Also known as: high sea · high-seas · international waters
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The open ocean beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation.
Helix Biotech charters a vessel to transport research equipment between two domestic ports. While hundreds of miles offshore on the high seas the crew discovers that a rival firm has planted counterfeit cargo seals. Congress enacts legislation authorizing federal prosecution of the tampering because the conduct occurred beyond any state's borders.
Hector Hernandez and his crew seize a foreign-flagged cargo ship on the high seas and demand ransom. Federal authorities arrest Hernandez after the vessel is brought into a U.S. port. Prosecutors charge him with piracy as defined by the law of nations because the acts took place outside any country's territorial waters.
The indictment against Smith was founded upon the act of Congress of March 3, 1819, which provided that any person committing piracy as defined by the law of nations on the high seas, if brought into or found in the United States, shall be punished with death upon conviction. Smith was tried before the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia. The jury returned a special verdict finding the prisoner guilty of the plunder and robbery charged in the indictment. The verdict further established that Smith and his associates were freebooters upon the sea at the time of the offense, not under the acknowledged authority or deriving protection from the flag or commission of any government. The judges of the circuit court divided in opinion upon the questions presented. They certified the questions to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court heard argument on February 21, 1820, and rendered its decision on February 25, 1820.
View caseHelix Biotech charters a vessel to carry cargo between two domestic ports. While hundreds of miles offshore on the high seas the crew encounters a federal inspection team enforcing a national safety statute. The court upholds the regulation because traffic on the high seas constitutes foreign commerce subject to Congress's exclusive power.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseDuring wartime a U.S. naval vessel encounters an enemy merchant ship on the high seas. The captain orders the seizure of the vessel and its cargo under presidential authorization. The court upholds the capture because the high-seas location places the action within the scope of congressionally granted war powers.
Open the case page for the full write-up.
View caseCoast Guard officers board a vessel drifting on the high seas and search its hold without a warrant. They seize documents later used in a criminal prosecution. The court suppresses the evidence because the high-seas location does not eliminate the need for a neutral magistrate's determination of probable cause.
In January 1964, fourteen-year-old Pamela Mason disappeared from her home in Manchester, New Hampshire, during a heavy snowstorm after receiving a telephone call about a babysitting job. Her body was discovered eight days later beside a major highway, prompting a massive police investigation. On January 28, officers visited Edward Coolidge at his home after learning he had been absent on the night of the disappearance. Coolidge produced three guns for inspection and agreed to take a lie-detector test. On February 2, while Coolidge was at the police station undergoing the test, two plainclothes officers arrived at his house and spoke with his wife. Mrs. Coolidge provided four guns belonging to her husband and some clothing she believed he might have worn on the night in question. Coolidge was held overnight on an unrelated charge but released the next day. Over the following two and a half weeks, the State accumulated evidence implicating Coolidge. On February 19, the results of the investigation were presented at a meeting between the police officers working on the case and the State Attorney General, who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder, and was later to serve as chief prosecutor at the trial. Coolidge was arrested at his home that day. His 1951 Pontiac automobile parked in the driveway was seized and towed to the police station two and a half hours later. The Pontiac was searched and vacuumed on February 21, again in January 1965, and a third time in April 1965. At Coolidge's subsequent jury trial for murder, vacuum sweepings from the car were introduced into evidence. One of the guns taken from the home was also introduced. Vacuum sweepings from the clothing were introduced into evidence. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction after upholding the admissibility of the evidence, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA deckhand on a cargo ship is convicted of a minor regulatory violation committed on the high seas. The sentencing court imposes a life sentence under a mandatory statute. The defendant challenges the punishment as grossly disproportionate to the offense under the Eighth Amendment.
Ronald Harmelin was convicted in Michigan state court of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Michigan law imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for that quantity of the drug. Harmelin had no prior felony convictions. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed the conviction because evidence supporting it had been obtained in violation of the Michigan Constitution. On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision and affirmed the sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The quantity of cocaine at issue had a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. The sentencing court imposed the mandatory term without considering any individualized circumstances of the offense or the offender. Harmelin challenged the sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, arguing both that it was grossly disproportionate to the crime and that the mandatory nature of the penalty was unconstitutional.
View caseNo. The high seas lie beyond any nation's territorial jurisdiction. A coastal nation may claim a two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone, but that zone is not part of the high seas.
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress authority to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas. That clause supplies the textual basis for federal maritime criminal statutes.
No. The high seas lie outside any state's territorial jurisdiction. Federal courts therefore exercise exclusive authority over crimes occurring there under the Constitution's grant of maritime power.
Yes. Contracts for ocean carriage under a bill of lading are classic maritime contracts. Federal admiralty jurisdiction therefore attaches even when the damage occurs hundreds of miles from land.
…offices and post roads, cl. 7, or to grant patents and copyrights, cl. 8, or to "punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas," cl. 10. It might not even need the power to raise and support an Army and Navy, cls. 12 and 13, for fewer people would engage in commercial shipping if they thought that a foreign power…