Also known as: impermissible vagueness · void for vagueness
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A constitutional or procedural defect in a statute, regulation, or court order that fails to provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or required and invites arbitrary enforcement by officials.
Jordan, a law school graduate belonging to a political association opposing constitutional democracy, refused to swear an oath to support the federal and state constitutions as a condition of bar admission. The state defended the oath as a generic commitment to uphold constitutional processes. The court upheld the requirement because the language supplied clear notice of the duty and did not chill protected expression or invite arbitrary enforcement.
A state bar sought to discipline an attorney for out-of-court statements to the press about a pending case. The governing rule prohibited statements creating a substantial likelihood of material prejudice but contained a vague safe harbor allowing statements about the general nature of the defense without elaboration. The court found the rule impermissibly vague because the safe harbor failed to give fair notice of what speech remained protected.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
A state judicial conduct rule barred candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. A candidate challenged the rule after declining to answer a questionnaire about such issues. The court held the announce clause impermissibly vague because the undefined terms left candidates without fair notice of what speech was prohibited.
A federal statute restricted expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate. A political organization challenged the provision after its planned advertisements were threatened with enforcement. The court found the phrase impermissibly vague because it failed to supply clear boundaries separating protected issue discussion from regulated express advocacy.
A city ordinance authorized police to disperse suspected gang members who remained in one place with no apparent purpose. A resident was ordered to move after standing with friends on a public sidewalk. The court struck down the ordinance as impermissibly vague because it supplied no objective standards and therefore invited arbitrary enforcement.
A state death penalty statute listed as an aggravating factor a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. A defendant facing sentencing challenged the factor after the jury considered his prior record. The state supreme court held the provision impermissibly vague because it failed to supply sufficiently clear and objective standards for the jury.
An injunctive order is impermissibly vague when it fails to state its terms specifically and describe in reasonable detail the acts restrained or required. Vague phrases such as disrupting activities or complying with all regulations leave parties and enforcers without clear notice of what conduct is forbidden.
Supporting sources
A generic oath to support the federal and state constitutions is not impermissibly vague because its meaning is well established as a commitment to uphold constitutional processes. Added clauses requiring rejection of unspecified groups or advocacy can render the oath vague by failing to give fair notice of prohibited conduct.
Supporting sources
An ordinance that permits dispersal of persons remaining in a place with no apparent purpose is impermissibly vague when it supplies no definitions, examples, or objective standards. The absence of textual guidance leaves enforcement dependent on unguided officer judgment and creates a substantial risk of arbitrary application.
Supporting sources
…however, has demonstrated a concern that the new sentencing procedures provide guidance to juries. It held this provision to be impermissibly vague in Arnold v. State , 236 Ga. 534, 540, 224 S. E. 2d 386, 391 (1976), because it did not provide the jury with "sufficiently clear and objective standards.' " Second, the petitioner points…