Also known as: imminent danger
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A situation of immediate and urgent danger that leaves no time for deliberation or alternative courses of action. The condition requires prompt response because the threat is on the verge of materializing and virtually certain to occur if nothing is done.
State officials in a coastal jurisdiction learn that an armed foreign vessel is hours from landing troops on an unguarded beach. With no time to seek congressional approval, the governor orders state militia to intercept the landing and repel the incursion before it reaches populated areas.
A delivery driver for Imperial Motors is pinned beneath a fallen crate in a warehouse loading bay. The site manager sees the crate shifting and the driver unable to move, then immediately calls for heavy equipment and medical help rather than waiting for the scheduled safety officer to arrive.
Ike Ingram awakens to an armed stranger climbing through his bedroom window at night. Believing the intruder intends to inflict life-threatening injury, Ike fires a single shot that stops the advance but does not pursue the intruder once he retreats.
A public-school student whose religious convictions prohibit saluting the flag faces suspension under a compulsory flag-salute policy. The student stands silently during the exercise while classmates participate, prompting school officials to enforce the rule.
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
View caseA passenger on a New York subway is approached by four youths who surround him and demand money. After one youth displays a weapon-like object and moves closer, the passenger draws a handgun and fires, wounding all four before they can strike.
On December 22, 1984, Troy Canty, Darryl Cabey, James Ramseur, and Barry Allen boarded an IRT express subway train in The Bronx. The four youths rode together in the rear portion of the seventh car. Two of them, Ramseur and Cabey, carried screwdrivers inside their coats to break into video machine coin boxes. Bernhard Goetz boarded the same train at 14th Street in Manhattan and sat in the rear section of that car while carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol loaded with five rounds. Canty approached Goetz and said “give me five dollars.” Goetz stood up, pulled out his handgun, and fired four shots in rapid succession. The first shot hit Canty in the chest. The second struck Allen in the back. The third went through Ramseur’s arm and into his left side. The fourth was fired at Cabey but missed. Goetz then fired a fifth shot at Cabey, who was sitting on a bench, and the bullet severed Cabey’s spinal cord. Goetz told the conductor that the four youths had tried to rob him. Goetz then fled between cars onto the tracks. On December 31, 1984, Goetz surrendered to police in Concord, New Hampshire. After receiving Miranda warnings, he gave two tape-recorded statements in which he admitted carrying the handgun illegally in New York City for three years. Goetz described the incident in detail, stating that he had established a pattern of fire from left to right with the intention to murder the four youths and make them suffer as much as possible. Goetz also stated that if he had had more bullets he would have shot them again and again. A first Grand Jury in January 1985 indicted Goetz only on three weapons-possession counts and dismissed all charges arising from the shootings. After the People obtained an order authorizing resubmission, a second Grand Jury heard testimony from Canty and Ramseur plus four passengers and received the tapes of Goetz’s statements. On March 27, 1985, the second Grand Jury returned a ten-count indictment charging four counts of attempted murder, four counts of assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. On October 14, 1985, Goetz moved to dismiss the second indictment. While the motion was pending, a New York Daily News column reported an interview in which Cabey stated that the other three youths had approached Goetz intending to rob him. A police officer informed the prosecutor that Canty had told him at the scene “we were going to rob [Goetz].” On January 21, 1986, Criminal Term dismissed all counts of the second indictment except reckless endangerment. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.
View caseFederal regulators issue an order prohibiting interstate shipment of petroleum produced in excess of state quotas. Oil producers challenge the order as lacking statutory authorization, arguing that the underlying statute delegates excessive discretion to the agency.
In June 1933 Congress enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act. Section 9(c) of Title I authorized the President to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and its products. This prohibition applied when the petroleum was produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of amounts permitted by any state law or valid regulation. On July 11, 1933, the President issued an Executive Order prohibiting such transportation of excess petroleum. On July 14, 1933, he issued a further order authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to enforce the prohibition by designating agents, setting up boards, and promulgating rules and regulations. The Secretary of the Interior issued regulations on July 15, 1933, later amended on July 25 and August 21, 1933. These regulations required every producer, purchaser, shipper, and refiner of petroleum to file monthly sworn statements detailing residence, production locations, allowable and actual production, deliveries, and storage, and to maintain adequate books and records available for inspection. Panama Refining Company, a Delaware corporation engaged in refining crude oil and shipping it in interstate commerce, together with its Texas subsidiary and Amazon Petroleum Corporation along with other Texas oil producers, filed suits in federal district court in Texas against federal officials including the Administrator and Attorney General. The complaints alleged that the regulations restricted their interstate shipments of oil produced in compliance with Texas law. The District Court granted permanent injunctions against enforcement of the federal regulations and orders. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decrees and directed that the bills be dismissed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 8, 1934.
View caseImminent peril requires that the danger be on the verge of occurring and virtually certain to happen, not merely possible or likely at some future time. Courts and restatements emphasize that the threat must leave no reasonable opportunity for deliberation or legal alternatives.
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The Constitution permits a state to engage in war without congressional consent only when actually invaded or when facing imminent danger that will not admit of delay. The peril must be so pressing that waiting for federal approval would defeat the purpose of defense.
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When an employee acting within the scope of employment faces imminent danger of serious harm known to the employer or a manager, the employer must exercise reasonable care to avert the harm. Failure to act exposes the employer to liability for resulting injuries.
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Serious bodily harm differs in kind from ordinary injury and includes harms creating a substantial risk of death, constituting mayhem, or causing permanent loss of function of an important organ or member. The actor's intended or reasonably anticipated force is measured against this standard.
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