Also known as:implied promises · implied contractual promise
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A promise inferred from the conduct or surrounding circumstances of a transaction rather than from explicit words. The promise receives the same legal effect as an express promise when determining rights and duties after a transfer of interests.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Landlord Obligation Survives Sale
Island Manufacturing leased a high-capacity warehouse to Insight Consulting for electronics assembly. The original landlord had always supplied backup generators during the tenancy even though the lease document never mentioned them. After selling the building to Ivy Investments, the new owner stopped the service and outages destroyed stored inventory. Insight Consulting sued to enforce the duty to maintain generators.
Lease Covenant Runs With Transfer
Original lessor consistently maintained common-area lighting under a silent lease. After conveying the reversion to a new owner, the successor refused further maintenance. Tenant sued to enforce the lighting obligation as an implied promise that survived the transfer.
Landlord had always repaired roof leaks during the tenancy though the lease was silent. Upon sale of the property the buyer discontinued repairs. Tenant sued the new owner to enforce the repair obligation inferred from prior conduct.
Denny v. Ford Motor Co.87 N.Y.2d 248, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 662 N.E.2d 730, 736 (1995)
Nancy Denny was severely injured when the Ford Bronco II that she was driving rolled over on June 9, 1986. The rollover occurred after Denny slammed on her brakes to avoid a deer that had walked directly into the vehicle's path.
The Bronco II was a downsized small utility vehicle designed for off-road use on unpaved and rugged terrain. Ford marketed the vehicle as suitable for commuting, suburban and city driving, and family use in snow and ice.
Denny and her spouse sued Ford Motor Co. asserting claims for negligence, strict products liability and breach of implied warranty of merchantability under UCC 2-314(2)(c) and 2-318. The case went to trial in the District Court for the Northern District of New York in October of 1992.
Plaintiffs introduced evidence that the Bronco II had a high center of gravity, narrow track width and short wheel base that made it prone to rollover on paved roads. Ford introduced evidence that those design features were necessary to the vehicle's off-road capabilities and that it had not been designed primarily as a passenger car.
The jury found that the Bronco II was not defective under the strict products liability claim but that Ford had breached the implied warranty of merchantability and that the breach proximately caused Nancy Denny's injuries. Following apportionment the plaintiff was awarded judgment in the amount of $1.2 million.
Ford moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) arguing that the verdicts were irreconcilable. The trial court rejected the motion. On appeal the Second Circuit certified three questions of New York law to this Court.
Lessor provided security services without written promise. After assignment of the leasehold the new landlord ceased the service. Tenant sued to enforce the security obligation that had been implied by the original parties' course of dealing.
Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co.801 F.2d 1001 (1986)
In 1979 Nexxus Products Company, a California corporation that formulates and markets hair care products, negotiated with Best Barber & Beauty Supply Company, Inc., a Texas corporation in the business of distributing beauty and hair care products to retail stores, barber shops and beauty salons throughout Texas.
Between March and July 1979 Mark Reichek, Best’s president, negotiated with Stephen Redding, Nexxus’ vice-president, over a possible distribution agreement between Best and Nexxus. This resulted in an August 2, 1979 distributorship agreement executed in the form of a July 24, 1979 letter from Reichek to Redding under which Best would serve as the exclusive distributor of Nexxus hair care products to barbers and hair stylists throughout most of Texas except El Paso.
The July 24, 1979 letter set forth pricing terms, Nexxus’s agreement to underwrite training and seminars, payment by letter of credit, and termination provisions allowing cancellation only on the anniversary date with 120 days’ prior notice and requiring Nexxus to buy back inventory at cost if it terminated the relationship.
In July 1981 Sally Beauty Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alberto-Culver Company, acquired Best in a stock purchase transaction and merged Best into Sally Beauty, which succeeded to Best’s rights and interests in all contracts; Alberto-Culver is a major manufacturer of hair care products and a direct competitor of Nexxus.
Shortly after the merger Stephen Redding met with Michael Renzulli, president of Sally Beauty, and wrote a letter stating that Nexxus would not allow Sally Beauty to distribute its products because Sally Beauty was wholly owned by a direct competitor.
