Also known as: Federal Rule of Evidence 702 · FRE 702 · Rule 702 · Fed. R. Evid. Rule 702
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A federal evidentiary rule that permits a witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to offer opinion testimony. The proponent must show that the specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, that it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and that the expert has reliably applied those principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Floyd Franklin sues Fisher Foods after suffering an allergic reaction to a packaged snack. Fisher Foods retains a toxicologist to testify about the product's ingredients and manufacturing process. Under the applicable disclosure rules, Fisher Foods must identify this witness to Franklin before trial so that the opposing party can prepare for the expert's opinions.
Fernando Farrell testifies that a warehouse floor appeared wet based on his direct observation of smearing patterns. When he begins to estimate how long the liquid had been present using specialized training in slip-and-fall analysis, the court requires him to satisfy the standards for expert testimony rather than permitting the opinion as ordinary lay testimony.
Faye Fuller offers a forensic economist to calculate damages in a securities fraud case using a novel event study with alternative market indices. The court examines whether the methodology has been tested, subjected to peer review, or shown to have a known error rate before deciding whether the testimony may reach the jury.
Forrest Falconer designates a network engineer to address redundancy failures in a telecommunications outage case. The disclosure must state the subject matter on which the engineer will present evidence so the opposing party receives adequate notice of the topics the expert will cover.
Felicia Fuentes offers an entertainment production manager to testify about rigging standards after a stage collapse. The court applies reliability screening to this experience-based technical testimony even though it rests on industry practice rather than laboratory science.
Farid Farahani offers a computer scientist who reviewed only marketing brochures and selected code snippets before concluding that one algorithm copies another. The court excludes the testimony because the limited data create too great a gap from the confident opinion offered on real-world performance.
In 1973, Robert Joiner began work as an electrician in the Water & Light Department of Thomasville, Georgia. This job required him to work with and around the City's electrical transformers, which used a mineral-oil-based dielectric fluid as a coolant. Joiner often had to stick his hands and arms into the fluid to make repairs. The fluid would sometimes splash onto him, occasionally getting into his eyes and mouth. In 1983 the City discovered that the fluid in some of the transformers was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Joiner was diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer in 1991. He sued petitioners in Georgia state court the following year. Petitioner Monsanto manufactured PCBs from 1935 to 1977; petitioners General Electric and Westinghouse Electric manufactured transformers and dielectric fluid. In his complaint Joiner linked his development of cancer to his exposure to PCBs and their derivatives, polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Joiner had been a smoker for approximately eight years, his parents had both been smokers, and there was a history of lung cancer in his family. Petitioners removed the case to federal court. Once in federal court, petitioners moved for summary judgment. They contended that there was no evidence that Joiner suffered significant exposure to PCBs, furans, or dioxins, and that there was no admissible scientific evidence that PCBs promoted Joiner's cancer. Joiner responded that there were numerous disputed factual issues that required resolution by a jury. He relied largely on the testimony of expert witnesses. In depositions, his experts had testified that PCBs alone can promote cancer and that furans and dioxins can also promote cancer. They opined that since Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, furans, and dioxins, such exposure was likely responsible for Joiner's cancer. The experts included Dr. Arnold Schecter, who testified that it was more likely than not that Mr. Joiner's lung cancer was causally linked to cigarette smoking and PCB exposure, and Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum, who testified that Joiner's lung cancer was caused by or contributed to in a significant degree by the materials with which he worked. The District Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs. But it nevertheless granted summary judgment for petitioners because there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins. The testimony of Joiner's experts had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. The court believed that the testimony of respondent's experts to the contrary did not rise above subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that because the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, it applied a particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony. The Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari in 1997.
The proponent must show that the expert is qualified, that the specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact, that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, that it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and that the expert has reliably applied those methods to the facts of the case.
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…district court properly applied this standard, and affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Frye was superseded by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2794, and remanded for us to consider the admissibility of plaintiffs' expert testimony under this new standard. B. Procedural Issues First, however,…
…82 F. 3d 1513, 1518-1519 (CA10), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1042 (1996). II A In Daubert , this Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable." 509 U. S., at 589. The initial question before us…
No. The requirement applies to all expert testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, including engineering and experience-based opinions. Courts use a flexible, case-specific analysis that may draw on the traditional scientific factors or other appropriate indicia of reliability.
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The trial judge acts as gatekeeper and must ensure that the testimony is both relevant and reliable before it reaches the jury. The judge evaluates the soundness of the expert's principles and methods and their application to the facts rather than leaving those questions entirely to the jury.
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Yes. When the expert's conclusions are not supported by sufficient facts or reliable methodology, the court may find too great an analytical gap and exclude the testimony. This determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal.
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