The constitutional allocation of powers between the national government and the states that preserves state sovereignty while granting enumerated powers to the federal government. This structure limits federal authority to those powers expressly conferred and reserves the remainder to the states or the people.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Treaty Cannot Override Fifth Amendment
Francesca Fiore, a U.S. citizen living abroad, signed an executive agreement with a foreign government that required her to submit to trial without a jury. She challenged the agreement in federal court, arguing it violated her constitutional rights. The court invalidated the agreement because treaties and executive agreements cannot authorize action inconsistent with the Constitution or alter federalism principles.
Abstention From State Prosecution
Faith Fitzgerald faced ongoing state criminal charges for conduct that also implicated federal interests. She asked a federal district court to enjoin the state proceeding on constitutional grounds. The court declined to intervene, citing comity and federalism absent bad faith or a patently invalid statute.
Felicia Fuentes alleged that federal narcotics agents violated her Fourth Amendment rights during a search. She filed suit directly in federal court seeking damages. The court recognized a cause of action under federal law to vindicate the constitutional violation within the federal system.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx.
The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.
Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Floyd Franklin lived with his grandchildren in a home zoned for single families only. City officials sought to enforce the ordinance against him. The court struck down the application of the zoning rule because it intruded on protected family interests reserved under the federal structure.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance.
Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her.
Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine.
The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children.
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
Flora Ford was prosecuted under a federal statute for possessing a firearm near a school. She moved to dismiss, claiming Congress lacked authority to regulate local activity. The court held the statute exceeded enumerated powers and invaded areas reserved to the states.
United States v. Lopez514 U.S. 549 (1995)
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises.
The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools.
The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Fernando Farrell, a state election official, challenged federal campaign finance restrictions that dictated how state parties could raise and spend funds. He argued the rules displaced traditional state authority over elections. The court upheld the provisions as consistent with the balance of power in the federal system.
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission540 U.S. 93, 226–27 (2003)
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Communications Act of 1934, and other statutes to address the role of soft money and issue advocacy in federal elections.
Plaintiffs included a diverse group of entities and individuals such as the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union who alleged that BCRA was unconstitutional. Defendants included the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General of the United States.
The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to special procedures in BCRA Section 403. The District Court received a voluminous record from the parties and issued a judgment on May 1, 2003, that upheld some provisions of BCRA and invalidated others.
All losing parties filed direct appeals to the Supreme Court within ten days, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 5, 2003, ordering expedited briefing and argument on September 8, 2003.
More than a century of federal legislation preceded BCRA, beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 that banned corporate contributions in connection with federal elections. Congress later extended prohibitions to unions, required disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and enacted FECA in 1971 with further amendments in 1974 that imposed contribution limits, expenditure ceilings, and created the FEC.
The Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to the 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo. After Buckley, the FEC permitted political parties to fund mixed-purpose activities such as voter registration and generic advertising in part with soft money not subject to FECA's source and amount limits.
Soft-money fundraising by the national parties grew from $21.6 million in 1984 to $498 million in 2000, with large corporate and union donations often motivated by a desire for access to federal candidates. National parties transferred substantial soft money to state parties, which could use higher percentages for mixed activities under FEC allocation rules.
The use of soft money also supported so-called issue ads that avoided express advocacy of a candidate's election or defeat and therefore fell outside FECA's disclosure and source restrictions. These ads frequently aired in the 60 days before federal elections, referred to clearly identified candidates, and were funded by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations using misleading names.
A Senate investigation into 1996 federal election practices documented both parties' use of soft money to obtain special access for large donors and the coordination of issue ads with candidates. The District Court compiled extensive evidence from declarations, expert reports, and internal party documents showing that federal officeholders solicited soft-money donations, that parties maintained tallies crediting donors to particular candidates, and that large soft-money contributions were often made to secure influence rather than for ideological reasons.
Does a conviction in one state bar prosecution for the same conduct in another state?
No. Each state is a separate sovereign under the federal system. The Double Jeopardy Clause limits successive prosecutions only by the same sovereign, so a conviction in Louisiana does not prevent Tennessee from prosecuting identical conduct under its own laws.
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When must a federal court abstain from enjoining an ongoing state criminal prosecution?
Federal courts must abstain absent extraordinary circumstances such as bad-faith prosecution or a flagrantly unconstitutional statute. Principles of comity and federalism require deference to state proceedings that are already underway.
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Can treaties or executive agreements override constitutional protections?
No. Such agreements are not co-equal with the Constitution and cannot authorize violations of specific rights or alter structural principles like federalism. An agreement that conflicts with the Fifth Amendment is invalid.
Supporting sources
federalism
and separation of powers.” Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). B The majority acknowledges none of this doctrinal background,…