Also known as:freedoms not to speak · right not to speak · compelled speech
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A First Amendment principle protecting individuals from governmental compulsion to express messages or beliefs they reject. The protection extends to both verbal statements and symbolic conduct that would convey an unwanted endorsement.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Parade Organizers Exclude Unwanted Group
Fiona Foster organizes an annual private parade celebrating local heritage. City officials order her to include a float from a political advocacy group whose views she opposes. She refuses and faces fines for violating an inclusion ordinance. A court holds that the order compels her to convey a message she rejects.
Students Refuse Loyalty Pledge
Francois Fortier attends a public high school that requires every student to stand and recite a superintendent-written pledge affirming support for all state policies. He remains silent and receives a disciplinary referral. School officials defend the rule as civic education. A court invalidates the requirement as unconstitutional compulsion.
Finn Fletcher operates a licensed pregnancy counseling center. State law requires him to display a notice listing abortion and contraception services available elsewhere. He objects that the notice endorses practices he opposes. The mandate forces him to convey the state's preferred message inside his own facility.
Rust v. Sullivan500 U.S. 173 (1991)
In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a–6, authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to make grants to public or nonprofit private entities for the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects offering a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services.
After eighteen years of administration, the Secretary in 1988 promulgated new regulations that prohibit Title X projects from engaging in counseling concerning, referrals for, or activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning. The regulations also require such projects to maintain physical and financial separation from any abortion activities. They further forbid the use of project funds for abortion-related activities even if separately funded.
Petitioners, who are Title X grantees and physicians who supervise Title X funds suing on behalf of themselves and their patients, filed two separate actions in federal district court. The actions were later consolidated. Petitioners challenged the facial validity of the regulations and sought declaratory and injunctive relief before the regulations had been applied.
The district court rejected petitioners' statutory and constitutional challenges and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals.
Fumiko Fujimoto directs a law school that receives federal funding. A statute conditions the funds on granting military recruiters equal access to campus facilities and students. She argues the requirement forces the school to facilitate a message it rejects. The access rule regulates conduct rather than compelling the school to endorse the military's position.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR)547 U.S. 47, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 164 L. Ed. 2D 156 (2006)
The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR) is an association of law schools and law faculties whose members have adopted policies expressing opposition to discrimination based on sexual orientation. These members objected to the military's policy regarding homosexuals in the military and sought to restrict military recruiting on their campuses. In response to such restrictions by law schools, Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment, which denies specified federal funds to institutions of higher education that do not provide military recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters.
In 2003, FAIR filed suit against enforcement of the Solomon Amendment and sought a preliminary injunction. At that time, the statute prevented the Department of Defense from providing funds to institutions that prohibited or prevented military recruiters from gaining entry to campuses. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Department of Defense had adopted an informal policy requiring equal access in quality and scope to students. Some law schools had previously arranged for military recruiters to interview on the undergraduate campus to comply while maintaining their policies.
The District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that FAIR had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. Congress subsequently amended the Solomon Amendment to codify the equal access requirement, specifying that military recruiters must receive access at least equal in quality and scope to that provided any other employer.
FAIR appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. A divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed the District Court and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Solomon Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's decision.
Frederick Ferguson owns a large shopping center. State law requires him to permit individuals to gather signatures for a political petition on his property. He objects that the presence of the petitioners conveys an unwanted association with their cause. The requirement does not force Ferguson himself to speak or endorse the message.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins447 U.S. 74 (1980)
PruneYard Shopping Center is a privately owned shopping center in Campbell, California. It covers approximately 21 acres with 5 acres devoted to parking and 16 acres occupied by walkways, plazas, sidewalks, and buildings. These buildings contain more than 65 specialty shops, 10 restaurants, and a movie theater. The center is open to the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of its commercial establishments.
The center maintains a policy of not permitting any visitor or tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity. This includes the circulation of petitions that is not directly related to its commercial purposes. The policy has been strictly enforced in a nondiscriminatory fashion by a security force. The center is owned by appellant Fred Sahadi.
In December 1975, appellees who are high school students sought to solicit support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism. On a Saturday afternoon they set up a card table in a corner of PruneYard's central courtyard. They distributed pamphlets and asked passersby to sign petitions that were to be sent to the President and Members of Congress. Their activity was peaceful and orderly and so far as the record indicates it was not objected to by PruneYard's patrons.
