Compensatory damages awarded for a harm that so frequently results from the tort or breach that its existence is normally anticipated. The plaintiff therefore need not specially allege or prove the harm to recover these damages.
See Our Sources
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Battery Victim Seeks Pain Relief
Gerald Gibson struck Gabriella Gomez during an argument, causing bruises and ongoing pain. Gomez sued for battery and recovered an award covering her physical discomfort even though her complaint mentioned only the battery itself. The court treated the pain as a harm normally expected from the tort.
Car Collision Produces Expected Pain
Gary Grant rear-ended Gina Grant's vehicle at a stoplight, causing her neck strain and several days of pain. Gina sued for negligence and recovered an award covering the discomfort even though her complaint mentioned only the collision itself. The court treated the pain as a harm normally expected from the tort.
A newspaper published a false article accusing Greta Goldstein of professional misconduct. Goldstein proved the statements were false and of and concerning her. The jury awarded general damages for reputational injury without requiring evidence of specific pecuniary loss.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)
In 1968, Chicago police officer Richard Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. State authorities prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for second-degree murder. The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio.
Respondent Robert Welch, Inc., publishes American Opinion, a monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society. In March 1969, the magazine published an article titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." The article accused Gertz of participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement, described him as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter," and claimed he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which it portrayed as a Communist organization involved in planning attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The article contained numerous inaccuracies, including the false implication that Gertz had a criminal record.
Gertz had served as an officer of the National Lawyers Guild approximately fifteen years earlier but had no involvement in planning the 1968 demonstrations. He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz before publication and appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had conducted extensive research.
Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court ruled that the statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law. After a trial, the jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in compensatory damages. The district court later entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, applying the New York Times standard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of constitutional standards to defamation of a private individual.
Dun & Bradstreet published an erroneous credit report stating that Greenmoss Builders was bankrupt. The report reached only a small group of subscribers and did not involve a matter of public concern. The court permitted recovery of general damages for reputational harm without proof of actual injury.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.472 U.S. 749 (1985)
In July 1976, Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency that provides subscribers with confidential financial and related information about businesses under subscription agreements prohibiting further disclosure, sent a report to five subscribers stating that Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a construction contractor, had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.
The report was false and grossly misrepresented respondent's assets and liabilities because the petition had actually been filed by one of Greenmoss's former employees. On the same day, Greenmoss's president learned of the report while discussing the possibility of future financing with the company's bank, immediately called Dun & Bradstreet's regional office to explain the error, requested a correction, and asked for the names of the firms that had received the report so he could assure them of the company's solvency.
Dun & Bradstreet promised to investigate but refused to divulge the names. After confirming the report was inaccurate, it issued a corrective notice on or about August 3, 1976, to the five subscribers stating that a former employee had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss continued in business as usual. Greenmoss expressed dissatisfaction with the notice and again requested the subscriber names, which Dun & Bradstreet again refused to provide.
Greenmoss then brought a defamation action in Vermont state court alleging injury to its reputation and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. At trial, evidence established that the error had been caused by a 17-year-old high school student paid to review Vermont bankruptcy pleadings who inadvertently attributed the petition to Greenmoss, and that Dun & Bradstreet did not attempt to verify the information with the company before reporting it despite routine practice to do so. The jury awarded Greenmoss $50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.
The trial court granted Dun & Bradstreet's motion for a new trial due to dissatisfaction with its charge to the jury. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of a new trial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The New York Times published an advertisement containing false statements about a public official. The official proved the statements were made with actual malice. The jury could award general damages for presumed reputational injury flowing from the libel per se.
New York Times v. Sullivan376 U.S. 254 (1964)
L. B. Sullivan is one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He has duties including supervision of the Police Department. He brought this civil libel action against the New York Times Company and four individual petitioners who were Alabama clergymen. The suit sought $500,000 in damages based on a full-page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" that appeared in the New York Times on March 29, 1960. A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded Sullivan the full amount claimed against all petitioners. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment.
