denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land

Anthony Palazzolo, a lifelong resident of Westerly, Rhode Island, formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI) with associates in 1959 to purchase three undeveloped adjoining parcels along Atlantic Avenue bordering Winnapaug Pond to the north and the beach to the south. SGI subdivided the property into 80 lots in the 1960s and developed most into single-family homes, but left the petitioner's 20-acre parcel undeveloped. Most of the property consists of salt marsh subject to tidal flooding requiring substantial fill for structures. In 1971, Rhode Island created the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) to regulate coastal development. In 1978, the CRMC promulgated regulations designating much of the property as protected coastal wetlands where filling is prohibited without a special exception. That same year SGI's corporate charter was revoked for unpaid taxes, transferring title to Palazzolo as sole shareholder. In 1983, Palazzolo applied to the CRMC to construct a bulkhead and fill the entire wetlands for a beach club, but the application was denied as vague and inadequate with significant environmental impacts. In 1985, he submitted a more specific proposal to fill 11 acres for a beach club including parking for 50 cars with trailers, dumpsters, port-a-johns, picnic tables, and barbecue pits, which the CRMC also rejected for failing to serve a compelling public purpose. Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court seeking $3,150,000 in damages based on the value of a 74-lot residential subdivision, alleging the regulations deprived him of all economically beneficial use. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against him, finding the parcel retained $200,000 in development value on an upland portion. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed on multiple grounds, including lack of ripeness and that Palazzolo lacked standing to challenge pre-acquisition regulations. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision.

The Murr family petitioners are two sisters and two brothers who own two adjacent lots along the Lower St. Croix River in Troy, Wisconsin. Their parents purchased Lot F in 1960, transferred it to the family plumbing company, and purchased neighboring Lot E in 1963, holding it in their own names. The parents conveyed Lot F to the petitioners in 1994 and Lot E in 1995. The lots are contiguous, with similar topography featuring a steep bluff that limits developable land to less than one acre on each lot despite their 1.25-acre sizes. In 1972, the St. Croix River received federal protection under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, prompting Wisconsin to authorize rules in 1976 that limit development to preserve the river's scenic qualities. The regulations require at least one acre of suitable land for separate building sites and include a merger provision that bars the separate sale or development of adjacent substandard lots under common ownership. A grandfather clause preserves the right to develop substandard lots that were in separate ownership on the regulation's effective date of January 1, 1976. After the lots came under common ownership through the 1994 and 1995 transfers, the merger rules prevented the petitioners from selling or developing Lot E separately. The petitioners sought variances from the St. Croix County Board of Adjustment to allow separate sale or use of the lots and to relocate the cabin on Lot F, but the board denied the requests. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the denial, determining that the ordinance effectively merged the lots. The petitioners then filed an action in the Circuit Court of St. Croix County, claiming the regulations effected a regulatory taking by depriving them of all or practically all use of Lot E. The parties submitted appraisals showing a combined regulated value of $698,300, a value of $771,000 if treated as two buildable lots, $373,000 for Lot F alone with improvements, and $40,000 for Lot E as undevelopable. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the respondents, noting that the petitioners retained options such as preserving or relocating the cabin or building a new residence on the combined property, and that the value decrease was less than 10 percent. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the takings analysis must consider the petitioners' property as a whole rather than Lot E in isolation. The court found that the petitioners could not reasonably expect separate treatment of the lots given the regulations in place when they acquired them. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied discretionary review, after which the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the definition of the parcel in this regulatory takings context.

In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.

In 1997, the State of Hawaii had a highly concentrated wholesale oil market due to its small size and isolation over 1,600 miles from the mainland, with only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers operating in the state. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer, controlling 60 percent of the in-state gasoline market and 30 percent of the wholesale market on Oahu. Gasoline was sold at retail through approximately 300 service stations, about half leased by oil companies to independent lessee-dealers. Chevron operated 64 such lessee-dealer stations under arrangements where it leased land, constructed stations, and leased them to dealers while setting wholesale prices and requiring supply contracts. In June 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257, which capped the rent oil companies could charge lessee-dealers at 15 percent of gross profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of other product sales, and imposed other restrictions on station ownership. Thirty days after enactment, Chevron filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against the Governor and Attorney General, challenging the rent cap. The parties stipulated that the cap would reduce aggregate rent on 11 of Chevron's stations by about $207,000 per year but allow increases on the remaining 53, potentially raising overall rental income by nearly $1.1 million annually, and that Chevron had not recovered station maintenance costs through rent alone over the past 20 years. The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. After a one-day bench trial featuring competing expert economists, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004.