Also known as: empanelment · impanelment of jury · impanelment · empaneling a jury · empanelled jury · jury selection · jury impanelment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The process by which a court selects and swears in a panel of jurors to hear and decide a case. Prospective jurors undergo questioning during voir dire to identify bias. Peremptory challenges and challenges for cause shape the final panel.
Eileen Epstein stood trial on criminal charges. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove all Black prospective jurors from the venire. Defense counsel made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. The trial court required the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation before the jury was empaneled.
Elijah Edwards faced federal criminal charges. The court conducted jury selection without Edwards present in the courtroom. His counsel objected that the defendant must attend every stage including empanelment. The judge halted proceedings until Edwards could appear before swearing the panel.
Emma Erickson sued her former employer in a civil rights action. Defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges to remove all female prospective jurors. The court sustained the plaintiff's objection that the strikes rested solely on gender. The empaneled jury included both men and women after the improper strikes were disallowed.
Esther Eisenberg sued Edgewater Capital in federal court for breach of contract. The company's counsel used peremptory challenges to exclude Black prospective jurors. The court treated the strikes as state action subject to equal protection review. The empaneled jury reflected the prohibition on racially discriminatory challenges by private parties.
Ethan Evans elected to represent himself at trial. The court permitted Evans to participate directly in questioning the venire and exercising challenges. After the empaneled jury was sworn, Evans confirmed he had knowingly waived counsel. The process preserved his right to control jury selection.
Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him. Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself. The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense. Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law. He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution. He had a high school education. The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling. The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor. The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected. His efforts to make motions on his own behalf were rejected. Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged. The judge sentenced him to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Ewan Eckhart was convicted by a jury that later faced allegations of racial animus. A juror affidavit revealed statements made during deliberations. The court allowed inquiry into whether bias infected the empaneled jury despite the general no-impeachment rule. The verdict was vacated after the showing of racial prejudice.
In 2007, two teenage sisters were sexually assaulted in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility. The girls identified the assailant as a racetrack employee, and police arrested Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez. Each girl separately identified him as the man who assaulted her. State prosecutors charged Peña-Rodriguez with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child. Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire received a written questionnaire asking if anything would make it difficult to be a fair juror. The court and defense counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. None of the empaneled jurors expressed reservations based on racial bias. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment but failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge. When the jury was discharged, the court gave the mandated instruction that whether jurors discussed the case was their own decision. Following discharge, two jurors remained in the jury room to speak privately with defense counsel. They reported that during deliberations another juror, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness. With the trial court's supervision, counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors. The affidavits stated that H.C. said Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women. The affidavits further stated that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls. H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want. H.C. did not find the alibi witness credible because the witness was an illegal. The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias. It denied Peña-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about statements made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statements did not fall within an exception to the rule. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias.
A defendant must be present at every trial stage including jury impanelment and the return of the verdict. The rule requires the defendant's attendance unless a specific exception applies. Courts halt selection proceedings when the defendant is absent to avoid reversible error.
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…was indicted in Kentucky state court on charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During jury selection at his trial, the judge conducted voir dire and excused certain jurors for cause. The prosecutor then used peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire, and a jury…
…Hernandez v. Texas , 347 U. S. 475 (1954); Castaneda v. Partida , 430 U. S. 482 (1977). To guard against discrimination in jury selection, the Court has ruled that no litigant may exclude a prospective juror on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 79 (1986); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. , 500 U. S. 614…
…grounds, including the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Among other errors, Hale alleged that his lawyer botched jury selection, failing to challenge or strike a juror named Mark Hoffman, a gay man with an African-American partner who ended up serving as the
…Honor, and the Civil Code. "THE COURT: If you have done extensive research into it, then tell me about it. "THE DEFENDANT: On empaneling a jury, your Honor? "THE COURT: Yes. "THE DEFENDANT: Well, the District Attorney and the defendant, defense counsel, has both the right to 12 peremptory challenges of a
…and, if so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Wright , 411 Mass. at 681. During jury selection, a judge is required to "examine jurors fully regarding possible bias or prejudice where it appears that there is a substantial risk that jurors may be influenced by factors extraneous to…
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of race. A defendant establishes a prima facie case by showing a pattern of strikes against jurors of one race. The burden then shifts to the striking party to offer a race-neutral explanation that the court evaluates for purposeful discrimination.
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Private litigants exercise peremptory challenges subject to equal protection constraints because jury selection is a traditional public function performed with court participation. Racially discriminatory strikes by private parties constitute state action. Courts disallow such strikes to prevent violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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Peremptory challenges based solely on gender violate the Equal Protection Clause. Attorneys may not strike jurors simply because of their sex. Courts sustain objections to gender-based strikes and require the empaneled jury to reflect nondiscriminatory selection.
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Voir dire allows the court and parties to question prospective jurors to uncover bias. The court may conduct the examination itself but must permit further inquiry the court considers proper. Effective voir dire ensures the final empaneled jury can decide the case impartially.
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