exchange for conveying the land upon which the Moyer house stood. Until that conveyance, neither Moyer nor predecessors asserted any right to the property possessed by Kunto and predecessors. Plaintiffs instituted this action to quiet title on August 19, 1960, when defendants had been in occupancy of the disputed property less than a year.
The trial court denied the Kuntos' claim of adverse possession, finding a lack of continuity of possession or estate to permit tacking and that defendants' possession was not continuous because it involved only summer occupancy. Defendants appealed from the decree quieting title in the plaintiffs.
Christopher Collins sued a dam operator whose structure flooded his land. The operator pleaded long use under color of right pursuant to state statutes. Because the plea rested on statutory authority rather than a good-faith claim of ownership, it failed to establish either prescription or disseizin against the true owner.
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.80 U.S. 166
After Wisconsin became a State, the legislature projected a system of improving the navigation of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers.
This system adopted the dam of Reid and Doty, then in process of construction, as part of that system. Under that act, a board of public works was established. The board made such arrangements with Reid and Doty that they continued and completed the dam. By subsequent legislation, the defendants finally became the owners of the dam with such powers concerning the improvement of the navigation of the river as the legislature could confer in that regard.
The land of the plaintiff came to him through a reservation in an Indian treaty in favor of one Therese Pacquett. She received a patent from the United States in 1849. The dam was completed to its present height in 1852.
By reason of the dam, the water of the lake was so raised as to cause it to overflow all his land. The overflow remained continuously from the completion of the dam in the year 1861 to the commencement of the suit in the year 1867. The nature of the injuries set out in the declaration are such as show that it worked an almost complete destruction of the value of the land.
The second plea alleges that the legislature authorized the erection of the dam as it now stands without any provision for compensating the plaintiff for the injury. The fourth plea avers that the defendants have ever since had, used, and enjoyed the easement of overflowing the plaintiff's lands with his acquiescence. They had done this under color of right. The sixth plea avers that the land of the plaintiff came to him through a reservation in an Indian treaty. This title came to the plaintiff burdened with an easement in favor of improving the navigation of the Fox River which authorized the injuries complained of. The matter came before the Supreme Court after proceedings in the lower court.
2 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
How does a color of right affect the hostility element in adverse possession?
A good-faith belief that the land belongs to the claimant satisfies the hostility requirement even when the belief rests on a mistaken boundary. Successive possessors who share the same mistaken belief may tack their periods together to meet the statutory duration.
Supporting sources
Does knowledge that force protects a property claim bar self-defense?
Yes. Modern self-defense rules withdraw justification when the actor knows the other person uses force under a claim of right to protect property. The limitation applies unless an exception such as a threat of death or serious bodily harm is present.
Supporting sources
Examples3
Honest Debt Setoff Negates Theft
Christian Coleman retained equipment after a client failed to pay an invoice Coleman believed was owed. He disclosed the retention openly and asserted the setoff in good faith. The color of right arising from the honest claim defeats embezzlement liability under the governing standard.
Mistaken Service Credit Defense
Caleb Chang kept a repaired vehicle after the shop billed an amount he honestly believed had already been paid by insurance. Chang disclosed the belief and refused to pay twice. The color of right from the honest claim defeats theft liability.
Good-Faith Bonus Retention
Charlotte Chung kept a year-end bonus payment she believed her employer had authorized as compensation. She recorded the amount openly on company ledgers. The color of right supplied by the honest belief negates embezzlement.
2 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a claim of right defeat embezzlement liability?
Embezzlement requires fraudulent intent. An honest belief that the actor is entitled to the property as payment for a debt or compensation negates that intent. Open retention of the property tends to support the existence of the claim.
Supporting sources
Can a mistaken belief in ownership support a claim-of-right defense to theft?
An honest though mistaken belief that one is entitled to the property or service defeats theft liability under the Model Penal Code. The defense requires only subjective honesty. Reasonableness is not required.
Supporting sources
416 A.2d 862
…between Stieglitz and Dr. Frank so that the original possession of the paintings by the Frank family may have been under claim of right. III On the limited record before us, we cannot determine now who has title to the paintings. That determination will depend on the evidence adduced at trial. Nonetheless, we believe…