Soon after the students had begun soliciting signatures a security guard informed them that they would have to leave because their activity violated PruneYard regulations. The guard suggested that they move to the public sidewalk at the PruneYard's perimeter. The students immediately left the premises and later filed this lawsuit in the California Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They sought to enjoin the shopping center owners from denying them access to the PruneYard for the purpose of circulating their petitions.
The Superior Court held that the students were not entitled under either the Federal or California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property. It concluded that there were adequate effective channels of communication available to them other than soliciting on the private property. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed. It held that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning reasonably exercised in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned. It concluded that the students were entitled to conduct their activity on PruneYard property. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Francesca Fiore owns a pharmacy that sells prescriber-identifying information to marketers. A state statute bars the sale without prescriber consent and requires pharmacies to convey only approved messages. She challenges the law as compelling her to withhold speech she wishes to make. The restriction singles out particular speakers and burdens their ability to communicate factual data.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.564 U.S. 552 (2011)
In 2007 Vermont enacted the Prescription Confidentiality Law, also known as Act 80, whose central provision appears at Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §4631(d). The statute prohibits pharmacies, health insurers, electronic transmission intermediaries, and similar entities from selling, licensing, or exchanging prescriber-identifying information, and from permitting its use for marketing prescription drugs, unless the prescriber consents. It likewise bars pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers from using such information for marketing absent consent. The prohibitions are subject to enumerated exceptions that permit dissemination and use for health-care research, enforcement of insurance formularies, patient care-management communications, law enforcement, and purposes otherwise provided by law.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers promote brand-name drugs through a process called detailing, in which sales representatives visit physicians' offices to present information and samples. Pharmacies receive prescriber-identifying information when filling prescriptions pursuant to federal and state requirements and routinely sell that information to data-mining firms. The data miners analyze the records, produce reports on individual physicians' prescribing patterns, and lease the reports to pharmaceutical manufacturers under nondisclosure agreements so that detailers can tailor their presentations.
Respondents are three Vermont data-mining companies and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of brand-name drug manufacturers. They filed two consolidated actions in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. The suits named the Vermont Attorney General and other state officials as defendants. Respondents sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that §4631(d) violates their First Amendment rights.
After a bench trial the district court denied relief. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the statute unconstitutionally burdens protected speech. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict with decisions of the First Circuit upholding similar statutes in Maine and New Hampshire.
The Vermont Legislature accompanied the statute with formal findings. Detailing often conflicts with state public-health goals. Use of prescriber-identifying data increases the effectiveness of brand-name marketing. The resulting increase in prescriptions of newer, more expensive drugs raises healthcare costs. The Act also funded an evidence-based prescription-drug education program intended to promote therapeutic and cost-effective prescribing.
Does the freedom not to speak protect only verbal statements or also symbolic conduct?
The principle covers both spoken words and conduct that would convey an unwanted endorsement. Courts have applied it to requirements that individuals recite pledges, display mottos, or host messages on their property or in their communications.
Supporting sources
How does the freedom not to speak interact with public school requirements?
Public schools may not condition participation in educational programs on students reciting government-authored pledges or endorsements. Disciplinary or credential consequences for refusal trigger First Amendment scrutiny because the compulsion forces affirmation of beliefs the student rejects.
Supporting sources
When does a government funding condition become unconstitutional compelled speech?
Funding conditions that require recipients to convey a specific government message inside their own facilities or professional communications receive heightened scrutiny. Conditions that regulate only conduct or permit the recipient to express contrary views by other means are less likely to violate the right.
Supporting sources
Does the freedom not to speak prevent all government speech on private property?
No. Requirements that merely grant access for third-party expression without forcing the property owner to endorse the message do not violate the right. The owner remains free to disassociate or respond, provided the government does not compel the owner to host or affirm the message.
Supporting sources
500 U.S. 173 (1991)
…proposition, and one the Court has rightly rejected in the past. In Abood , it was no answer to the petitioners' claim of compelled speech as a condition upon public employment that their speech outside the workplace remained unregulated by the State. Nor was the public employee's First Amendment claim in Rankin v.…