Federal Rule 17(b)

In 1953 the Textile Workers Union of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Lincoln Mills of Alabama. The agreement was to run for one year and from year to year thereafter unless terminated on specified notices. It contained a no-strike clause and established a multi-step grievance procedure whose final step, available to either party, was arbitration. Several grievances concerning work loads and work assignments arose under the agreement. The union processed the grievances through every step of the contractual procedure, after which the employer denied them. The union then requested arbitration, but the employer refused. The union filed suit in federal district court seeking an order compelling the employer to arbitrate the grievances. The district court held that it possessed jurisdiction and directed the employer to comply with the arbitration provisions of the agreement. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, concluding that the district court lacked authority under either federal or state law to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. After the Court of Appeals decision but before oral argument, Lincoln Mills terminated its operations, ceased all work at the mill in March 1957, and contracted to sell its mill properties. Some of the grievances sought back pay for increased workloads, and the collective bargaining agreement authorized the arbitration board to adjust compensation retroactively.

On October 4, 1960, a commercial airliner scheduled to fly from Boston to Philadelphia plunged into Boston Harbor shortly after departing from a Boston airport. This crash led to the institution of over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful death against the airline, manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States, and in some cases the Massachusetts Port Authority. More than 100 of these actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. More than 45 actions were instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The present case involves 40 wrongful death actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of victims of the crash. These plaintiffs are described as Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents. The defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of Massachusetts. The defendants alleged that most of the witnesses resided there and that over 100 other actions were already pending in that district. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the actions. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred and should vacate its transfer order. The Court of Appeals concluded that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review important questions concerning the construction and operation of § 1404(a). Prior citations in the case include the District Court decision at 204 F. Supp. 426 and the Court of Appeals decision at 309 F. 2d 953.

In February 1819 the Ohio legislature enacted a statute imposing an annual tax of fifty thousand dollars on each office of discount and deposit maintained by any bank transacting business in the state without authorization under Ohio law. The statute authorized the state auditor to issue warrants for collection of the tax. Those warrants permitted entry into banking houses and seizure of money or goods to satisfy the levy. The Bank of the United States filed a bill in equity in the circuit court for the district of Ohio at the September term 1819. The bill named Ralph Osborn, the state auditor, as defendant and sought an injunction to restrain enforcement of the tax statute against its operations. On September 14, 1819, the circuit court awarded a preliminary injunction upon the posting of a one hundred thousand dollar bond. Subpoena and injunction writs were served on Osborn and on John L. Harper, whom Osborn had employed to collect the tax. On September 17, 1819, after service of the writs, Harper forcibly entered the Bank's office in Chillicothe and seized one hundred thousand dollars in specie and notes. The funds were delivered to H. M. Curry, then treasurer of Ohio. Curry held them separately until his resignation in early 1820, at which point the money passed to his successor, S. Sullivan. An amended bill added Curry, Sullivan, and Harper as defendants. It sought discovery, restoration of the funds, and further injunctive relief. Curry answered admitting receipt of approximately ninety-eight thousand dollars from Harper. He credited the sum to the state but kept it separate. Sullivan, after initially failing to answer and being held in contempt, admitted finding the separate sum upon taking office and holding it untouched. The circuit court entered decrees against Osborn and Harper and directed restoration of the funds with interest on a portion of the specie. The defendants appealed the decree to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court requested argument on whether the Bank's charter conferred jurisdiction on the federal circuit courts and whether Congress possessed constitutional authority to grant such jurisdiction.