Also known as: governmental function · government functions
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A category of state and local activities once invoked to determine whether federal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause impermissibly regulated traditional state operations. The category proved unworkable as a judicially enforceable limit and was abandoned in favor of political-process protections for state sovereignty.
A category of state and local activities once invoked to determine whether federal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause impermissibly regulated traditional state operations. The category proved unworkable as a judicially enforceable limit and was abandoned in favor of political-process protections for state sovereignty.
Activities undertaken by a municipality for the good of the general public and involving an exercise of sovereign powers delegated from the state. Such activities are distinguished from proprietary or businesslike undertakings that generate profit for the locality.
The city Department of Social Services fires several employees without hearings. The employees sue under federal civil rights law. The court holds that the department acted as a municipal policymaker when it adopted the termination policy, exposing the city to liability for the governmental function of delivering social services.
Activities undertaken by a municipality for the good of the general public and involving an exercise of sovereign powers delegated from the state. Such activities are distinguished from proprietary or businesslike undertakings that generate profit for the locality.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Heartland Regional Transit District operates buses across state lines and competes with private carriers. A federal agency orders Heartland to reclassify drivers under nationwide wage rules that apply to all large transportation employers. Heartland claims Tenth Amendment immunity because transit is a traditional governmental function. The court rejects the claim and enforces the rules because Congress may regulate states and private entities alike under the commerce power.
A federal statute requires county sheriffs to perform background checks on handgun buyers using their own personnel and forms. Sheriff Glenn Gross refuses, arguing that law enforcement is a core governmental function the federal government cannot commandeer. The court holds that the statute violates the anti-commandeering doctrine because it directly orders state officers to administer a federal program.
In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational. Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law. Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks. In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseGavin Grant owns oceanfront lots on which he plans to build homes. A state coastal council bars all construction to preserve the beach as a public resource. Grant claims the total deprivation of economic use amounts to a taking. The court examines whether the regulation prevents a nuisance or instead commandeers private land for a governmental function without compensation.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
Gordon Gray brings a loaded handgun onto school grounds in violation of a federal statute. He argues that education is a traditional governmental function reserved to the states and beyond Congress's commerce power. The court invalidates the statute because mere possession near a school lacks a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Genevieve Gardner, an assistant district attorney, circulates a questionnaire criticizing office policies on political campaigns. Her supervisor fires her. The court determines that most questions address internal personnel matters rather than matters of public concern tied to governmental functions, so the discharge does not violate the First Amendment.
Sheila Myers worked as an Assistant District Attorney in the New Orleans office under District Attorney Harry Connick for approximately five and a half years. In early October 1980, Myers was informed she would be transferred to prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court. She strongly opposed the transfer and expressed her objections to several supervisors including Connick. On October 6, 1980, Myers received formal notice of the transfer. Later that day she discussed her concerns with First Assistant District Attorney Dennis Waldron. That night Myers prepared a questionnaire soliciting the views of fellow Assistant District Attorneys on office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. The next morning, she typed and copied the questionnaire. She then distributed it to fifteen Assistant District Attorneys. Connick learned of the distribution shortly after noon on October 7. He returned to the office, informed Myers she was being terminated for refusing the transfer, and stated that distributing the questionnaire constituted insubordination. Myers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the termination violated her First Amendment rights. The District Court found the questionnaire was the real reason for discharge, submitted the motivating-factor question to a jury which answered in Myers' favor, and ordered reinstatement with backpay. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
2 common questions
The Supreme Court found the test unworkable because drawing a principled line between traditional and nontraditional state functions proved arbitrary and judicially unmanageable. States are now protected primarily through their participation in the federal political process rather than through categorical judicial limits on Commerce Clause power.
Supporting sources
No. After the traditional governmental functions test was rejected, Congress may apply generally applicable statutes to state and local employers engaged in commercial activity so long as the statute falls within an enumerated power and does not commandeer state legislative or executive processes.
Supporting sources
In July 1971 petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because the city and the Board had changed their maternity-leave policies after the complaint was filed. The court found that the acts complained of were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. It denied backpay on the ground that any damages would come ultimately from the city of New York and that holding otherwise would circumvent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape. On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the Board of Education was not a municipality within the meaning of Monroe v. Pape and that the District Court had erred in barring a damages award against the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 because it performed a vital governmental function and had no final say over its appropriations. It also held that a damages action against officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed because any award would have to be paid by a city held not amenable to suit in Monroe v. Pape. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument, the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
View case1 common questions
A municipality enjoys immunity only when performing governmental functions that involve sovereign powers exercised for the public good. It remains liable for negligence arising from proprietary activities undertaken for financial profit, though the distinction has produced inconsistent results and drawn criticism.
…directing the State to enact a certain policy, cf. New York v. United States , 505 U. S. 144 (1992), or to organize its governmental functions in a certain way, cf. FERC v. Mississippi , 456 U. S., at 781 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). While the intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as…