Also known as:extreme and outrageous conduct · outrageous conduct
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The standard supplies the second element of intentional infliction of emotional distress and also supports awards of punitive damages when the actor's motive is evil or the indifference to others' rights is reckless.
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Restatements
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Public Accusations at School Assembly
Sabrina, the boarding-school administrator, summoned Dakota to a mandatory assembly and accused her of cheating and theft before the entire student body, then threatened expulsion and deportation to a country Dakota had never visited. Dakota fainted on stage and later developed self-harm ideation. The public shaming and baseless threats crossed the threshold of extreme and outrageous conduct, exposing Sabrina to liability for the resulting severe emotional distress and bodily harm.
Supervisor's Repeated Sexual Threats
Harlan, a farm cooperative supervisor, repeatedly told migrant worker Elena Vargas that he would report her family to immigration authorities unless she agreed to sexual relations with him, describing detention-center conditions in graphic detail in front of laughing coworkers. Vargas suffered chronic nightmares and fainting spells. The sustained exploitation of her economic and family vulnerabilities constituted extreme and outrageous conduct that justified both compensatory and punitive damages.
Funeral Protest with Offensive Signs
Zara and twenty members of a tenants' group stood on a public sidewalk beside a cemetery during Leah's private burial service, displaying large signs labeling the deceased a slumlord and chanting about housing policy failures. Leah and the family inside the grounds suffered severe emotional distress. Because the speech addressed matters of public concern on public property and remained peaceful, the conduct did not qualify as extreme and outrageous for tort purposes.
Snyder v. Phelps562 U.S. 443 (2011)
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in action in Iraq. His father, Albert Snyder, arranged for the funeral to be held in Westminster, Maryland. Members of the Westboro Baptist Church, an unincorporated association founded by Fred Phelps, learned of the funeral through local newspapers and decided to picket it to communicate their belief that God punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality.
On the day of the funeral, Westboro members displayed placards on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the service was held. The signs included messages such as "God Hates the USA," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in Hell," "Priests Rape Boys," "You’re Going to Hell," and "God Hates Fags." The picketing took place for about 30 minutes before the funeral began. The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the picketers. Church members also posted an online "epic" that discussed Matthew Snyder’s funeral and criticized his parents.
Albert Snyder filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against Fred Phelps, his daughters, and the Westboro Baptist Church. The suit alleged claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. A jury found for Snyder and awarded $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages.
The district court reduced the punitive damages award to $2.1 million but left the verdict otherwise intact. The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment, holding that Westboro’s statements were protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability for their picketing speech.
Oil-Spill Corporate Conduct
After a massive tanker spill, executives at Empire Logistics continued operations without implementing known safety upgrades despite internal warnings that another spill was probable. The resulting environmental and economic harm to coastal communities triggered claims for punitive damages. The company's reckless indifference to foreseeable risks met the extreme and outrageous threshold required for such awards.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker554 U.S. 471 (2008)
In March 1989 the Exxon Valdez supertanker grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, releasing millions of gallons of crude oil.
Exxon Shipping Company, the vessel's owner and now known as SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., together with its parent Exxon Mobil Corporation, confronted widespread liability from the spill. The company settled a class action brought by more than 32,000 commercial fishermen, Native Americans, landowners, and others for $2.5 billion in compensatory damages. Exxon also pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Refuse Act, paying $150 million in criminal fines, and spent an additional $2.1 billion on cleanup.
Respondents, other persons whose businesses and livelihoods were disrupted by the spill, filed this civil action seeking punitive damages. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs into three classes and conducted a three-phase trial. In the first phase the jury found Exxon Shipping Company and Captain Joseph Hazelwood, the ship's master, reckless and therefore potentially liable for punitive damages. In the second phase the jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon.
The District Court later reduced the punitive award to $2.5 billion. On appeal the Ninth Circuit reinstated the jury's original $5 billion punitive damages award. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the $2.5 billion punitive damages award was excessive under maritime law.
Media Broadcast of Private Facts
A television station aired detailed reports of a private individual's involvement in an accident without verifying the facts or obtaining consent, causing widespread public humiliation and lost business opportunities. The broadcast's reckless disregard for accuracy and privacy crossed into extreme and outrageous territory, supporting an emotional-distress claim alongside defamation issues.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.403 U.S. 29 (1971)
In 1963 George Rosenbloom operated as a distributor of nudist magazines in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. During the fall of that year the Special Investigations Squad of the Philadelphia Police Department, commanded by Captain Ferguson, responded to citizen complaints by purchasing magazines from more than twenty newsstands and determining that the publications were obscene.
On October 1, 1963, Rosenbloom was arrested while delivering magazines to a newsstand where police were making an arrest. Three days later police obtained a search warrant, raided Rosenbloom's home and a rented barn used as a warehouse, and seized thousands of magazines and books; Rosenbloom surrendered and was arrested a second time.
Captain Ferguson telephoned radio station WIP and other local media to report the raid and arrest. WIP broadcast news reports on October 4 that identified Rosenbloom by name and address and described the seized materials as obscene or allegedly obscene.
Later broadcasts between October 21 and November 1 covered Rosenbloom's federal lawsuit for injunctive relief and referred to participants as smut distributors and girlie-book peddlers without naming Rosenbloom.
In May 1964 a state-court jury acquitted Rosenbloom of the criminal obscenity charges after the trial judge instructed that the magazines were not obscene as a matter of law. Rosenbloom then filed this diversity action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Metromedia, owner of WIP, alleging that the broadcasts constituted libel under Pennsylvania law.
The jury returned a verdict for Rosenbloom awarding $25,000 in general damages and $725,000 in punitive damages, the latter reduced by the district court to $250,000 on remittitur; the district court denied Metromedia's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the judgment, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Bystander Distress at Accident Scene
Eileen Epstein watched from the curb as a negligent driver struck her sister, who was pushing a stroller containing Eileen's infant niece. Eileen suffered severe emotional distress that manifested in lasting anxiety and sleep loss. The driver's extreme and outrageous conduct toward the direct victims, combined with Eileen's presence and resulting bodily harm, permitted recovery under the bystander rule.
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon. Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister.
The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries. In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering. The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident. The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses.
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California.
In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim. The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What four elements must coalesce for intentional infliction of emotional distress liability?
The conduct must be intentional or reckless, the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, a causal connection must exist between the conduct and the distress, and the emotional distress must be severe. Courts assess outrageousness by whether the conduct exceeds all bounds of decency and would be regarded as atrocious in a civilized community.
When can a bystander recover for distress caused by conduct directed at a third person?
A bystander who is an immediate family member present at the time may recover whether or not bodily harm results. Any other person present may recover only if the distress produces bodily harm. The underlying conduct must still satisfy the extreme and outrageous standard.
Supporting sources
Does the First Amendment bar IIED claims arising from speech on matters of public concern?
Yes when the speech occurs on public property, remains peaceful, and addresses public issues even if it causes severe emotional distress at a sensitive event such as a funeral. Liability is precluded absent additional unprotected conduct such as threats or fighting words.
Supporting sources
Can punitive damages be awarded when the underlying conduct is extreme and outrageous?
Yes. Punitive damages punish the actor for outrageous conduct and deter similar future acts. They are available when the defendant's evil motive or reckless indifference to others' rights is shown, and the trier of fact may consider the character of the act and the nature of the harm.
Supporting sources
, as I have said, with a bad motive or with reckless disregard of the interests of others, and before you would award punitive damages you must find that these broadcasts were published with…
TortsIntentional torts · Harms to the person and property interests (assault, battery, false imprisonment, infliction of mental distress, trespass to land and chattels, conversion)UBEFoundational