Also known as: government of law · rule of law
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A foundational constitutional principle requiring that all governmental actions affecting life, liberty, or property occur only according to established legal rules rather than the arbitrary discretion of officials. The principle ensures that legal remedies exist for violations of vested rights and that courts may review executive or legislative acts for compliance with law.
Glenn Gross, an employee of Granite Holdings, left a containment valve partially open after routine maintenance at a chemical facility. Heavy rain later carried leaked material into Genevieve Gardner's adjacent property, causing damage through an indirect path. A court imposes liability on Granite Holdings because the principle of government of laws requires remedies for violations of rights even when harm occurs indirectly.
Gavin Grant, a resident of one state, conveyed an interest in land located in another state to George Garcia. The parties dispute whether the interest qualifies as immovable or movable under applicable choice-of-law rules. A court classifies the interest according to the law selected by the governing principles to ensure government acts only according to established legal rules.
Gabriel Gonzalez executed a will devising property to his heirs at law with language of similar import. After his death, a dispute arises over whether the language creates a reversionary interest in the estate. A court refuses to recognize any such reversion under the governing probate statute because the principle of government of laws demands that courts follow enacted statutes rather than superseded common-law doctrines.
Gustavo Gutierrez published a statement about Glacier Energy's operations that caused third parties to cancel contracts with the company. Glacier Energy sues for the resulting financial harm. A court holds the publisher liable because the principle of government of laws requires that legal remedies remain available and that no manner of harm relieves responsibility under established rules.
Genevieve Gardner faces delinquency charges in juvenile court for an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. The prosecution presents evidence meeting a preponderance standard but not beyond a reasonable doubt. The court requires the higher standard before adjudicating delinquency.
During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny. The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied on section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provides that any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a juvenile did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. After a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his eighteenth birthday, six years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744(b). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseGrove Manufacturing receives a signed commission from the President but the Secretary of State refuses delivery. The company sues in federal court to compel delivery. The court entertains the action because a legal right exists and the laws must furnish a remedy for its violation.
In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State. During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.
View caseThe principle requires that the official follow the statutory command to disburse funds to every qualifying applicant by the deadline. Withholding based on political considerations violates the mandate that government act only according to law. A court may order disbursement to enforce the legal right.
No. The principle prohibits legislative interference with final judicial judgments because such action exceeds Congress's authority and violates separation of powers. Courts must treat final judgments as conclusive exercises of judicial power.
The principle limits absolute immunity to aides performing discretionary functions closely tied to presidential decisionmaking in sensitive areas. An aide who bypasses established procedures receives only qualified immunity so that legal remedies remain available for due process violations.
The principle requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt when the proceeding may result in loss of liberty. A lower standard would permit governmental action affecting liberty without the full protection of law.
…where there is a legal right there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law. The government of the United States is a government of laws and not of men; it will cease to deserve that appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of vested legal rights. The question is whether this case can be arranged with…