Also known as: exclusionary rule of evidence · exclusionary rule · exclusionary rules
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A rule of evidence that bars the introduction at trial of evidence obtained through violations of constitutional rights. The rule applies in both federal and state criminal proceedings and operates to deter official misconduct by removing the incentive to conduct unlawful searches or seizures. Courts have recognized several exceptions that permit admission when the benefits of exclusion are outweighed by other considerations such as good-faith reliance or inevitable lawful discovery.
Eileen Epstein was stopped at a highway checkpoint where officers relied on a shared database showing an active warrant. The warrant had been recalled months earlier due to a clerical mistake in another county. Officers arrested her and searched her vehicle, discovering contraband. The court denied suppression because the officers' reliance on the apparently valid database entry was objectively reasonable.
Edgar Evers obtained a warrant that contained a typographical error in the address caused by the issuing judge's clerk. Officers executed the warrant in good faith and seized evidence of drug trafficking. Evers moved to suppress on the ground that the warrant was technically invalid. The court admitted the evidence because the officers reasonably relied on the warrant's facial validity.
Edith Eberhardt's computer was searched without a warrant during an investigation. Agents later obtained a valid warrant for the same records through routine audit procedures that would have been completed within days. The prosecution showed that the records would have been discovered lawfully regardless of the initial search. The court admitted the evidence under the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
Ella Emerson's home was searched pursuant to a warrant later found to lack probable cause. The officers had relied on the neutral magistrate's issuance of the warrant and had no reason to doubt its validity. Evidence of financial crimes was recovered. The court denied suppression because the officers acted in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on the warrant.
Ewan Eckhart received use and derivative-use immunity and testified before a grand jury. The government later prosecuted him using evidence obtained independently of his testimony. Eckhart moved to dismiss on the ground that the prosecution could not prove an independent source. The court required the government to demonstrate that its evidence was not derived from the compelled testimony.
In February 1971 petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in the Central District of California investigating violations of federal gambling and related laws. The government believed that petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Prior to the scheduled appearances, the government applied to the District Court for an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003. Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, contending that the scope of the immunity provided by the statute was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and therefore was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel their testimony. The District Court rejected this contention and ordered petitioners to appear before the grand jury and answer its questions under the grant of immunity. Petitioners appeared but refused to answer questions, asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. They were brought before the District Court, and each persisted in his refusal to answer the grand jury's questions notwithstanding the grant of immunity. The court found both in contempt and committed them to the custody of the Attorney General until either they answered the grand jury's questions or the term of the grand jury expired. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the contempt findings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether testimony may be compelled by granting immunity from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom or whether transactional immunity is necessary.
View caseEugene Ellsworth was arrested for drunk driving and taken to a hospital. Officers directed a physician to draw blood without a warrant or Ellsworth's consent. The blood-alcohol results were offered at trial. The court admitted the evidence because the draw was justified by exigent circumstances arising from the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.
Petitioner Schmerber and a companion had been drinking at a tavern and bowling alley on November 12, 1964. Petitioner was driving from the bowling alley about midnight when the car skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree. Both petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to a hospital for treatment. A police officer who arrived at the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner's breath and testified that petitioner's eyes were bloodshot, watery, and sort of a glassy appearance. The officer saw petitioner again at the hospital within two hours of the accident and noticed similar symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner that he was under arrest and that he was entitled to the services of an attorney, that he could remain silent, and that anything he told the officer would be used against him in evidence. At the direction of a police officer, a blood sample was then withdrawn from petitioner's body by a physician at the hospital. The chemical analysis of this sample revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in his blood at the time of the offense which indicated intoxication. The report of this analysis was admitted in evidence at the trial. Petitioner objected to receipt of this evidence of the analysis on the ground that the blood had been withdrawn despite his refusal, on the advice of his counsel, to consent to the test. Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles Municipal Court of the criminal offense of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Appellate Department of the California Superior Court rejected petitioner's contentions and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseYes. The rule prohibits the use of evidence obtained through Fourth Amendment violations in state proceedings under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The exception applies when officers reasonably rely on a warrant that is later found defective due to clerical errors or lack of probable cause, provided the reliance is objectively reasonable and the warrant is not facially deficient.
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Evidence is admissible if the prosecution proves that the police would have discovered it through lawful means even without the constitutional violation.
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No. The rule generally does not apply in civil removal hearings, so evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may still be used.
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…recently fixed as Department of Justice policy. See Beaney, Right to Counsel 29-30, 36-42 (1955). In Mapp , which imposed the exclusionary rule on the States for Fourth Amendment violations, more than half of the States had themselves already adopted some such rule. See 367 U. S., at 651. In Gideon , which extended Johnson v.…