Also known as: exclusive powers · exclusive authority
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An authority granted to the donee of a power of appointment that permits the donee to appoint all appointive property to one or more members of a designated class while excluding others from any share.
Sole authority vested in one person or body to perform or prevent specified acts, such as adding or changing the person to whom an authoritative electronic copy has been transferred or exercising regulatory power over a defined domain.
An authority granted to the donee of a power of appointment that permits the donee to appoint all appointive property to one or more members of a designated class while excluding others from any share.
1 common questions
An exclusive power permits the donee to appoint all property to one or more members of the class while excluding others entirely. A nonexclusive power requires the donee to appoint some property to each member of the class. Courts default to construing powers as exclusive absent express language requiring distribution to every object.
Sole authority vested in one person or body to perform or prevent specified acts, such as adding or changing the person to whom an authoritative electronic copy has been transferred or exercising regulatory power over a defined domain.
Everlasting Insurance hired Emanuel Escobar, a nonlawyer adjuster, to determine losses and negotiate settlements on multiple claims for a contingent fee. Escobar completed the work and sought payment under the contract. The court refused enforcement because the state constitution placed exclusive authority over the practice of law in the judiciary, rendering the statute permitting unregulated nonlawyer performance invalid.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Edward Everett and Ewan Eckhart formed a partnership to manage a hotel lease. Everett, acting as manager with exclusive powers of direction, received an offer to renew the lease but kept it secret and pursued the opportunity for himself alone. The court held Everett breached his duty because the exclusive control charged him with disclosure to equalize the opportunity for his partner.
On April 10, 1902, Louisa M. Gerry leased the Hotel Bristol at the northwest corner of Forty-second Street and Fifth Avenue in New York City to Walter J. Salmon for a twenty-year term beginning May 1, 1902, and ending April 30, 1922. The lease required Salmon to convert the building into shops and offices at a cost of two hundred thousand dollars. All alterations became accretions to the land. While negotiating the lease with Gerry, Salmon entered into a joint venture agreement with Morton H. Meinhard. Meinhard agreed to pay half the funds needed to reconstruct, alter, manage, and operate the property. Salmon received sole power to manage, lease, underlet, and operate the building. Net profits were to be divided forty percent to Meinhard for the first five years and fifty percent thereafter. Losses were to be shared equally. The venture operated the reconstructed property at a loss in its early years and later at a profit. It generated substantial returns for both parties until the lease approached its end. In late 1921, Elbridge T. Gerry, who had acquired the reversion and owned adjoining lots on Fifth Avenue and Forty-second Street, approached Salmon alone after failing to interest other parties in a larger development plan. On January 25, 1922, Gerry executed a new lease to Midpoint Realty Company, a corporation owned and controlled by Salmon. The new lease covered the entire tract for twenty years with successive renewal options extending up to eighty years. It required demolition of existing buildings after seven years and construction of a new three-million-dollar building. Annual rents ranged from three hundred fifty thousand to four hundred seventy-five thousand dollars. Salmon personally guaranteed performance until the new building was completed and paid for. Salmon did not inform Meinhard of the negotiations or the new lease until February 1922. Upon learning of it, Meinhard demanded that the lease be held in trust for the venture and offered to share the guaranty obligations. Salmon refused, prompting this suit. A referee awarded Meinhard a twenty-five percent interest in the lease. On cross-appeals the Appellate Division modified the judgment to enlarge the interest to one-half of the entire lease. The defendants appealed. Separately, in 1917 Meinhard had assigned his entire interest in the joint venture agreement to his wife. She reassigned it to him before suit was commenced. Salmon continued to deal with Meinhard on the basis that the enterprise remained subsisting.
View caseOregon enacted a statute permitting physician-assisted suicide under strict protocols. The U.S. Attorney General issued an interpretive rule asserting exclusive federal authority to determine that assisting suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose under the Controlled Substances Act. The Court rejected the rule because Congress had not granted the Attorney General such sweeping interpretive power over state medical practices.
In 1994 Oregon voters enacted the Oregon Death With Dignity Act. The Act exempts state-licensed physicians from civil or criminal liability when they dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs to a terminally ill patient. Eligibility requires a diagnosis of an incurable and irreversible disease expected to cause death within six months. The patient must make a voluntary and informed request and obtain confirmation from a consulting physician. The statute requires attending physicians to determine competency. They must provide information about palliative alternatives. They must refer patients for counseling if depression or psychological disorder impairs judgment. Physicians must maintain detailed medical records that the Oregon Department of Human Services reviews. In 2004 thirty-seven patients ended their lives by ingesting medication prescribed under the Act. The Controlled Substances Act was enacted in 1970. It places substances in five schedules based on potential for abuse, accepted medical use, and safety under medical supervision. Schedule II substances require a written nonrefillable prescription from a registered physician. A 1971 regulation requires every prescription to be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by a practitioner acting in the usual course of professional practice. Physicians must obtain registration from the Attorney General. The Attorney General may deny suspend or revoke registration when inconsistent with the public interest. The Attorney General must consider five statutory factors including state recommendations and compliance with state and federal law. In 1997 members of Congress asked the DEA to prosecute or revoke the registrations of Oregon physicians who assisted suicide. Attorney General Janet Reno concluded that the CSA did not authorize the DEA to displace state regulation of medical practice or override a state's determination of legitimate medical practice. Legislation granting explicit authority failed to pass. In February 2001 Oregon's Attorney General wrote to incoming Attorney General John Ashcroft requesting consultation if the Department revisited the issue. An adviser replied that no review was pending. On November 9 2001 without consulting Oregon officials Attorney General Ashcroft issued an Interpretive Rule. The Rule declared that assisting suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose under 21 CFR §1306.04. It stated that prescribing dispensing or administering controlled substances for that purpose violates the CSA and may render a physician's registration inconsistent with the public interest. The Rule applies regardless of state-law authorization. Every prescription filled under the Oregon Act uses Schedule II substances. Revocation of DEA registration would bar a physician from prescribing them. The State of Oregon joined by a physician a pharmacist and terminally ill patients sued in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The district court entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the Interpretive Rule. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit invalidated the Rule. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View case3 common questions
A system gives a person exclusive power when an authoritative electronic copy enables that person to identify itself as the transferee and to prevent others from adding or changing the transferee while also allowing transfer of control. This power must be subject only to limited exceptions in subsection (d).
A state constitution vests exclusive authority in the judiciary when it reserves regulation of legal practice to the courts. A statute attempting to authorize nonlawyers to perform core legal acts such as loss determination and settlement negotiation is unconstitutional and prevents enforcement of fee contracts for those services.
Yes. The person to whom general letters are first issued holds exclusive authority until termination or modification. A later appointee acting in good faith before notice may still have acts validated, but the first representative may recover estate property from the subsequent appointee.
…extension which he had locked within his breast to be utilized by himself alone. The very fact that Salmon was in control with exclusive powers of direction charged him the more obviously with the duty of disclosure, since only through disclosure could opportunity be equalized. If he might cut off renewal by a purchase for his own…