The advertisement was signed by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. It described widespread non-violent demonstrations by Southern Negro students and an unprecedented wave of terror against them. Two paragraphs formed the basis of the claim. One alleged that after students sang on the State Capitol steps their leaders were expelled, truckloads of police ringed the Alabama State College Campus, and the dining hall was padlocked to starve students into submission. The other stated that Southern violators had bombed Dr. King's home, assaulted him, arrested him seven times, and charged him with perjury. The text appeared over the names of 64 persons. It was endorsed by the individual petitioners among others.
Sullivan contended that the references to police referred to him in his supervisory capacity. Six Montgomery residents testified that they read the statements as referring to him. However, several statements were inaccurate. The students sang the National Anthem rather than "My Country, 'Tis of Thee." The expulsions were for a different incident. The dining hall was not padlocked. Dr. King had been arrested only four times. The bombings occurred before Sullivan's tenure with police efforts to apprehend the perpetrators.
The Times published the advertisement for approximately $4800. It acted upon an order from a New York advertising agency. The agency provided a letter from A. Philip Randolph certifying authorization. The Times made no efforts to confirm its accuracy against its own news files.
Sullivan served written demands for retraction on the petitioners pursuant to Alabama law. None of the individual petitioners responded as they had not authorized use of their names. The Times did not retract. It published a retraction only upon demand by Governor John Patterson after learning more facts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the separate petitions of the individual petitioners and the Times due to the importance of the constitutional issues involved.
State Farm mishandled the Campbells' claim in bad faith, causing them severe emotional distress over eighteen months. The jury awarded one million dollars in compensatory damages for that distress. The award reflected general damages for the emotional harm normally anticipated from the insurer's conduct.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003)
In 1981, Curtis Campbell was driving with his wife Inez in Cache County, Utah, when he attempted to pass six vans on a two-lane highway. This caused an oncoming driver, Todd Ospital, to swerve onto the shoulder, lose control, and collide with a vehicle driven by Robert G. Slawson and his wife, killing Ospital and permanently disabling Slawson. Campbell's insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, declined settlement offers of the $50,000 policy limit from Slawson and Ospital's estate despite early investigations indicating Campbell's fault and advice from its own adjuster.
A jury in the underlying tort actions found Campbell 100 percent at fault and returned a judgment of $185,849 against him. State Farm refused to pay the $135,849 excess over policy limits or post a supersedeas bond. The Campbells then entered an agreement with Slawson and Ospital's estate under which the claimants would not seek satisfaction of the judgment in exchange for the Campbells pursuing a bad-faith action against State Farm, being represented by the claimants' attorneys, and assigning 90 percent of any recovery to them.
The Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court bifurcated the case into two phases before separate juries. In phase one the jury found State Farm's refusal to settle unreasonable. In phase two the jury heard evidence that State Farm's decision was part of a nationwide Performance, Planning and Review policy implemented since 1979 to cap payouts and meet corporate profit goals, including testimony from former Utah employees and experts about practices in multiple states over twenty years. The jury awarded $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.
The trial court reduced the compensatory award to $1 million and the punitive award to $25 million. Both sides appealed. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award after applying the three guideposts from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and relying on the nationwide evidence, State Farm's wealth, and the statistical likelihood of punishment in only one of 50,000 cases. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Must a plaintiff specially plead general damages to recover them?
No. Because general damages are harms normally expected from the tort or breach, the plaintiff may prove them without having alleged their existence in the complaint.
Supporting sources
How do general damages differ from special damages?
General damages compensate harms that typically flow from the wrong and are presumed. Special damages compensate other harms that must be specifically alleged and proved.
Supporting sources
Can general damages include compensation for emotional distress?
Yes. Emotional distress is a classic form of general damages when it is a natural consequence of the tort, and it may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss.
In defamation cases, when are general damages presumed?
At common law, general damages for reputational harm were presumed in libel and slander per se. Later constitutional decisions limited presumed damages unless actual malice is shown or the speech is not of public concern.
general damages
need not be alleged or proved but are presumed," and "punitive
damages
may be awarded by the jury even though the amount of actual
damages
is neither found nor shown." An award of punitive…