Guaranty Clause

Low-level radioactive waste is generated by many sources and must be isolated from humans for long periods. Historically the Nation relied on a small number of disposal sites. Concern about declining disposal capacity prompted Congress initially to adopt the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980. That statute declared a federal policy that each State is responsible for providing for disposal of waste generated within its borders. It authorized States to enter into regional compacts. That Act contained no penalties for nonparticipation. By 1985, with few operational sites and a looming crisis, Congress enacted the 1985 Amendments. The amendments were based largely on proposals of the National Governors' Association. They embodied a compromise among sited and unsited States. The 1985 Act directs each State to be responsible for disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within the State. It authorizes States to enter into interstate compacts. For an additional seven years the three existing disposal sites were required to make capacity available for waste from any source. Sited States were permitted to exact graduated surcharges on out-of-region waste. After the transition period approved compacts could exclude out-of-region waste. The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage States to comply with its requirements. The monetary incentives authorize sited States to impose surcharges on out-of-state waste. They require the Secretary of Energy to collect a portion of the surcharge into an escrow account. They permit distribution of that fund to States that achieve the statutory milestones. The access incentives authorize sited States and regional compacts to increase and ultimately deny access to their sites to waste from States that do not meet federal deadlines. The take title provision requires a State that fails to provide for disposal by January 1, 1996. Upon request of the generator or owner of waste, the State must take title to and possession of the waste and be liable for damages suffered by the generator or owner as a result of the State's failure to take possession. The petitioners, New York and two of its counties, sought a declaratory judgment that the three incentives are inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and with the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4. The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

In November 1992 the voters of Arkansas approved Amendment 73 to their state constitution. The amendment's preamble declared that long-term incumbency had reduced voter participation and made elections less competitive and less representative. Section 3 barred any person elected to three or more terms in the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas from appearing on the ballot for that office. It imposed a parallel bar on any person elected to two or more terms in the United States Senate from Arkansas. The amendment was self-executing and applied to all persons seeking election after January 1, 1993. On November 13, 1992, respondent Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself and similarly situated Arkansas citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters, together with the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County seeking a declaratory judgment that section 3 was unconstitutional and void. The complaint named then-Governor Clinton, other state officers, the Republican Party of Arkansas, and the Democratic Party of Arkansas as defendants. The State of Arkansas, through its Attorney General, intervened as a party defendant in support of the amendment. Several proponents of the amendment, including petitioner U. S. Term Limits, Inc., also intervened. On cross-motions for summary judgment the Circuit Court held that section 3 violated Article I of the Federal Constitution. In a 5-to-2 decision the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed that holding. The State and the intervenors petitioned for writs of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States granted both petitions and consolidated the cases for argument.

In November 1966 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected from New York's Eighteenth Congressional District to serve in the 90th Congress. During the preceding Congress a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration investigated expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor. The subcommittee issued a report concluding that Powell had deceived House authorities about travel expenses and that illegal salary payments had been made to his wife at his direction. The report also found that Powell met the standing qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence. When the 90th Congress organized in January 1967 the House adopted House Resolution No. 1 by a vote of 363 to 65. The resolution appointed a nine-member Select Committee to inquire into Powell's qualifications and alleged misconduct. Powell appeared before the committee but, on advice of counsel, limited his testimony to the three standing qualifications and refused to answer questions about other matters. The Select Committee issued a report finding that Powell met the standing qualifications yet recommending that he be seated, censured, fined $40,000, and deprived of seniority. On March 1, 1967, the House rejected a motion to vote on that recommendation. The House then adopted an amendment calling for exclusion by a vote of 248 to 176 and passed House Resolution No. 278 by a vote of 307 to 116, thereby excluding Powell and declaring the seat vacant. Powell and thirteen voters from his district filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Speaker John W. McCormack, four other House members, and the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Doorkeeper. The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated the Constitution because Powell satisfied the standing qualifications and requested declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus to compel seating and payment of salary. The district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. While the case was pending the 90th Congress ended. Powell was reelected in November 1968 and seated in the 91st Congress under a resolution that imposed a $25,000 fine. Respondents filed a suggestion of mootness, but Powell's claim for back salary from the period of exclusion remained unresolved.

In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational. Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law. Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks. In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.