Also known as: FRE 702 · Federal Rule of Evidence 702 · Fed. R. Evid. 702 · Rule 702 · expert witness rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A rule of evidence that permits a witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to offer opinion testimony when the proponent shows it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, employs reliable principles and methods, and applies those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Farah Fox sues Falcon Dynamics in federal court for product defects. Falcon Dynamics plans to call a retained engineer at trial. Falcon Dynamics must disclose the engineer's identity to Fox under the initial expert disclosure rule even before completing its full investigation of the case.
Fiona Foster, a store cashier, observes a spill pattern and wants to testify that the liquid must have been present for an hour based on her training program. The court excludes the opinion because it rests on specialized knowledge that requires qualification under the expert evidence rule rather than lay opinion standards.
Faith Fitzgerald offers a forensic economist who used a novel event study lacking a documented error rate to prove class damages. The judge conducts a gatekeeping inquiry into whether the methodology is reliable before deciding whether the testimony reaches the jury.
Francisco Frost designates a network engineer to testify about nationwide cellular capacity issues. Frost must disclose the subject matter of the engineer's expected testimony under the expert disclosure provisions even though no written report is required.
Francois Fortier offers an entertainment production manager to testify about rigging practices based solely on industry experience. The court applies a flexible reliability analysis to the experiential testimony rather than limiting review to laboratory science.
Forrest Falconer offers a computer scientist whose informal laptop tests support broad conclusions about real-world algorithm performance. The court excludes the testimony after finding too great a gap between the limited data and the opinions offered.
Robert Joiner began work as an electrician in the Water & Light Department of Thomasville, Georgia, in 1973. This job required him to work with and around the City’s electrical transformers, which used a mineral-oil-based dielectric fluid as a coolant. Joiner often had to stick his hands and arms into the fluid to make repairs. The fluid would sometimes splash onto him, occasionally getting into his eyes and mouth. In 1983 the City discovered that the fluid in some of the transformers was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls. Joiner was diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer in 1991. He sued petitioners in Georgia state court the following year. Petitioner Monsanto manufactured PCB’s from 1935 to 1977. Petitioners General Electric and Westinghouse Electric manufactured transformers and dielectric fluid. In his complaint Joiner linked his development of cancer to his exposure to PCB’s and their derivatives, polychlorinated dibenzofurans and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins. Joiner had been a smoker for approximately eight years. His parents had both been smokers, and there was a history of lung cancer in his family. Petitioners removed the case to federal court. Once there, they moved for summary judgment. Joiner responded that there were numerous disputed factual issues that required resolution by a jury. He relied largely on the testimony of expert witnesses. In depositions, his experts had testified that PCB’s alone can promote cancer and that furans and dioxins can also promote cancer. They opined that since Joiner had been exposed to PCB’s, furans, and dioxins, such exposure was likely responsible for Joiner’s cancer. The District Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCB’s. But it nevertheless granted summary judgment for petitioners because there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins. The testimony of Joiner’s experts had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCB’s and small-cell lung cancer. The court believed that the testimony of respondent’s experts to the contrary did not rise above subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that because the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, it applied a particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge’s exclusion of expert testimony. The Supreme Court granted petitioners’ petition for a writ of certiorari.
View caseThe proponent must demonstrate that it is more likely than not the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, employs reliable principles and methods, and applies those principles and methods reliably to the case facts.
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No. The gatekeeping obligation extends to all expert testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, including experience-based opinions in engineering and other fields.
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The trial judge acts as gatekeeper and must ensure the testimony is both relevant and reliable before it reaches the jury, using a flexible case-specific analysis that may consider testing, peer review, error rate, standards, and general acceptance.
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Parties must disclose the identity of any witness expected to present evidence under the rule and, when required, the subject matter of that testimony along with a summary of facts and opinions.
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…district court properly applied this standard, and affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Frye was superseded by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2794, and remanded for us to consider the admissibility of plaintiffs' expert testimony under this new standard. B. Procedural Issues First, however,…