Also known as: bonis defuncti · estate of the deceased
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A designation for property rights or interests located among the assets of a deceased person. The phrase identifies claims such as dower or curtesy that attach to the estate of a deceased spouse and are measured as though the deceased had held fee simple absolute, subject to any executory interests or possibilities of reverter that limited the original estate.
Ike Ingram held a fee tail estate in a downtown building limited to professional-office use, with a possibility of reverter in Alicia. After Ike's death his surviving spouse Ivy Ibarra sought a dower interest measured as fee simple. Alicia's reverter became possessory when a sublease altered the use, so Ivy's claim among the assets of the deceased yielded.
Elena held a fee tail in her studio subject to an executory interest in the City of Biloxi if artistic use ceased. After Elena's death her surviving spouse Kevin petitioned for curtesy calculated as though she had held fee simple. The executory interest remained contingent because artistic use continued, allowing Kevin's claim to attach among the assets of the deceased.
The decedent held a fee simple conditional in a test track that would revert if automotive testing stopped. After death the surviving spouse Bryce asserted a life estate measured as fee simple absolute. Because the testing-use condition had never been breached, Bryce's interest attached among the assets of the deceased without triggering the reverter.
A media mogul held a fee tail in a broadcast campus subject to an executory interest in Mountain Publishing if title left the bloodline. After the mogul's death the surviving spouse Aidan sought a life estate measured as fee simple. Recognition of Aidan's claim among the assets of the deceased would have activated the executory interest, giving Mountain Publishing the superior right.
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child. Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
View caseThe decedent held a fee tail in a family studio that would pass only to heirs of the body. After death the surviving spouse sought curtesy measured as fee simple absolute. Because the spouse was not a lineal descendant, the claim among the assets of the deceased remained subordinate to the executory limitation in favor of the City of Biloxi.
In January 1993, Lauren Woodward and her husband Warren Woodward, who had been married for approximately three and one-half years and remained childless, learned that Warren had leukemia. The couple arranged for a quantity of Warren's semen to be medically withdrawn and preserved through a process known as sperm banking before he began treatment. Warren underwent an unsuccessful bone marrow transplant and died in October 1993, after which Lauren was appointed administratrix of his estate. In October 1995, Lauren gave birth to twin girls who had been conceived through artificial insemination using Warren's preserved semen. In January 1996, she applied to the Social Security Administration for child's insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) and mother's benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1). The SSA denied the claims on the ground that the twins were not the husband's children within the meaning of the Act. In February 1996, while pursuing appeals from the SSA denial, Lauren filed a complaint for correction of birth record in the Probate and Family Court against the clerk of the city of Beverly, seeking to add Warren as the father on the twins' birth certificates. In October 1996, a Probate Court judge entered a judgment of paternity based on stipulations of voluntary acknowledgment of parentage and ordered the birth certificates amended to declare Warren the children's father. An administrative law judge conducted a de novo hearing. The judge concluded that the children did not qualify for benefits because they were not entitled to inherit from Warren under Massachusetts intestacy and paternity laws. The SSA appeals council affirmed that decision. Lauren appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court certified the question regarding the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children under Massachusetts intestacy law to the Supreme Judicial Court because the parties agreed that a determination under state law was dispositive and no directly applicable precedent existed.
View caseAn heir held a fee tail in an automotive test track subject to a possibility of reverter if testing ceased. After death the surviving spouse asserted a life estate measured as fee simple. Continuous testing use kept the reverter dormant, so the spouse's interest attached among the assets of the deceased without divesting the founding family's future interest.
Edward Moragne was a longshoreman employed by Gulf Florida Terminal Company. On April 23, 1967, he was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in the Port of Miami, Florida. A beam supporting hatch covers fell on him during the stowage of a cargo of fertilizer. Petitioner, his widow and representative of his estate, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the vessel owner. She sought damages for wrongful death and for pain and suffering prior to death. The claims rested on theories of both negligence and unseaworthiness. States Marine removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. It filed a third-party complaint against Gulf Florida Terminal Company. The complaint asserted that any negligence or unseaworthiness resulted from Gulf's stevedoring operations. Both defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful-death claim based on unseaworthiness. The District Court dismissed the unseaworthiness portion of the complaint, citing The Tungus v. Skovgaard, and certified the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Florida wrongful-death statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.01, encompassed unseaworthiness. The state court answered in the negative. On return to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the dismissal. Earlier related proceedings in state court had produced an affirmance by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 236 So. 2d 80, and denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court, 239 So. 2d 829. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe phrase identifies the assets against which the surviving spouse's dower or curtesy is measured. The interest is calculated as though the deceased had held fee simple absolute, yet it remains subordinate to any executory interest or possibility of reverter that restricted the original estate.
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No. Once the reverter or executory interest becomes possessory, the surviving spouse's claim among the assets of the deceased is defeated because the governing rule expressly subordinates dower or curtesy to that future interest.
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The interest attaches when the deceased held a qualifying estate such as a fee tail or fee simple conditional and the surviving spouse satisfies the marital-status requirement. Attachment is measured by fee-simple standards but never overrides a still-effective executory limitation or reverter.
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…different. Under Louisiana law, all illegitimate children, "natural" and "bastard," were entitled to support from the estate of the deceased parent. 401 U. S., at 534 n. 2. Despite these differences, it is apparent that we have examined the Illinois statute more critically than the Court examined the Louisiana statute in…