Also known as: seisin · seizin · seisin doctrine
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A common-law principle requiring that seisin remain vested at all times in an identifiable person. The rule prevented creation of remainders in unascertainable persons or groups and barred remainders subject to conditions that risked a gap in seisin when a prior estate ended.
Destiny Davis conveyed Greenacre to Denise Donovan by general warranty deed containing the covenant of seisin. After closing Denise discovered that Destiny had never held valid title because a prior unrecorded conveyance had already passed seisin to a third party. Denise sued for breach and recovered damages measured by the value of the lost estate.
Devon Drake started and pursued a fox across open land with his hounds. Damian Decker shot and carried away the fox while the hounds were in full cry. Devon claimed that his pursuit gave him seisin-like possession sufficient to support an action. The court rejected the claim because no identifiable person held continuous seisin of the wild animal.
Lodowick Post was in possession of dogs and hounds under his command. Upon wild and uninhabited waste land called the beach, he found and started one of those noxious beasts called a fox. Post then hunted, chased, and pursued the fox with his dogs and hounds while the animal remained in view. Pierson, well knowing that the fox was so hunted and pursued, killed and carried it off in the sight of Post to prevent his catching the same. Post commenced an action of trespass on the case against Pierson in a justice's court. The declaration set forth these facts, and a verdict was rendered for Post as the plaintiff below. Pierson sued out a certiorari directed to one of the justices of Queens county. The cause came before the court on the return to the certiorari. The proceedings presented the question of whether Post had acquired a property right in the fox sufficient to maintain the action against Pierson for killing and taking it away.
View caseDorothy Daniels received a legislative grant of land from the state. Years later the state attempted to rescind the grant. Doris Duffy, claiming under a later conveyance, argued that the original grant never transferred seisin because the legislature lacked authority. The court held that the grant passed seisin and could not be divested by subsequent legislative action.
The suit was instituted on several covenants contained in a deed made by John Peck, the defendant in error, conveying to Robert Fletcher, the plaintiff in error, certain lands which were part of a large purchase made by James Gunn and others, in the year 1795, from the state of Georgia. The contract for which was made in the form of a bill passed by the legislature of that state. The first count set forth a breach in the covenant that the legislature of the state of Georgia at the time of passing the act of sale had good right to sell and dispose of the same in manner pointed out by the said act. The second count assigned as a breach that the original grantees had promised and assured members of the legislature an interest in the lands if they voted for the bill. The third count alleged that a subsequent legislature passed an act annulling and rescinding the law under which the conveyance to the original grantees was made. The fourth count assigned as a breach that the right to the soil was in the United States and not in Georgia. In the circuit court there were demurrers to three pleas and a special verdict found on an issue joined on the fourth plea. The pleas were all sustained and judgment was rendered for the defendant. After the opinion of the court was delivered on the initial demurrers, the parties agreed to amend the pleadings and the cause was continued for further consideration. The special verdict found the grant of Carolina by Charles the second to the Earl of Clarendon and others. It found the subsequent erection of Georgia as a colony. It found the surrender of the grantees to the crown in 1752. It found the appointment of governors with commissions describing the boundaries. It found the 1763 proclamation creating new colonies and reserving lands on the western waters for the use of the Indians. It found the 1787 convention between South Carolina and Georgia settling their boundary line. The verdict described the situation of the lands in such manner that their lying within the limits of Georgia as defined in the proclamation of 1763, in the treaty of peace, and in the convention between that state and South Carolina has not been questioned. The case comes before this court on the amended pleadings consisting of sundry demurrers and the special verdict.
View caseDawson Steel leased a warehouse to the United States for a one-year term under condemnation. The company argued that the temporary ouster destroyed its seisin. The Court held that the government took only a term and left the owner's underlying seisin intact for compensation purposes.
