Also known as: dormancy · inactive
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
2 senses
A judgment that has lost enforceability because the statutory period for execution has expired without action by the creditor.
A constitutional doctrine under which the Commerce Clause invalidates state laws that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce when Congress has remained silent.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
A judgment that has lost enforceability because the statutory period for execution has expired without action by the creditor.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
A judgment becomes dormant when the statutory period for enforcement expires without the creditor seeking a writ of execution. Most states set this period between five and ten years. A creditor may revive the judgment in some jurisdictions by taking enforcement steps before the period ends.
Supporting sources
A constitutional doctrine under which the Commerce Clause invalidates state laws that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce when Congress has remained silent.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
State officials enacted a statute barring all live baitfish shipments from other states to protect local lakes from invasive species. A commercial supplier challenged the ban as economic protectionism under the dormant Commerce Clause. The court upheld the statute because the ecological interest was legitimate and no nondiscriminatory alternative existed.
A state imposed a per-ton surcharge on hazardous waste generated outside its borders that exceeded the fee charged for in-state waste. An out-of-state generator sued, claiming the differential violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The court invalidated the surcharge because origin-based cost differences are presumptively invalid without congressional approval.
State liquor rules permitted in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers but barred identical shipments from out-of-state producers. An out-of-state winery sued under the dormant Commerce Clause. The court held the scheme unconstitutional because the Twenty-First Amendment does not authorize discriminatory economic protectionism.
A state agency offered above-market prices for scrap metal sold by residents while paying lower rates to nonresidents. An out-of-state seller challenged the policy under the dormant Commerce Clause. The court upheld the program because the state was participating in the market rather than regulating it.
The dormant Commerce Clause invalidates state laws that discriminate against interstate commerce on their face or in effect unless the state shows a legitimate non-economic interest and no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. Discriminatory fees on out-of-state waste are presumptively invalid. Congressional authorization can remove the prohibition.
No. State liquor regulations remain subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. A law allowing in-state wineries to ship directly while barring out-of-state wineries constitutes unconstitutional economic protectionism that the Amendment does not justify.
When a state buys or sells goods as a market participant rather than regulating private conduct, it may favor its own citizens without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. Paying higher prices to residents for scrap metal is a classic example of permissible favoritism.
A county ordinance required all solid waste collected within its borders to be delivered to a publicly owned transfer station. Private haulers sued under the dormant Commerce Clause. The court applied lenient review and upheld the rule because the ordinance favored a government facility performing a traditional public function.
A state statute imposed a fee on out-of-state nuclear waste pursuant to an express federal statute permitting such charges. A waste generator challenged the fee under the dormant Commerce Clause. The court rejected the challenge because Congress had expressly authorized the discrimination.
A flow-control ordinance directing waste to a government-owned facility receives lenient review because it favors a public provider performing a traditional government function. Such favoritism is presumed to serve legitimate public objectives rather than economic protectionism.
Yes. When Congress expressly authorizes states to impose surcharges on certain out-of-state waste, the resulting discrimination does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The authorization must be clear and specific to the activity at issue.