Also known as: relative hardship doctrine · balancing the equities · relative hardship
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factor considered by courts in determining whether to grant injunctive relief against a tort. The factor weighs the hardship an injunction would impose on the defendant against the hardship its denial would impose on the plaintiff.
Summit Minerals operates a mine whose runoff harms a stream supporting a rare amphibian. Green Earth Alliance sues for a preliminary injunction requiring emergency controls. Summit shows that installing the controls would be technically difficult and would cost millions. The court weighs that burden against the environmental harm Green Earth would suffer without relief before deciding whether to issue the injunction.
Dusk Indemnity converts part of its campus into an outdoor fitness center that produces loud music and whistle blasts. Nearby homeowners suffer aggravated health conditions and lose the chance to sell their homes during peak season. Birch Indemnity seeks a preliminary injunction. The court compares the hardship an injunction would place on Dusk with the immediate harm the homeowners would continue to suffer if relief is denied.
Universal City Studios sues Sony for contributory copyright infringement arising from the sale of Betamax recorders. Universal seeks an injunction halting further manufacture and sale. Sony demonstrates that an injunction would shut down a major product line and affect thousands of legitimate users. The court evaluates that hardship against the harm Universal would suffer without the injunction before determining the appropriate remedy.
In 1976, Universal City Studios, Inc., and Walt Disney Productions, owners of copyrights in motion pictures and other audiovisual works, commenced a copyright infringement action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Sony Corporation of America and related entities that manufacture and sell Betamax video tape recorders. The Betamax consists of a tuner that receives signals from the public airwaves, a recorder that places those signals on magnetic tape, and an adapter that converts the signals for playback on a television set. It includes a timer for unattended recording, a pause button to omit commercials, and a fast-forward control. Surveys of several hundred Betamax owners conducted by both parties in 1978 showed that the primary use for most owners was time-shifting, recording a program for single later viewing and then erasing it. Sony's survey indicated that over 80 percent of interviewees watched at least as much regular television as before owning a Betamax. Seven point three percent of use was to record sports events whose professional leagues had no objection to home recording, and representatives of religious and educational broadcasters also testified they had no objection. After a lengthy trial, the District Court in 1979 denied all relief to the respondents, finding that time-shifting was fair use, that Sony had no direct involvement with any infringing activity, and that the Betamax was a staple article of commerce capable of substantial noninfringing uses. The court noted Sony's instruction booklet warned that unauthorized recording of copyrighted material may violate copyright laws. The Ninth Circuit in 1981 reversed the District Court's judgment on the copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringement without setting aside any findings of fact, and remanded for consideration of damages or a continuing royalty. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1982, ordered reargument in 1983, and issued its decision in January 1984.
O'Keeffe sues Snyder to recover paintings she alleges were stolen decades earlier. Snyder has possessed the works openly and invested in their care. O'Keeffe requests an injunction ordering immediate return of the paintings. The court weighs the hardship Snyder would face from sudden dispossession against the hardship O'Keeffe would continue to suffer if possession is not restored.
Georgia O'Keeffe, a renowned artist, had three paintings stolen from An American Place gallery in New York in March 1946. The gallery was operated by her husband Alfred Stieglitz. The paintings subject to this action are "Seaweed" and "Cliffs," with a third painting "Fragments" also missing. O'Keeffe did not report the theft to the police or advertise the loss, though she discussed it with associates. Stieglitz died in the summer of 1946. In 1947 O'Keeffe retained Doris Bry to help settle the estate. Bry urged reporting the loss, but O'Keeffe declined. In 1972, O'Keeffe authorized Bry to report the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc., which maintains a registry of stolen paintings. In September 1975, O'Keeffe learned that the paintings were in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York on consignment from Bernard Danenberg Galleries. On February 11, 1976, O'Keeffe discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had sold the paintings to Barry Snyder for $35,000. She demanded their return, but Snyder refused. O'Keeffe filed her complaint for replevin in March 1976 against Snyder, who impleaded Frank as a third-party defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment to Snyder on the ground that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed and entered judgment for O'Keeffe. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to consider the issues. Frank traces his possession of the paintings to his father, Dr. Frank, who died in 1968, claiming to have seen them in his father's apartment as early as 1941-1943. Snyder purchased the paintings from Frank in 1975. There are factual disputes regarding the circumstances of the paintings' disappearance and acquisition.
The Browns hold an easement across the Vosses' land for access to parcel B. They begin using the easement to reach an additional parcel C where they are building a residence. The Vosses seek an injunction limiting use to parcel B. The court compares the hardship an injunction would impose on the Browns' construction plans with the hardship the Vosses would suffer from continued overuse of their servient land.