In 1928 General Motors Corporation leased a one-story warehouse building in Chicago for a term of twenty years for the storage and distribution of automobile parts and fitted the premises for this use. In 1942 the United States became subtenants of a portion of the floor space, leaving General Motors in possession of some 93,000 square feet. On June 8, 1942 the United States filed a petition in the District Court seeking condemnation of the temporary use of the remaining space for a term ending June 30, 1943 pursuant to the Second War Powers Act. The court entered an order declaring the property condemned and granting the United States immediate possession, use, and improvement. General Motors removed its personal property from the area and dismantled bins and fixtures so that the space was available for government use by June 19. At the trial for compensation the Government called a real estate expert who testified that the fair rental value of the space was 35 cents per square foot per year. General Motors called expert witnesses who testified that the fair rental value was 43 cents per square foot. It also introduced evidence that the rent it paid its landlord had varied from 41.9 to 43.24 cents per square foot during 1940 to 1942. General Motors then offered to prove items of cost caused by removal of the contents, including salaries of employees engaged in the work, compensation due employees put out of work, wages of janitors and watchmen, shipping costs, freight and haulage charges, rental of storage space, the value of bin equipment destroyed, and the estimated original cost of installation of fixed equipment lost, but the court sustained an objection to the offer. The jury awarded compensation in a lump sum at a rate of approximately 40 cents per square foot for the term of one year. General Motors appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment by a vote of 2 to 1. The Supreme Court granted review of the ruling on the elements that may be considered in arriving at just compensation.
View caseDelta Dynamics and Dillon Energy held Blackacre as joint tenants. Delta executed a deed purporting to convey its interest to itself as tenant in common. The court examined whether the deed transferred seisin and thereby severed the joint tenancy without delivery to a third party.
Mr. and Mrs. Riddle purchased a parcel of real estate, taking title as joint tenants. Several months before her death, Mrs. Riddle retained an attorney to plan her estate. After reviewing pertinent documents, he advised her that the property was held in joint tenancy and that, upon her death, the property would pass to her husband. Distressed upon learning this, she requested that the joint tenancy be terminated so that she could dispose of her interest by will. As a result, the attorney prepared a grant deed whereby Mrs. Riddle granted to herself an undivided one-half interest in the subject property. The document also provided that “The purpose of this Grant Deed is to terminate those joint tenancies formerly existing between the Grantor, Frances P. Riddle, and Jack C. Riddle, her husband. ...” He also prepared a will disposing of Mrs. Riddle’s interest in the property. Both the grant deed and will were executed on December 8, 1975. Mrs. Riddle died 20 days later. The trial court refused to sanction her plan to sever the joint tenancy and quieted title to the property in her husband. The executrix of the will of Frances Riddle appeals from that judgment.
View caseDuarte Shipping owned a chicken farm. Military aircraft flew so low that the noise and vibration made continued operation impossible. The owner claimed a taking of its seisin in the airspace above the land. The Court recognized that frequent low flights could destroy the owner's right to exclusive possession.
Respondents Thomas Lee Causby and his wife purchased 2.8 acres of land near an airport outside Greensboro, North Carolina in 1934. The property included a dwelling house and outbuildings used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway was 2,220 feet from the barn and 2,275 feet from the house, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet above the ground. In April 1942 the airport was taken over by the Greensboro-High Point Municipal Airport Authority. In May 1942 the United States leased the airport for military operations beginning June 1, 1942, with the lease renewable until 1967 or the end of the national emergency. Military planes including four-motored heavy bombers used the northwest-southeast runway about four percent of the time for takeoffs and seven percent for landings, frequently flying low over the Causbys' land and buildings. The flights caused the chickens to become frightened, resulting in the loss of approximately 150 birds that flew into walls, a decline in egg production, and the eventual destruction of the commercial chicken business. The noise and glare from the planes also deprived the family of sleep and caused them to become nervous and frightened. Although no accidents occurred on the property, several happened nearby. The Causbys brought suit in the Court of Claims, which found that their property had depreciated in value due to the flights and entered judgment for them in the amount of $2,000. The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the case.
View caseThe doctrine treats the fee tail as equivalent to a fee simple for dower purposes. The spouse therefore receives a dower-type life estate measured as though the decedent had held fee simple absolute. That life estate remains subject to any executory interests or reversions that already limited the fee tail.
The covenant promises that the grantor holds good title at the moment of conveyance. A recorded encumbrance existing at closing breaches the covenant even if the grantee had constructive notice. The covenant runs with the land and permits the grantee to recover damages from the original grantor.
Birth of issue satisfies the condition and expands the holder's power of alienation to equal that of a fee simple absolute owner. The expanded power permits conveyance of full title that extinguishes prior future interests the holder could not previously destroy.
…present, through waste and unoccupied lands, which must inevitably and speedily have terminated in corporal possession or bodily seisin, confers such a right to the object of it as to make any one a wrongdoer who shall interfere and shoulder the spoil. The justice's judgment ought, therefore, in my opinion, to be affirmed.