Also known as:fruit of the poisonous tree · fruits of the poisonous tree · poisonous tree doctrine
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine extending the exclusionary rule to bar not only evidence obtained directly through a constitutional violation but also evidence later derived from exploitation of that illegality. The doctrine requires courts to determine whether the connection between the initial violation and the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. Factors relevant to attenuation include temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of official misconduct.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Warrant Based on Unlawful Sampling
Environmental officer Dana Cruz secretly placed a sampling device inside ChemTech Corporation's locked wastewater pipe without a warrant. Using only data from that device, the agency obtained warrants and seized ChemTech's servers and lab reports. ChemTech moved to suppress the records. The court suppressed them because the warrants rested entirely on information obtained through the prior violation.
Hacked Logs Leading to Warrants
Agent Perez hacked into Malik's home server without a warrant and viewed private IP logs. Perez then used those logs to obtain warrants for NimbusCloud's internal records and employee emails. Malik moved to suppress the emails. The court excluded both the logs and the emails because the warrants were derived directly from the unlawful search.
Detective Leaming elicited an unwarned statement from Williams directing officers to a child's body. Officers later located the body through an independent search already underway. The court admitted evidence of the body's location and condition because it would have been discovered regardless of the violation.
Nix v. Williams (Williams II)467 U.S. 431 (1984)
On December 24, 1968, ten-year-old Pamela Powers disappeared from a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa, where she had accompanied her parents to watch an athletic contest.
Williams was seen leaving the YMCA carrying a large bundle wrapped in a blanket. A fourteen-year-old boy who helped open his car door reported seeing two skinny white legs inside it.
Williams' car was found the next day 160 miles east in Davenport, Iowa. Items of the child's clothing along with an army blanket were recovered at a rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell between Des Moines and Davenport.
A warrant issued for Williams' arrest. On December 26 the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation organized a search with two hundred volunteers divided into teams that began twenty-one miles east of Grinnell and moved westward through Poweshiek County into Jasper County. Searchers checked all roads, ditches, culverts, abandoned farm buildings, and other places where a small child's body could be hidden. The search area was marked off in grids on highway maps.
Williams surrendered to police in Davenport and was arraigned. After his attorneys arranged for no questioning during transport, two Des Moines detectives took him into custody for the return drive.
During the trip Detective Leaming spoke to Williams about predicted snow and the parents' right to a Christian burial. Williams then directed the officers to the child's shoes, the blanket, and ultimately the body itself.
The body lay next to a culvert in a ditch beside a gravel road in Polk County. It was roughly two and one-half miles from where one search team had stopped when the search was suspended at 3 p.m.
Williams was indicted for first-degree murder. At his first trial the evidence of the body was admitted over objection. He was convicted. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed in Brewer v. Williams on the ground that the statements were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
At the second trial in 1977 the prosecution introduced evidence of the condition of the body, articles and photographs of clothing, and autopsy results without offering Williams' statements or showing that he had directed police to the body. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the body would have been discovered within a short time in essentially the same condition by the continuing search. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.
On federal habeas corpus the District Court denied relief after an independent review. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Federal agents conducted an unlawful wiretap of a suspected conspirator's phone. The government later introduced conversations involving Alderman that were captured on the same tap. Alderman moved to suppress the evidence. The court held that only those with a legitimate privacy interest in the tapped conversations could challenge the derivative evidence.
Alderman v. United States394 U.S. 165, 174–75 (1969)
Petitioners Alderman and Alderisio, along with Ruby Kolod (now deceased), were convicted in federal court of conspiring to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 875(c). Their convictions were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 1967, and the Supreme Court initially denied certiorari. After denial, the petitioners alleged in a rehearing petition that Alderisio's Chicago business premises had been subjected to government electronic surveillance. The government responded by acknowledging that Alderisio's conversations had been overheard through unlawful eavesdropping.
Petitioners Ivanov and Butenko were convicted in separate proceedings of conspiring to transmit national defense information to the Soviet Union under 18 U.S.C. §§ 794(a) and (c) and related charges under 18 U.S.C. § 951. The Third Circuit affirmed most convictions. Following the Alderman rehearing developments, certiorari was granted in Ivanov and Butenko on parallel questions concerning surveillance.
After the convictions were affirmed and while the cases were pending, it was revealed that the United States had engaged in electronic surveillance that might have violated Fourth Amendment rights and tainted the convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments and remanded each case to the District Court for adjudication of whether any government evidence supporting the convictions was the product of illegal surveillance. The government moved for modification of the remand order, proposing that surveillance records first undergo in camera inspection by the trial judge, who would disclose to petitioners and counsel only those materials found arguably relevant to the prosecution.
