dangerous lunatic

In 1984, Terry Foucha was charged by Louisiana authorities with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. Two medical doctors were appointed to conduct a pretrial examination of Foucha. The doctors initially reported that Foucha lacked mental capacity to proceed, but four months later the trial court found Foucha competent to stand trial. The doctors reported that Foucha was unable to distinguish right from wrong and was insane at the time of the offense. On October 12, 1984, the trial court ruled that Foucha was not guilty by reason of insanity. The court found that Foucha was unable to appreciate the usual, natural and probable consequences of his acts, that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong, that he was a menace to himself and others, and that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crimes and presently insane. Foucha was committed to the East Feliciana Forensic Facility until such time as doctors recommend that he be released and until further order of the court. In 1988, the superintendent of Feliciana recommended that Foucha be discharged or released. A three-member panel was convened at the institution to determine Foucha's current condition and whether he could be released or placed on probation without being a danger to others or himself. On March 21, 1988, the panel reported that there had been no evidence of mental illness since admission and recommended that Foucha be conditionally discharged. The trial judge appointed a two-member sanity commission made up of the same two doctors who had conducted the pretrial examination. Their written report stated that Foucha is presently in remission from mental illness but that they cannot certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if released. One of the doctors testified at a hearing that upon commitment Foucha probably suffered from a drug induced psychosis but that he had recovered from that temporary condition. The doctor testified that Foucha evidenced no signs of psychosis or neurosis and was in good shape mentally. The doctor also testified that Foucha had an antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental disease and that is untreatable. The doctor further testified that Foucha had been involved in several altercations at Feliciana and that he would not feel comfortable in certifying that Foucha would not be a danger to himself or to other people. After it was stipulated that the other doctor would give essentially the same testimony, the court ruled that Foucha was dangerous to himself and others and ordered him returned to the mental institution. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Foucha had not carried the burden placed upon him by statute to prove that he was not dangerous. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case presents an important issue and was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in a manner arguably at odds with prior decisions of this Court.

Leland was charged with murder in the first degree in the Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Oregon. He pleaded not guilty and gave notice of his intention to prove insanity. The jury found him guilty of first degree murder. Because the jury did not recommend life imprisonment, he received a death sentence. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The facts emerged from Leland's confessions corroborated by other evidence. He killed a fifteen-year-old girl by striking her over the head several times with a steel bar and stabbing her twice with a hunting knife. Five days after the crime, after his arrest for automobile theft, Leland asked to speak with a homicide officer. He voluntarily confessed and directed police to the body. That same day he signed a full confession and, at his own request, wrote out another confession by hand. Counsel were appointed after indictment. Oregon law required a defendant pleading insanity to prove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute also provided that a morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts formed no defense. The specific statute stated that when the commission of the act charged as a crime is proven, the defense of insanity must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge instructed the jury on lesser included offenses. The jury could return verdicts of guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. A first degree murder verdict required unanimous agreement of all twelve jurors, while an insanity acquittal required only ten. The prosecution bore the burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt throughout the trial. The confession was produced in court five days before the defense rested its case. Counsel and expert witnesses had ample time to study it. The trial judge offered additional time for review, but the offer was refused. The record showed no prejudice from the delayed access. No assignment of error was made on this ground in the motion for a new trial.

In 1992 Scott Louis Panetti broke into the home of his estranged wife's parents in Texas, shot and killed both of them in front of his wife and daughter, and held his wife and daughter hostage overnight before surrendering to police. Tried for capital murder in 1995, Panetti sought to represent himself. A court-ordered psychiatric evaluation revealed a fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations, and noted multiple prior hospitalizations for these disorders. He was found competent to stand trial and to waive counsel. At trial he claimed insanity and engaged in bizarre and trance-like behavior before the jury. Less than two months after sentencing the trial court found him incompetent to waive appointment of state habeas counsel. The Texas courts denied relief on direct appeal and state habeas. The federal district court and Fifth Circuit rejected Panetti's first federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and this Court denied certiorari. On October 31, 2003 the state trial court set an execution date of February 5, 2004. Panetti then filed his first motion under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 46.05 claiming, for the first time, that mental illness rendered him incompetent to be executed. The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Panetti filed a second federal habeas petition. The district court stayed execution to permit the state trial court to consider evidence of his current mental state. The state court ordered two mental-health experts to examine Panetti. Their April 28, 2004 report concluded he knew he was to be executed and understood the reason. Without holding a hearing or ruling on Panetti's ten pending motions—including requests for a competency hearing, funds for his own expert, and transcription—the state judge found him competent on May 26, 2004 and closed the case. Panetti returned to federal court. The district court concluded the state proceedings failed to comply with Texas law and were constitutionally inadequate under Ford v. Wainwright. It reviewed the incompetency claim without deference to the state finding but denied relief because Panetti had not shown he met the Fifth Circuit's competency standard. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted certiorari.

In 1972 three individuals who had been convicted of felonies and had completed their terms of incarceration and parole sought to register to vote in California. Respondent Ramirez, convicted in Texas of robbery by assault, applied in San Luis Obispo County. Respondent Lee, convicted in California of heroin possession, applied in Monterey County. Respondent Gill, convicted in California of burglary and forgery, applied in Stanislaus County. Each was refused registration by the respective county clerk or registrar on the ground of their prior felony convictions. The three respondents filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme Court of California in May 1972, invoking that court's original jurisdiction. They brought the action on behalf of themselves and all other ex-felons similarly situated whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired. The petition named as defendants the three county election officials who had refused registration, individually and as representatives of the class of all county clerks and registrars, as well as the California Secretary of State. The three named county clerks did not contest the action and indicated they would register the named plaintiffs and similarly situated ex-felons. Petitioner Viola Richardson, County Clerk of Mendocino County, moved to intervene, alleging the suit was collusive and noting a pending lawsuit against her by an ex-felon in her county. The California Supreme Court denied the motion to intervene but added Richardson as a named defendant. The Secretary of State appeared and denied the essential claims. The California Supreme Court determined the case was not moot despite the relief afforded the named plaintiffs, exercised its original jurisdiction, and addressed the constitutional challenge. It denied the peremptory writ of mandate. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.