On April 1, 1977, plaintiffs Will and Jean Brown purchased land designated as parcel B from the Christensens. Parcel B is adjacent to and north of land designated as parcel A owned by defendants Fred and Hattie Voss. Access to parcel B is from the south by means of a road that crosses several parcels including parcel A. The roadway easement across parcel A arose by express grant to the Christensens to provide access to parcel B. On July 31, 1977, the Browns purchased from the Rylanders the contiguous tract designated as parcel C north of parcel B. Parcel C was not a dominant estate with respect to the easement across parcel A. The Browns plan to build a residence that would straddle the property line between parcels B and C. The Browns began clearing parcels B and C in November 1977. They performed most of the preparation of the land for construction during the following spring and summer. To the existing easement road the Browns connected a new road that they had built across parcels B and C. After traversing parcel B, the new road crosses the line between parcels B and C and then loops back onto parcel B. The Browns have used the road in connection with their construction activities. In February and March of 1978, the Vosses erected a chain link fence along the side of the easement road. The parties stipulated that the fence was located upon the 16-foot-wide easement. Sometime in 1978, the Vosses placed obstructions on the easement road. In March 1979, the Browns sought damages and to enjoin the Vosses from interfering with their use of the easement. The Vosses counterclaimed, seeking damages for trespass and an injunction to stop the Browns from using the easement road to gain access to parcel C. Before trial, the parties agreed to relocate the easement. The trial court's order reflected this agreement by declaring that the plaintiffs have an easement of record. It consists of a strip of land 16 feet in width immediately west of the permanent chainlink fence for ingress and egress from the property of plaintiffs. The trial court denied the injunction requested by the Vosses. It ruled that the easement may be used for ingress to and egress from parcel C as long as the properties are developed and used solely for the purpose of a single family residence. The Vosses appealed from the judgment denying their counterclaim for an injunction to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two.
eBay sues Bidder's Edge for trespass after the latter's automated bots access eBay's servers to collect auction data. eBay moves for a preliminary injunction barring further access. Bidder's Edge shows that an injunction would eliminate its primary business model and force layoffs. The court balances that hardship against the burden continued scraping would place on eBay's systems before ruling on the motion.
eBay, Inc. operates an Internet-based person-to-person trading site that allows sellers to list items for auction and buyers to search listings and place bids directly with sellers. The site has over 7 million registered users, adds more than 400,000 new items daily, receives 10 million searches per day, and processes 600 bids per minute across nearly 3 million items. Users register by clicking an “I Accept” button on a seven-page User Agreement that prohibits robots, spiders, or other automated devices from monitoring or copying web pages without prior written permission. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., a 22-employee company founded in 1997, operates an auction aggregation site that compiles data from more than one hundred auction sites into its own database containing over five million items. When a user searches on the BE site, the site queries its database rather than the original host sites. Approximately 69 percent of the items in BE’s database come from eBay auctions, and BE estimates it would lose one-third of its users if it stopped covering eBay. In early 1998 eBay permitted BE to include Beanie Babies and Furbies listings. In April 1999 eBay verbally approved BE crawling the site for a 90-day period while the parties negotiated a licensing agreement, but they failed to reach terms. After BE briefly stopped posting eBay listings in late August or early September 1999 and then resumed in November, eBay sent a November 9 letter demanding that BE cease access, alleging trespass, and offering a license. eBay then blocked 169 IP addresses it believed BE was using; BE evaded the blocks by routing queries through proxy servers. BE sent eBay’s systems between 80,000 and 100,000 requests per day, accounting for 0.70 to 1.53 percent of eBay’s requests and data transfer during October and November 1999. eBay calculated alleged damages of $45,323 to $61,804 over ten months but did not identify specific incremental costs caused by BE. The motion for a preliminary injunction was heard on April 14, 2000.
The doctrine requires a court to compare the hardship an injunction would impose on the defendant with the hardship its denial would impose on the plaintiff. This comparison is one of several equitable factors considered when deciding whether injunctive relief is appropriate. The court does not automatically grant an injunction merely because a tort has been shown.
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…that an award of damages, or continuing royalties, or even some form of limited injunction, may well be an appropriate means of balancing the equities in this case. Although I express no view on the merits of any particular proposal, I am certain that, if Sony were found liable in this case, the District Court would be able to…
…bears the burden of proof with respect to those defenses, and, ultimately, to weigh the respective interests of the parties by balancing the equities in order to determine who should bear the loss of the paintings. For these reasons, I dissent. For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices PASHMAN, CLIFFORD,…
…parcel C. Under these circumstances, the hardship of which the Browns complain is entitled to significantly less weight when balancing the equities
…defendant $11,500. The trial court had found that the breach harmed plaintiff to the extent of $1,000 in damages. Invoking the "doctrine of relative hardship
No. Relative hardship is only one factor. Courts also consider delay by the plaintiff, related misconduct, the interests of third parties and the public, and the practicability of framing and enforcing an order. The doctrine forms part of a broader equitable balancing process rather than a single decisive test.
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The factor receives greater weight on a motion for a permanent injunction than on a motion for interlocutory relief. At the interlocutory stage the provisional nature of the order and the emergency character of the request allow the court to measure hardship with a different yardstick than at final hearing.
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No. Even substantial economic hardship to the defendant does not automatically defeat injunctive relief. The court must weigh that hardship against the severity and irreparability of the harm the plaintiff would suffer without the injunction. A severe and irreparable injury to the plaintiff can outweigh a large but quantifiable burden on the defendant.
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