Petitioners opposed the in camera procedure and sought full disclosure of all surveillance records to which they claimed standing. The government maintained that none of the overheard conversations were arguably relevant to the prosecutions and that disclosure of irrelevant conversations would endanger third parties or national security. The Supreme Court restored the cases for reargument specifically on the disclosure issue and the question of standing to object to the fruits of illegal surveillance.
Officers obtained an unwarned statement from Patane revealing the location of a firearm. They recovered the gun based on that statement. Patane moved to suppress the firearm. The court admitted the gun because the physical evidence was not itself a testimonial statement subject to the Miranda violation.
United States v. Patane542 U.S. 630 (2004)
In June 2001, Samuel Francis Patane was arrested for harassing his ex-girlfriend, Linda O’Donnell. He was released on bond subject to a temporary restraining order that prohibited him from contacting O’Donnell.
On June 6, 2001, after Patane apparently violated the restraining order by attempting to telephone O’Donnell, Officer Tracy Fox of the Colorado Springs Police Department began to investigate the matter. A county probation officer informed an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms that Patane, a convicted felon, illegally possessed a .40 Glock pistol. The ATF relayed this information to Detective Josh Benner, who worked closely with the ATF. Detective Benner and Officer Fox proceeded to Patane’s residence.
After reaching the residence and inquiring into Patane’s attempts to contact O’Donnell, Officer Fox arrested Patane for violating the restraining order. Detective Benner attempted to advise Patane of his Miranda rights but got no further than the right to remain silent. At that point, Patane interrupted, asserting that he knew his rights, and neither officer attempted to complete the warning.
Detective Benner then asked Patane about the Glock. Patane was initially reluctant to discuss the matter. He ultimately told Benner that the pistol was in his bedroom and gave permission to retrieve it. Detective Benner found the pistol and seized it.
A grand jury indicted Patane for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court granted Patane’s motion to suppress the firearm. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling with respect to probable cause but affirmed the suppression order on Patane’s alternative theory. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Officers arrested Brown without probable cause and took him to the station. Several hours later, after receiving Miranda warnings, Brown gave a detailed confession. Brown moved to suppress the statement. The court examined the time lapse, intervening circumstances, and flagrancy of the arrest to decide whether the taint had dissipated.
Brown v. Illinois422 U.S. 590 (1975)
On May 13, 1968, Chicago police detectives William Nolan and William Lenz broke into petitioner Richard Brown's apartment without a warrant or probable cause, searched it, and waited inside.
When Brown arrived around 7:45 p.m. and climbed the rear stairs, the detectives arrested him at gunpoint after one positioned himself at the rear door window and the other approached from behind. The detectives had obtained Brown's name from the brother of murder victim Roger Corpus, killed one week earlier on May 6 with a .38-caliber revolver, but had identified him only as an acquaintance and lacked probable cause for arrest. They transported Brown to the Maxwell Street police station.
At the station, after obtaining the Corpus homicide file, the detectives gave Brown Miranda warnings around 8:45 p.m. and questioned him for twenty to twenty-five minutes. Brown signed a two-page statement acknowledging that he and Jimmy Claggett had visited Corpus on May 5, that Claggett ordered Brown at gunpoint to bind Corpus, and that Claggett shot Corpus three times with a revolver Brown had sold him. The detectives and Brown then searched for Claggett, arrested him around 12:15 a.m., and returned to the station.
Brown remained at the station and at 2 a.m. spoke with Assistant State's Attorney Crilly, who again administered Miranda warnings. Brown gave a second statement around 3 a.m. that was substantially consistent with the first but contained inaccuracies about his employment and education; he refused to sign it. Brown made a phone call to his mother at 4 a.m. and was taken before a magistrate at 9:30 a.m., approximately fourteen hours after arrest.
Brown and Claggett were indicted on June 20, 1968. The trial court denied Brown's motion to suppress the statements after a hearing. At trial the State introduced evidence of both statements through Detective Nolan's testimony and the reading of the second statement to the jury.
Brown was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifteen to thirty years' imprisonment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
Does the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine apply only to evidence obtained directly from an unconstitutional search?
No. The doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to evidence later derived from exploitation of an initial constitutional violation. Courts must determine whether the connection between the illegality and the challenged evidence has become attenuated.
Supporting sources
When is evidence admissible despite an earlier constitutional violation under this doctrine?
Evidence is admissible if obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the primary illegality to purge the taint. Relevant factors include temporal proximity between the violation and discovery of the evidence, intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of official misconduct.
Supporting sources
Does a later warrant automatically remove the taint from evidence derived from an unlawful search?
No. A warrant does not purge the taint if its probable cause rests solely or primarily on information obtained through the prior violation. An independent source or sufficient attenuation must be shown.
Supporting sources
467 U.S. 431 (1984)
…discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Williams contends that evidence of the body's location and condition is "fruit of the poisonous tree," i. e. , the "fruit" or product of Detective Leaming's plea to help the child's parents give her "a Christian burial," which this Court had already held equated to interrogation. He…