Also known as: essential to the judgement
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A fact found in a prior criminal judgment that was necessary to sustain the conviction. The fact must have been an element of the offense or otherwise required for the judgment to stand.
A determination of fact or law that was required for the court to reach its final judgment in the prior action. Only such determinations receive preclusive effect in later litigation between the same parties or their privies.
A fact found in a prior criminal judgment that was necessary to sustain the conviction. The fact must have been an element of the offense or otherwise required for the judgment to stand.
A determination of fact or law that was required for the court to reach its final judgment in the prior action. Only such determinations receive preclusive effect in later litigation between the same parties or their privies.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Malik sues his insurer after a fire destroys his home. The insurer offers a certified copy of Malik's earlier felony conviction for intentionally burning another insured building. The conviction is admissible to prove that Malik intentionally set the prior fire because that finding was essential to the judgment of guilt.
4 common questions
The fact must have been an element of the crime or otherwise necessary for the court to enter the conviction. Only those facts qualify for admission under the exception.
Supporting sources
No. The exception is limited to facts that were necessary to sustain the conviction. Using the judgment for other purposes exceeds the rule's scope.
Supporting sources
No. The rule expressly states that the pendency of an appeal does not affect admissibility, though the parties may show the appeal to the jury.
Supporting sources
In evidence it limits which facts a conviction may prove. In preclusion it limits which determinations bind future litigation. The phrase serves distinct doctrinal functions in each context.
Supporting sources
After a court-martial convicts a civilian dependent of murder, the Supreme Court addresses whether the earlier Madsen decision controls. The recognition of congressional power to authorize military trials of civilians was essential to the judgment in Madsen, so that holding binds the analysis in the present case.
Mrs. Clarice Covert, a civilian, killed her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, at an airbase in England where she was residing with him. Mrs. Dorothy Smith, also a civilian, killed her husband, a colonel in the United States Army, at a post in Japan where she was living with him. Both women were tried by courts-martial convened under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the offense of murder and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The court-martial that tried Mrs. Covert was composed of Air Force officers after charges were preferred by Air Force personnel. The judgment was affirmed by the Air Force Board of Review but reversed by the Court of Military Appeals on grounds related to the defense of insanity, leaving a retrial pending in the District of Columbia. Mrs. Smith was tried by an Army court-martial. Her conviction was approved by the Army Board of Review and the Court of Military Appeals, after which she was confined in a federal penitentiary in West Virginia. While Mrs. Covert was held pending retrial, her counsel petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus. That court ordered her release. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Mrs. Smith's father petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia for habeas corpus relief on her behalf. That court denied the writ, and while an appeal was pending in the Fourth Circuit the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The two cases were consolidated for argument. An executive agreement between the United States and Great Britain permitted United States military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Britain by American servicemen or their dependents. A similar administrative agreement governed jurisdiction in Japan. Both women were tried pursuant to Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which extends court-martial jurisdiction to persons accompanying the armed forces outside the continental United States subject to treaty or international law provisions.
View caseParents sue the Boy Scouts after their son is abused by a troop leader. The Scouts invoke a prior judgment that found no duty to the victim. Because that duty determination was essential to the earlier judgment, the parents are precluded from relitigating the issue.
Plaintiffs Richard E. and Margaret Schultz were domiciled in Emerson, New Jersey, with their sons Richard, age 13, and Christopher, age 11. In 1978 the boys attended Assumption School, an institution owned and operated by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark. By agreement with the Archdiocese, defendant Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc., an Ohio corporation, supplied teachers for the school, including Brother Edmund Coakeley. Coakeley also served as scoutmaster of Boy Scout Troop 337, a locally chartered troop sponsored and approved by defendant Boy Scouts of America, Inc., a federally chartered corporation then maintaining its national headquarters in New Brunswick, New Jersey. In July 1978 Coakeley took Christopher to Pine Creek Reservation, a Boy Scout camp located in upstate New York near Foresport in Oneida County, where the complaint alleges he sexually abused the boy. The complaint further alleges that Coakeley continued the abuse after Christopher returned to Assumption School in New Jersey that fall. He made similar threats during a scout trip to the same New York camp on Memorial Day weekend in 1978 when he abused Richard. As a result of these acts both boys allegedly suffered severe psychological, emotional and mental pain. Christopher committed suicide by ingesting drugs on May 29, 1979. The complaint sets forth four causes of action. Richard E. Schultz, as administrator of Christopher's estate, seeks damages for wrongful death and for pre-death injuries. As father and natural guardian he seeks damages for Richard's personal injuries. The parents also seek damages for their own injuries, including destruction of family life, medical expenditures, mental anguish and psychological harm. They charge both corporate defendants with negligence in assigning Coakeley to positions of trust and in failing to dismiss him despite actual or constructive notice of prior similar misconduct at another Boy Scout camp. Plaintiffs had previously sued the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark in New Jersey; that action was dismissed. In the present New York action against Boy Scouts of America and the Franciscan Brothers, defendants moved for summary judgment asserting New Jersey charitable immunity and collateral estoppel from the prior judgment. Special Term granted the motions, severed the causes of action and dismissed the complaint. A divided Appellate Division affirmed.
1 common questions
Only determinations necessary to the outcome receive preclusive effect. Alternative or unnecessary findings do not bind later courts.
Supporting sources