In August 1983 Sally Beauty commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Northern District of Illinois, claiming that Nexxus had violated the federal antitrust laws and breached the distribution agreement. Nexxus moved for summary judgment on the breach claim. The district court granted the motion on January 31, 1985. The remaining claims were dismissed by stipulation in May 1985, and final judgment was entered on the breach of contract claim.
Landlord supplied HVAC maintenance throughout the lease term. Upon transfer of the building the purchaser discontinued service. Tenant sued the successor to enforce the maintenance obligation implied from the original transaction facts.
Seaver v. Ransom224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918)
Judge Beman and his wife were advanced in years. Mrs. Beman was about to die. She had a small estate consisting of a house and lot in Malone and little else. Judge Beman drew his wife’s will according to her instructions. It gave $1,000 to plaintiff, $500 to one sister, plaintiff’s mother, and $100 each to another sister and her son, the use of the house to her husband for life, remainder to the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. She named her husband as residuary legatee and executor. Plaintiff was her niece, thirty-four years old, in ill health, sometimes a member of the Beman household.
When the will was read to Mrs. Beman she said that it was not as she wanted it; she wanted to leave the house to plaintiff. She had no other objection to the will, but her strength was waning and although the judge offered to write another will for her, she said she was afraid she would not hold out long enough to enable her to sign it. So the judge said if she would sign the will he would leave plaintiff enough in his will to make up the difference. He avouched the promise by his uplifted hand with all solemnity and his wife then executed the will.
When he came to die it was found that his will made no provision for the plaintiff.
This action was brought and plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court on the theory that Beman had obtained property from his wife and induced her to execute the will in the form prepared by him by his promise to give plaintiff $6,000, the value of the house.
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment by a return to the general doctrine laid down in Lawrence v. Fox. The Court of Appeals of New York granted review and affirmed the judgment.
Landlord had always handled snow removal under a silent lease. After selling the property the new owner refused removal. Tenant sued to enforce the snow-removal duty inferred from the prior landlord's consistent conduct.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373
Interactive Data Corporation hired John Foley in June 1976 as an assistant product manager at a starting salary of $18,500. As a condition of employment Foley signed a confidential and proprietary information agreement. The company's president told Foley that if he performed his job well he would have a long and rewarding employment with the firm.
Over the next six years and nine months Foley received steady salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evaluations, rising to branch manager of the Los Angeles office with an annual salary of $56,164 plus a merit bonus. In January 1983 Foley learned that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former employer, Bank of America. Foley reported the information to Vice President Richard Earnest because he was worried about working for Kuhne in a supervisory position.
Earnest told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. In early March 1983 Kuhne informed Foley that the company had decided to replace him for performance reasons and offered a transfer to another division. Foley was later told he could continue as branch manager if he agreed to a performance plan, but when Kuhne met with him the next day Kuhne instead gave Foley the choice of resigning or being fired. Foley was discharged on March 13, 1983.
Foley filed suit against Interactive Data Corporation alleging three causes of action: tortious discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate only for good cause, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court sustained the company's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review.
How does an implied promise arise in a lease when the writing is silent?
An implied promise arises when the facts and circumstances of the lease transaction show that the parties understood a particular performance to be part of the bargain. The original landlord's consistent provision of a service without separate charge, combined with rent levels reflecting that cost, supports finding the promise. The promise then binds successors exactly as an express covenant would.
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Does an implied promise require words or can conduct alone create it?
Conduct alone can create the promise. The original landlord's repeated performance of a service not mentioned in the lease, together with the surrounding circumstances of the tenancy, supplies the factual basis from which the promise is inferred.
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What effect does an implied promise have after a transfer of the leasehold interest?
The implied promise is treated identically to an express promise. Its burden and benefit therefore pass with the transferred interest according to the same rules that govern express covenants.
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Can an implied promise supply consideration in an otherwise one-sided contract?
Yes. When one party receives an exclusive right and the other receives only a share of profits, the law infers a promise to use reasonable efforts to generate those profits, preventing the arrangement from being illusory.
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implied promise
, the transaction cannot have such business “efficacy as both parties must have intended that at all events it should have” (Bowen, L. J., in The Moorcock , 14 P. D. 64, 68). But the…